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PREFACE 
This paper provides an authoritative and up to date picture of the 
State of the European Economic Community's (EC) Conunon Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The paper is largely descriptive and gives an 
infonnative account of how the CAP has evolved to the present time and 
the major dilemma the EC now faces over the CAP. 
The paper was written by Dr 
agricultural economist from Europe and 
AERU for a period of a year. 
E.A. Attwood, a distinguished 
Visiting Research Fellow in the 
Dr Attwood has held positions at Cambridge University, and the 
University of Wales before moving to Ireland to head the Farm 
Management Department and the Agricultural Economics and Marketing 
Department at An Foras Taluntais. In 1968 he was seconded to the Irish 
Department of Agriculture to establish an Economics Unit. He now heads 
this Unit and holds the position of the Chief Economist in the 
Department of Agriculture. 
Dr Attwood is well qualified to comment on the CAP. He was 
engaged in the detailed assessment of the economic benefits of Irish 
entry to the EEC before 1973. Since that time he has been closely 
involved with the CAP and has been Chairman of a number of EEC Council 
working parties during the periods of Irish Presidency of the Council. 
(ix) 
P.D. Chudleigh 
Director 

SUMMARY 
The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community has its 
roots in the economic, social and political situation of Europe in the 
mid 1950's, when over a quarter of the population lived and worked on 
farms and when the memory of food shortages of the decade earlier was 
still vivid. The CAP has been constructed on the basis of three 
fundamental principles: 
(a) Market Unity involving common management and support prices 
throughout the Community 
(b) Community Preference over external supplies 
(c) Financial Solidarity under which the costs of the CAP are met 
from the Community budget 
These principles have come under increasing pressure as new 
production technology has fuelled a growth in output far beyond the 
needs of the internal Community market and commercial export 
opportunities. This has led to a new approach by the Commission to 
these problems involving a system of production management to 
complelt1ent the existing market management system. This has been 
initiated to bring a better balance between supply and demand for the 
main farm commodities and in order to control the growth in the 
budgetary costs of the present policies. 
The agricultural and economic situation within the Community is 
one of great diversity and of rapid change. Hhile agriculture now 
contributes 3.5 per cent of the total Net Domestic Product at factor 
cost, this involves 7.5 per cent of the total Community labour force. 
This relationship between the economic product from agriculture (after 
allowing for the various measure of price supports) and the labour 
force engaged in its production has deteriorated over the past decade 
and this is an essential part of the consequent political problems that 
have arisen. This deterioration has occurred in spite of the 5.7 per 
cent fall in the number of people on the land in the past 20 years. 
Furthermore the real terms of trade in agriculture have fallen by 15 
per cent since 1973, and this fall has continued into 1984. 
France is the biggest single producer of farm products in the 
Community and agriculture plays a leading part in the economic policy 
of the French Government even though this sector now contributes only 
3.6 per cent to total Net Domestic product in France. The next largest 
agricultural country is Italy, which still bas two and a half million 
people working in farming many of them on small non-viable holdings. 
The main Italian concern in the operation of the CAP is that most of 
the price support measures help the richer farmers in NOrthern Europe, 
while the smaller farmers in the south receive little benefit from the 
Community. Germany and the U.K. have agricultural sectors that 
generate less than 2 per cent of the Net Domestic Product of these 
countries and their attitude towards the CAP has become increasingly 
concerned with its cost (though both countries have been anxious to get 
(xi) 
what they can for their own farmers from that Policy). The smaller 
European countries represent the wide range in European agriculture, 
with efficient farming particularly in the Netherlands and Denmark and 
large numbers of poor non-viable farms in Ireland and Greece, with 
these latter two countries in particular looking to the CAP to help 
resolve the economic problems of their farmers. 
Although the average size of farm in the Community is only 18 ha 
with over 40 per cent of farms of less than 5 ha, farming in Europe has 
undergone a technical and economic revolution in the last 20 years. 
This has involved increasing specialisation and intensification and an 
increase in output per man in real terms of over 70 per cent in the 
last decade (compared with a growth of less than 20 per cent in 
industry). Even so the average size of individual farm enterprises is 
still small :7.6 acres in the case of cereals, 1 ha for potatoes, 15 
cows in the case of dairy herds, 87 animals in the case of sheep (and 
only 46 if the U.K. is excluded), and 35 animals in the case of pig 
enterprises. 
The attempts to improve the efficiency of European farming through 
an effective structures policy has Inet with great difficulties, both 
from within the farming sector where modernisation is beyond the reach 
of the weaker farms and from the external economic environment, which 
has not provided the off-farm jobs needed to implement action within 
the fanning sector. A new structures policy, involving much more 
budgetary resources has been proposed, with greater emphasis on the 
problems of the small farmer, but in the absence of new off-farm 
employment opportunities, the effectiveness of this new policy will be 
severely limited. 
The paper then considers the current EC situation of the main 
cOffilllodities of concern to New Zealand - Dairying, Sheepmeat and Beef 
(wool is not a product coming vlithin the ambit of the Common 
Agricultural Policy but is treated as a ra~" material for the industrial 
sector). On the production side, the dairying sector has seen an 
increase in the rate of growth of output far beyond the available 
commercial and food aid outlets, even though only 12 per cent of the 
dairy herds are above the 30 cow minimum required for a viable 
enterprise by European standards. Over 1.5 m dairy farmers have ceased 
milk production over the past decade, but cow numbers have been 
constant and better yields have been the source of output growth. The 
operation of the organisation of the market for dairy products under 
the CAP involves a very detailed set of market intervention measures, 
but these have failed to avoid the growth of an unsaleable surplus of 
dairy products. 
The internal consumption of dairy products including liquid milk 
has virtually stabilised at 86m tonnes milk equivalent, and the 
Community has now taken steps to reduce milk production to 97.2m tonnes 
thus providing around 11m tonnes to meet export outlets. The effects 
of these measures have yet to be seen, but they are likely to have some 
adverse effects on dairy farmers' incomes in the COffilllunity. 
The situation in the sheepmeat sector is very different from that 
in dairying; much of the production comes from areas where farm incomes 
are particularly low and where support has been given for social and 
(xii) 
conservation reasons. The Community has a net deficit in sheepmeat of 
around 250,000 tonnes. This is projected by the Commission to fall to 
around 200,000 tonnes in the latter part of the 1980's, but will 
require an increase in consumption higher than that over recent years 
and in production at a rate less than half that which has occurred 
since 1970. If recent trends in consumption and production are 
sustained, the Community's sheepmeat deficit could fall to under 
100,000 tonnes. The common organisation of the market for sheepmeat 
was not finally agreed until 1980; the essential dichotomy of a low 
priced "everyday" sheepmeat market in the UK and the high priced 
"luxury" market in France still being unresolved. The sheepmeat regime 
has required a substantial volume of funds from the Community budget 
and limited steps have been taken to reduce the costs involved. The 
prospect of further increases in supply, particularly if farmers move 
resources into sheep production out of enterprises where growth is 
deliberately curtailed, could lead to problems of disposal similar to 
those for other farm products already in structural surplus. 
Beef production is one of the most common farm enterprises in the 
EC. Production has been expanding in recent years primarily due to the 
upward trend in slaughter weights and the higher proportion of total 
cattle numbers slaughtered. The longer term growth of production of 
between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent per annum has led to a surplus of 
0.4m tonnes over the static consumption of some 6.6m tonnes. This 
surplus has been disposed of with the payment of export refunds 
(subsidies), and these have been reflected in the rapid growth of 
budgetary expenditure on beef and veal. The problems of production 
surpluses and the consequential budgetary costs have led to limited 
steps to reduce the degree of support under the common organisation of 
the market for beef, but the measures taken so far are likely to have 
only very little impact on the supply position in the Community. Unless 
more vigorous steps are taken the surplus problems could become luore 
serious. 
The major debate on the CAP outside the Community has been on the 
effects on world trade in farm products. The instruments to regulate 
EC farm trade are levies on imports (and occasionally on exports), 
duties on imports and subsidies on exports. The duties express the 
degree of Community Preference in farm products, while the export 
subsidies are paid in order to encourage traders to sell Community 
products on external markets, and are fixed in relation to the prices 
prevailing on those markets. A considerable part of the agricultural 
imports into the EC are bound under the GATT code, but trade is 
affected by protectionist policies involving non-tariff barriers which 
limit the effectiveness of trade negotiations. 
The concern of non-member states has been expressed most 
vigorously by the US, which has objected particularly to the effects of 
the CAP on both internal demand and on the world market for food 
through subsidised competition and the insulation of the Community 
producers from the adjustments signalled by the international market 
mechanism. However the EC Commission has drawn attention to the 
effects of US policy, especially monetary policy, on the international 
performance of US agriculture. Trade policy cannot be isolated from 
the consequences of agricultural policy and the factors which shape 
that policy. While long-term adjustment policies will help to resolve 
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the existing social and economic difficulties of smaller farmers in 
Europe, the current budgetary difficulties may well have a more direct 
impact. 
Within the Community the development of the CAP had, until 
recently, been dominated by the question of farm incomes. After 
substantial improvements in the early years of the CAP, the underlying 
trend in per capita farm incomes in real terms has been downwards, in 
spite of the very sharp decline in the numbers of farmers. This farm 
income decline has been particularly evident in France and Germany and 
this has had a significant effect on their policy decisions in relation 
to the CAP. One of the problems that has been of particular concern is 
that of inflation, and the European parliament has criticised the 
conclusion of the Commission that member states with high inflation 
have not suffered from a low rate of increase in agricultural incomes 
in nominal terms. 
It is not easy to explain or justify the concern of the Community 
with the farm income problem, given the high unemployment in recent 
years and the associated problems of urban society in Europe. While 
consumers are a far larger group numerically than fanners, their 
strength as a pressure group has been of little significance compared 
with the farmers lobby. The present level of support for agriculture 
is partly a result of the present parliamentary situation in a number 
of European countries. 
The operation of the CAP has been made difficult by the problems 
of adjusting to currency exchange rate changes. A policy of full 
adjustment \",ould create substantial changes in the prices of farm 
products; to avoid such changes a system of special agricultural (or 
green) exchange rates has been operated for countries devaluing or 
revaluing their currencies. This system has involved a special set of 
monetary charges or payments (monetary compensatory amounts) on trade 
in fBrm products of the countries concerned. While these MCA's were 
originally intended as a short-term temporary arrangement to allow a 
gradual transition to the new market exchange rates, these temporary 
solutions have often been of a long-term virtually permanent character. 
Under these circumstances the system of MCAs has become a factor 
distorting the operation of the CAP. Considerable efforts have been 
made to resolve the problem. The most recent attempt was made at the 
Council meetings to fix the 1984/5 agricultural prices; this will 
involve the creation of a special green ECU (the basic currency unit of 
the Community) and a substantial additional cost to the Community 
budget. Whether this will be the long-term solution to the problem is 
still far from certain. 
The budget situation itself has become the major issue in the 
current operation and future development of the Community. The current 
(1984) expenditure programme will not be possible unless additional 
financial resources can be agreed, or a considerable reduction is made 
in some of the progralilmes in operation at present. The provis ion of 
additional resources requires the unan~nous agreement of all member 
states; this will be most difficult to achieve in the face of the 
widely differing interests within the Community. While the Community 
in theory does not have the power to borrow to meet its current 
budgetary expenditure, this prohibition could be overcome if some 
(xiv) 
suitable procedure could be found to which all member states could 
subscribe. 
The underlying cause of the current financial crisis has arisen 
largely from the rapid increase in expenditure on the CAP, which has 
grown twice as rapidly as the Community's own resources. Proposals to 
raise the financial resources of the Community face considerable 
opposition from the net contributing member states. The Commission has 
proposed that the financial burden should be 'modulated' according to 
the level of prosperity of the different countries and to their degree 
of dependence on agriculture. The difficulties of reaching an 
agreement are increased by the role of the European Parliament, which 
has a greater influence in budgetary matters than in the other aspects 
of Community policy. 
The budgetary crisis and the grave imbalance between the supply 
and market outlets for a number of major farm products has led to a 
series of attempts to reform the CAP. In addition to these factors, 
the future of the CAP will depend upon the income situation of farmers, 
the strength of new production technology and the trends in the 
resources in agriculture, particularly labour. The fall in farm 
incomes per head in real terms over the past decade has been 
accentuated by the growth in off-farm incomes (though this factor has 
been partially lessened by the growth in unemployment and the 
likelihood of serious employment difficulties lasting for many years to 
come). The benefits of a policy of direct income supplements to the 
poorest farmers led to a strong reaction particularly from the 
beneficiaries of the present system of aids through price support 
measures. There is little effective support for a policy that would 
replace price subsidies by direct income aids, and while some limited 
income aids are already provided it is unlikely that ·these would playa 
major role in the foreseeable future. 
The prospects for a better supply balance in the Community's 
internal market for farm products are handicapped by the likely decline 
in the growth of food consumption to no more than half the rate that 
prevailed over the past two decades. The growth of 0.25 per cent in 
internal consumption to 1990 will only account for a small part of the 
underlying upward trend in production, which has averaged 1.5 per cent 
to 2 per cent over recent years. This situation has led to proposals 
to limit, still further, access to the Community market for external 
suppliers. 
The attempts by the Commission to hold agricultural spending to 
its 1983 level in order to reduce the pressures in the budget have been 
over-ruled by the Council of Hinisters, which at the 1984/5 Price 
Agreement raised the costs of the CAP by a further 2b ECU. The funds 
for this extra expenditure are likely to be very difficult to obtain, 
even though they amount to a small proportion of the total GDP of the 
Community. 
The forces towards expanding farm output in Europe are still very 
strong. The effects of new technology, capital investment and 
structural reform will continue in the future. At the same time the 
decline in the total number working on farms has been slackening; this 
decline has been a major factor in improving per capita incomes and its 
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slowdown will exacerbate the farm income problem. 
The key decisions however are those on prices. In fixing prices, 
Ministers for Agriculture are primarily concerned with the farmers' 
income problem but prices have other functions, particularly that of 
market clearing in the short term and the guiding of production 
decisions in the longer term. It is the low priority given to these 
two latter roles which is at the root of much of the problems of the 
CAP today. 
The economic pressures for a reform of the CAP have come up 
against a 
political reaction which has involved a lengthy list of factors to be 
taken into account in any future developments. The Commission has put 
special emphasis on the rationalisation of the market organisation for 
the main agricultural products, with a series of proposals for 
guarantee thresholds beyond which producers would be more fully 
involved in the costs of disposal of surplus production. This system 
is already in existence in principle, but has had only very limited 
impact so far. The Council's reaction so far has been cautious, though 
it has brought in a super levy on surplus milk production which will go 
a considerable way to reduce the severe imbalance in the EC dairy 
market. Limitations brought about by guarantee thresholds may, 
however, result in greater output of the remaining unlimited products; 
an example is sheepmeat where the present supply deficit from Community 
sources is regarded as a justification for expansionist production 
policies. If these policies are accompanied by measures to limit 
consumer subsidies then there is a real danger of the growing supply of 
sheepmeat to be accompanied by a declining level of consumption. A 
comparable situation already exists on the Community beef market, where 
the increasing production surplus has already given rise to measures to 
reduce the current budgetary costs of support for beef. For other 
products, particularly cereals, the large surplus of Community 
production has led to proposals to reduce the gap between Community 
prices and those of its main external competitors, but accompanied by 
greater limitations on the imports of cereal substitutes. More 
restrictive import policies will however generate very strong 
opposition, particularly from the US. 
The effects that the measures to limit supplies will have on farm 
incomes should be seen in the context of the Community economy in 
virtual stagnation and suffering from growing unemployment. Even in 
this context and given the size of the budgetary burden, there is 
little evidence of the radical realignment of farm prices called for by 
the president of the Commission. The need for a new set of positive 
and realistic guidelines for the CAP has not yet led to any fundamental 
change in its basic objectives or mechanisms. 
The consequences of a continuation of the essential elements of 
the CAP for New Zealand are very serious. In contrast to the situation 
in the EC, agriculture has shown a remarkable capacity to maintain its 
contribution to the New Zealand Gross Domestic product. However this 
has involved a decline in the output and inputs of agriculture in New 
Zealand, and a v,ery slow growth in the Gross Domestic product itself 
over the past decade. In spite of all the expenditure on the CAP, 
average farm incomes in New Zealand remain substantially above those in 
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the Community, even though New Zealand sheep and dairy farmers have 
seen their incomes fall sharply over the past five years. 
Export earnings from agriculture have remained at close to 70 per 
cent of total export earnings in recent years in New Zealand, compared 
with less than 10 per cent in the Community. The EC market for New 
Zealand sheepmeat will come under increasing pressure from the growth 
in Community production. In the case of dairy products, the 
difficulties facing New Zealand in the EC market are primarily a 
consequence of the extraordinary growth in UK output and the decline in 
UK consumption. It is likely that this would have occurred to a 
substantial degree even in the absence of Community membership - though 
policies under the CAP have certainly exacerbated the difficulties. 
Trade difficulties, not only in the dairying sector but for other 
products, will continue to affect relations between the European 
Community and other countries. The political and economic pressures 
which affect these relationships are likely to be of greater benefit to 
third world countries, the US and non-EC European countries than to 
advanced agricultural countries such as New Zealand, in spite of the 
general goodwill that exists towards New Zealand in the Community. 
The dominant themes in the CAP today production constraints, 
small price increases and greater spending on farm structures - will 
not resolve the current problems though these measures should prevent 
the situation becoming much worse. The policy of supply control is 
unlikely to be implemented with such rigour as to eliminate the present 
structural surpluses. Small price increases may well have only a 
limited impact, particularly in the case of products where prices are 
already high by world standards. The policy of more intensive action 
on farm structures could make the supply problem even worse and while 
this may bring social benefits it will not lead to any diminution of 
demands for higher protectionist measures against imports from outside 
the Community. 
Nothing in the current developments of the CAP holds out any 
relief for New Zealand at least in the short to medium term. What the 
longer-term effects may be is impossible to foresee, but the political 
and economic forces holding the Community together are very strong, and 
these necessarily involve a continuation of common policies for 
agriculture. In these circumstances New Zealand faces continued 
problems in its agricultural exports to the Community, whose own 
problems may increase the pressures against a more liberal trade policy 
so far as New Zealand is concerned. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The development and continued viability of the New Zealand economy 
is based on the competitiveness of the agricultural sector and the 
opportunities for sales of its output on the main world markets for 
food. This competitiveness of farming has continued to improve, 
primarily through a more efficient use of inputs rather than through 
any significant growth in total output, as the growth in output has 
been constrained by the problems of finding remunerative external 
markets. This problem has become of increasing complexity with the 
development of stronger protectionist policies in agricultural products 
in many areas of the world. This has been most evident in the case of 
the European Community (EC) where the Common Agricultural Policy has 
had a substantial impact on New Zealand's agriculture and therefore on 
the New Zealand economy as a whole. 
Agriculture in Europe, however, also faces major difficulties on 
its own domestic market, as the growth in output has created enormous 
problems of finding remunerative markets. The present study sets out 
to explain the underlying forces which have fashioned the evolution of 
the Common Agricultural Policy; the factors which are dominating the 
current developments in that policy and which will continue to 
determine its course over the coming years. The basic horizon for the 
consideration of future events is the end of the present decade. Even 
that may be too long a period over which to project the economic social 
and political factors which shape the decisions taken by the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
The purpose of the study is to present a reasonably comprehensive, 
but not too detailed, account of the CAP and an assessment of its 
current development for New Zealand agriculture, in the hope that a 
better understanding of the European situation might help to contribute 
towards a solution of the economic difficulties between New Zealand and 
the Community. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ROLE OF THE C.A.P. 
2.1 CAP as a Political Instrument 
The framework for the Common Agricultural Policy is set out in the 
basic treaty which set up the European Economic Community. The second 
section of that part of the Treaty of Rome setting out the 'Foundation 
of the Community' is concerned with agriculture (the first section 
deals with the free movement of goods); this section precedes the parts 
concerned with economic policy, social policy, the financial provisions 
etc. The high priority accorded to agriculture reflected its 
importance in the European economy in the mid-fifties, when over a 
quarter of the population worked directly on farms. Its continued 
priority in the affairs of the Community, when its farm labour force 
has fallen to only 7 per cent of total employment, is a remarkable 
testimony to the political strength of that labour force. 
It would be useful at the outset to draw attention to the direct 
connection between 'policy' and 'political'. Policy has been defined 
as "political sagacity" and as "course of action adopted by Government, 
party etc", while political has been defined as "of the State or the 
Government" and as "of public affairs". The Common Agricultural Policy 
both in its general formulation, and even more so in its day-to-day 
operation, is a course of action adopted by Governments as a result of 
political considerations. While this is entirely appropriate in a 
democratic society, it does not mean that the actions involved are 
necessarily well founded or sensible in terms of the needs of European 
society as a whole. 
However, an explanation of the priority given to the agricultural 
sector in the affairs of the European Community solely in terms of the 
political strength of the farmers of Europe is clearly inadequate. The 
appropriation of over 60 per cent of the total EC budget for a sector 
in which only a small proportion of the population is employed cannot 
be entirely explained in terms of the political strength of that part 
of the population, even if it is extremely well organised to use its 
political muscle. A further reason must underline the decisive role of 
agriculture in the affairs and development of the European Community. 
It has been suggested that the reason for this is basically related to 
the demand for and the supply of farm produce. Farmers produce goods 
which are a basic human want and, rightly or wrongly, there seems to be 
an innate concern that without market intervention supplies of a 
commodity could become erratic and so become scarce. Whether or not 
this explanation is adequate, agriculture has ~emained a dominant issue 
in the affairs of the Community since its inception. 
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2.2 Evolution of the CAP 
The need for a common policy in agriculture arises from the very 
first set of principles in the Treaty of Rome, "by establishing a 
common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of 
member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to 
it". This "harmonious development of economic activities" was to be 
achieved through the elimination, as between Member States, of customs 
duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of 
goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect. For this to 
be achieved it was essential that the different policies in the 
agricultural sector would be unified, so that a single market for farm 
products could be created within the Community. 
There were, however, very wide differences between the 
agricultural sectors of the different member States when the Community 
was first established, both in the relative importance of the 
agricultural sector in the respective national economies and in the 
productivity of agriculture in the different countries. These 
differences in agricultural conditions were in sharp contrast to the 
industrial sector, where there was a much greater degree of uniformity. 
Yet, in spite of these great differences between the agricultural 
sectors of the six original member states, there was agreement on one 
cardinal point; without a policy of government subsidies, incomes in 
agriculture would everywhere lag behind those in industry. 
Such a disparity was no longer acceptable. For many years the 
authorities everywhere in Europe had intervened to ensure adequate 
incomes in agriculture. They had intervened not only in the field of 
farm prices and incomes but frequently also in the production and 
distribution mechanism. In this way each of the six countries had 
built up its own agricultural system, a development which did not 
always run on parallel lines. However, the problems inherent in 
integrating the agricultural policies of the different member States 
was recognised as early as the late 1950's when Dr Mansholt, then Vice 
President of the European Commission with responsibility for the 
agricultural sector, drew attention to the danger of being caught up in 
a vicious circle. On the one hand there was the economic, social and 
political need to improve the income of persons engaged in agriculture 
and therefore to strive for a higher degree of productivity, and on the 
other hand it was inevitable that by achieving greater productivity, 
and especially by demanding higher prices, the limit for the sales of 
foodstuffs would eventually be reached. Unfortunately this warning by 
Mansholt was insufficiently heeded and the limitations he predicted 
have become of major concern. 
The original objectives of the CAP were set out in detail at a 
conference of agricultural experts which met in Stresa, in Italy, in 
1958. These objectives have been summarised as: 
1. to expand trade in agricultural products between member countries 
and with third countries and to eliminate all internal 
quantitative restrictions, 
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2. to maintain a close correlation between structures and market 
policies, 
3. to achieve a balance between supply and demand of farm products 
avoiding the encouragement of surpluses and glvlng scope to the 
principles of comparative advantage of each region, 
4. to eliminate all subsidies tending to distort competition between 
one country or region and another, 
5. to improve the rate of return on capital and labour, 
6. to preserve the family structure of farming, 
7. to encourage rural 
to surplus labour 
disadvantaged areas. 
industrialisation in order to give employment 
and to give special aid to geographically 
So far as the Stresa conference was concerned, the primary 
objectives of European farm policy were seen as the maintenance of the 
family character of farming while increasing the efficiency of such 
enterprises. However, the concept of "the family farm" covers a wide 
range of farming situations in Europe, from the large scale arable 
farms of the Paris basin to the small peasant holdings in some of the 
poorest regions of Southern Europe. These farms while all categorised 
as "family farms", are so diverse in their basic economic 
characteristics that they are in reality quite different economic and 
social units. The major focus on improving the efficiency of European 
farming, in order to bring reasonable parity between incomes in 
agriculture and those in other occupations, has not allowed 
sufficiently for the great diversity of farming within Europe. The 
rapid growth in the European economy was seen as providing a massive 
opportunity to move farm labour, especially on the small, low output 
farms, into more economically productive activities. The expectation 
was that the output per head in agriculture could be increased by 
positive action towards increasing total farm output, while 
simultaneously reducing the amount of labour employed. While it was 
recognised that a greater output would have to be directed towards ne\J 
outlet possibilities, there was a general belief that the growth in the 
European rnarket itself would generate greater sales opportunities and 
that trade and distribution of farm products could be organised on a 
larger scale and therefore more efficiently. In the longer run, it was 
anticipated that the consumer would benefit from all this by lower 
prices, which would stimulate consumption and in turn boost production. 
In the short run this proved to be realistic; in the long run the 
inherent contradictions have become virtually insoluble. 
2.3 Basic Principles 
The three principles which embody the underlying beliefs of the 
CAP are: 
(a) Market Unity: that there should be a single market for any 
commodity coming under the CAP, involving a common system of 
management and pricing throughout the Community. 
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(b) Community Preference: that producers inside the Community should 
be more favourably placed on the internal market than competing 
overseas suppliers. 
(c) Financial Solidarity: that there is a commitment by the Community 
to finance the budgetary requirements of the CAP. 
The basic aim in the implementation of the CAP so far as the 
different farm products are concerned has been to establish a managed 
market system. This involves the disposal of farm output on the 
domestic and export markets in a manner that would meet a series of 
different objectives (i.e. to stabilise markets, particularly the 
internal market, to provide an adequate level of income to producers, 
to assure the availability of supplies to consumers at reasonable 
prices, to limit the demands on the Community's budget etc.). These 
objectives are not complementary and there has inevitably been a 
growing measure of conflict between them. 
The philosophy of the managed market system has run into enormous 
problems, particularly those generated by the growth of farm output 
fuelled by the development of new production technology. The belief in 
the late 1950's that the consumer would benefit through lower prices, 
which would in turn stimulate consumption, has proved to be of very 
limited validity. The consequences of improved technology have not 
been absorbed by the growth of viable market outlets. Nor has the farm 
structural reform programme resolved this problem. The managed market 
approach has come under increasing pressure as the volume of supplies 
of farm products has grown without a corresponding growth in commercial 
markets. In the face of the general economic developments of the past 
decade, the European .Community has not been able to achieve a common 
response to the challenges it has faced. By political pressure, or by 
practical necessity, the Member States have found themselves assigning 
priority to widely differing economic objectives - employment, consumer 
prices, the balance of payments, etc. - and this has necessarily had an 
impact on the evolution of the CAP. 
Now that general economic growth in the Community has slowed down 
so sharply, there are far fewer opportunities for farmers and farm 
workers to find jobs outside agriculture. In fact, total employment in 
industry and services has been declining over recent years. More than 
12 m people in Europe are now out of work today, twice as many as there 
were just five years ago. Four young people in ten have no job. 
Rationalization of farming by streamlining the agricultural labour 
force is no longer the obviously desirable policy it was in the past, 
although the situation varies from member State to member State. 
Horeover, the member States in which the proportion of the labour force 
working in farming is highest (Ireland, 19.2 per cent; Italy, 14.2 per 
cent, (1980» and where rationalization is therefore most needed are 
the member States which have the largest reserves of manpower (the 
unemployment rate is over 16 per cent in Ireland and over 10.4 per cent 
in Italy). It is just these countries where it is hardest for farmers 
or farm workers to find alternative employment. 
This situation has not only slowed the process of rationalization 
of agriculture, but has reinforced the pressure to use agricultural 
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prices policy to support incomes on farms which normally would have 
disappeared from the market. In consequence, the objective of a prices 
policy based on a narrowing of the gap between Community prices and 
prices charged by its main competitors, as proposed by the Commission, 
has become increasingly difficult to achieve. 
2.4 New Approach to the Managed Market System 
The basic Commission thinking is now along the lines of a managed 
production system to complement the existing managed market 
arrangements. This has involved an attempt to reduce the growth of 
output by a prudent price policy i.e. a policy of declining real 
prices for farm products. For the years from 1977 to 1981, real prices 
(i.e. nominal prices paid to farmers deflated by the changes in prices 
paid by farmers for their inputs) declined by an average of 3 per cent 
per year. This had some effects in restraining the growth in farm 
output, at least enough to give some justification for the more 
favourable price settlement in 1982. However, this improvement on the 
supply/demand balance was only a temporary reprieve; with the upsurge 
in farm output in 1983, the pressure for a restrictive price policy to 
reduce the disequilibrium in the market for farm products has become 
far stronger. 
This prudent price policy approach has been reinforced by policies 
of producer coresponsibility levies. The details of how this has been 
implemented are discussed later but their essential character involves 
a reduction in the prices paid to farmers when a specified volume of 
output has been reached. The levy can and has been modified to exempt, 
wholly or in part, certain categories of producers, and thus tends to 
be a more flexible policy instrument in supporting farm incomes than 
direct price reductions. However, the impact of coresponsibility 
levies on food prices and the Community budget are different to those 
of straight price cuts; levies do not affect consumer prices while 
price cuts bring lower prices in the shops. 
The purpose of the coresponsibility levies (i.e. to require 
producers to contribute towards the disposal of surplus production) has 
been expressed much more forcibly in the Conwission's proposals in 1980 
to impose a supplementary levy on milk output (or 'super-levy' as it 
became known) which would fund all the costs of disposal of production 
in excess of a specific quota. This proposal was the subject of 
considerable debate in 1981 and again in 1983 but was not agreed by the 
Council of Ministers at this time; in consequence the output of milk 
grew very sharply in spite of the absence of any markets for this extra 
milk. The resurrection of this proposal again in 1984 came only after 
a large volume of additional dairy products had filled the cold stores 
of Europe and the pressure for meaningful action had become 
overwhelming. 
The failure to resolve the inherent contradictions in the 
operation of the managed market policies has resulted in mounting costs 
to the budget. It is a fundamental feature of the financial policy of 
the Community that budgetary expenditure must be balanced by actual 
receipts; the EC does not, at least in principle, have the power to 
borrow to meet increased levels of expenditure. Furthermore, the 
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powers to make additional 
severely constrained, such 
financial resources which 
difficulty. 
financial demands on member 
that there is in effect a 
can only be raised with 
States are 
ceiling on 
considerable 
In these circumstances, the burgeoning costs of the CAP, together 
with the rapid growth in other common policies of the Community, have 
generated a need to find effective solutions to the financial costs of 
the CAP, which remains the principal charge on the total Community 
budget. It is this financial pressure which has become the real 
dynamic behind the moves by the Council of Ministers to reform the CAP. 
There are of course other issues which have played their part in the 
proposals for this reform, but it is clear that these do not have the 
strength that the budgetary constraints now impose on the further 
development of the CAP and indeed on its current day-to-day operation. 
With all its problems, the CAP still plays a central part in the 
affairs of the Community. Ministers for Agriculture in the Community 
have powers far in excess of that which they could exercise 
individually within their own Governments. There is no doubt that this 
is in part the price which the more industrialised countries (e.g. 
Gennany and the UK) have to pay for the opening up of the domestic 
markets of the less industrialised member States. This price has now 
created major problems for the further development of the Community. 
The European Commission has said that the lack of common policies, or 
at the very least, the absence of harmonization of the policies 
determining the economic context in which the common agricultural 
policy is ever more closely involved, is liable not only to slow down 
the development of the CAP but also, in the long term, to pose a threat 
to it. 
Thus the future of the EC itself is bound up with the solution of 
the current problems arising from the CAP. There is an overwhelming 
view in Europe that these problems will be surmounted and that the 
Community will continue its progress towards .3 more unified European 
economy. This progress will inevitably be slowed by the magnitude of 
the problems to be overcome; the resolution of these problems, arlslng 
directly from the CAP, create their own friction within the Community. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY 
3.1 Role of Agriculture in the Economy of the Community 
The EC represents one of the world's largest agricultural 
producing and food consuming political entities. It is, however, far 
from homogeneous, either in terms of the physical, economic, and social 
circumstances of agriculture or in the food consumption patterns in the 
various parts of the Community. There have been enormous changes in 
the agricultural sector over the past two decades - changes which are 
far from over yet. 
Take first the main economic factors in relation to agriculture. 
In total, agriculture contributes about 3.2 per cent of total Net 
Domestic Product of the Community - varying from 1.3 per cent in 
Germany to over 17 per cent in Greece. A considerably higher 
proportion of the labour force is working in farming - about 7.5 per 
cent for the Community as a whole, varying from 2.5 per cent in the UK 
to 30 per cent in Greece. Part of the agricultural problem can be seen 
in these figures; as 7.5 per cent of the population are involved in a 
sector generating only 3.2 per cent of the production of the Community, 
there are bound to be large income problems, and especially a 
substantial gap between farm incomes and those in other sectors of the 
European economy. 
This relationship between people and product has not improved over 
the past decade. In 1983 some 8.3 per cent of the total population 
worked on farms and _produced 5.5 per cent of total Net Domestic 
product. Thus the decline in the proportion of Community G.N.P. coming 
from the agricultural sector has been faster than the decline in the 
labour force working in agriculture. This has meant that, in spite of 
all the support measures under the CAP, the ga.p between incomes in 
farming and those in the rest of the economy has widened still further. 
Yet at the same time the decline in the labour force has itself 
been sharp, particularly if a long-term view is taken. Employment in 
the agricultural sector fell from 19m in 1960 to 12m in 1970 and to 
8.2m in 1982 - an average loss of 1 job per minute over a 20 year 
period. This works out at just under 4 per cent per year over the 20 
years from 1960 to 1980, though this has fallen to nearer 3 per cent in 
recent years. The 8 m people currently employed in farming ,vork on 5 m 
farms which occupy 102m ha of agricultural land. Of the total area 
about half is under arable crops, somewhat less under permanent grass 
and the remainder under permanent crops (mainly vines and fruit trees). 
The main products are milk (20 per cent), beef (15 per cent), pigmeat 
(12 per cent), poultry and eggs (8 per cent) and, on the crop side, 
cereals (13 per cent). fruit and vegetables (11 per cent), wine (6 per 
cent), sugar beet .and potatoes (5 per cent). Thus just over one third 
of farm output is milk and beef, with 20 per cent from pigs and poultry 
and about 30 per cent from field crops. There is a wide variation 
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between member States - milk and beef account for 70 per cent of farm 
output in Ireland but only 13 per cent in Greece, pigmeat is nearly 30 
per cent of output in Denmark but only 7 per cent in Italy and France; 
cereal production accounts for over 18 per cent of output in both 
France and the U.K., but only 2 per cent in the Netherlands. 
Farm output has been growing at an annual average rate of 1.7 per 
cent between 1973 and 1981 and nearer 2 per cent if growth in 1982 and 
1983 is allowed for. However, this has required a faster rate of 
growth of purchased inputs, so that value-added in real terms has grown 
at just under 1.5 per cent a year. Coupled with the decline in the 
total farm labour force, output per man in volume terms has been 
growing by almost 6 per cent a year. Yet in spite of this growth, the 
farm income position has become more acute, not less so. 
The underlying reason for this farm income situation has been the 
adverse movement in the terms of trade for agriculture in the EC i.e. 
the ratio of agricultural producer prices to prices of purchased 
inputs. Over the years 1973 to 1982, the overall terms of trade facing 
European farmers worsened by about 15 per cent. The decline was 
particularly severe in France, Ireland and to a lesser extent the U.K., 
due mainly to the relatively high inflation rates in these countries 
and their effects on the level of input prices. This decline in the 
real prices paid to European farmers for their products has been an 
even more serious long-term problem over the period since the 1960's. 
From 1967/8 to 1980/1 the guaranteed farm prices under the CAP, in real 
terms (i.e. nominal farm prices deflated by the implicit price index of 
the G.D.P.) fell by an average of 4.5 per cent per year. This trend is 
likely to be maintained and possibly even accentuated in the current 
situation of the CAP. There is little in economic theory that can 
explain the level of supply response of European farmers in the face of 
the large price decline in real terms that has occurred; the concept of 
a backward sloping supply curve would appear to be a reality in the 
European agricultural situation, but it must be recognised that this 
has involved a substantial change in technology over the years in 
question and is not just a response to price changes. 
3.2 Agricultural Situation in the Individual Member States 
The biggest single producer of farm products is France, which 
accounts for just over a quarter of Community output - and over one 
third of cereal and wine output and around 30 per cent of beef and 
poultry output. The former French President, Mr Giscard d'Estaing has 
referred to agriculture as the "green oil" of France, as agriculture 
provides a substantial proportion of French export earnings. 
With over 1m farms, well over half of them less than 20 ha in 
size, French farmers have traditionally played a leading part in the 
agricultural politics of Europe. It has been generally held that part 
of the basic understanding on which the Community is based is that, in 
return for opening its frontiers to free trade on industrial products, 
the French economy would be compensated by way of better market access 
and price support measures under the Common Agricultural Policy. France 
is a substantial direct beneficiary from the EC budget and the fanning 
sector haR also enjoyed large gains from the system of Community 
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preference, which maintains internal prices of farm produce sold on the 
domestic European market well above the levels which would otherwise 
prevail. Although the contribution of agriculture to the French Net 
Domestic Product has declined to only 3.6 per cent, over 8 per cent of 
the population work in the agricultural sector. The French Government 
has constantly followed a policy of concern for the need to improve the 
position of these people. 
French agricuiture has made great strides in improving its arable 
sector. This is particularly the case in the Paris basin, whose 
farmers can compete with those of any other region in Europe. In the 
livestock sector progress has not been so evident; in dairying the 
average size of the dairy herd is still only 15 cows and nearly 40 per 
cent of French dairy herds are of less than 10 cows. In the case of 
pigs nearly two thirds of all producers have less than 10 animals and 
even in the case of cattle, where the French contribution to total 
Community output is substantial, the average size of herd is only 35 
animals. 
The second largest agricultural country in Europe is Italy, which 
accounts for just under 20 per cent of total Community output but has 
nearly 40 per cent of the total number of farms. Italian agriculture 
probably shows a greater range in the economic characteristics of its 
farms than any other EC member State. Many of the farms in the north 
are large commercial holdings. With the exception of the UK it has 
more of its cattle on farms with over 300 head than any other member 
state; the exception of Greece it also has more of its cattle on farms 
with no more than two animals. These very small units are to be found 
particularly in southern Italy, where smallholdings of no more than a 
few ha provide the main source of livelihood for very large numbers of 
families. In many cases, however, these small units are devoted to 
intensive cropping systems - vines, fruit, vegetables, olive oil, etc. 
- which are run with a relatively high labour input from the farmer and 
members of his family. Although Italy has two and a half million 
people working in farming i.e. 50 per cent more than in France, the 
Italian policy position in the Community has tended to be less dominant 
than that of France. The Italians have been particularly concerned 
that the mix of their agricultural output, with its emphasis on fruit 
and vegetables, wine, olive oil, tobacco, rice etc., has derived less 
benefit from the agricultural budget than that provided for northern 
European products. Moreover the lower output per farm in Italy 
compared with that in other European countries has meant that the 
absolute level of benefits per farmer from price supports from Brussels 
have tended to be relatively low. 
In recent years the balance of advantage has been partially 
restored with the introduction of a special Mediterranean package for 
fruit and vegetables and also a special structural package for 
improving farm structures which would give particular benefits to 
Italian producers. These would have their sharpest impact in Southern 
Italy, where output and income per farm are much lower than in the rest 
of Italy or in Europe generally. The Italian view has been, therefore, 
that rather than limit total Community spending, the Community should 
link its production aims more closely to the economic recovery of its 
weaker members. 
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The third biggest agricultural country in Europe is Germany which, 
like Italy, has an efficient farm sector in the north of the country 
but a less viable farm sector in the southern region. Agriculture, 
however, contributes less to total net domestic product in Germany than 
in any other member State; only 1.3 per cent of the output of the 
German economy comes from agriculture. German farmers are particularly 
concerned with producing cereals and sugarbeet in the cropping sector 
and pigmeat and milk in the livestock sector. The average German farm 
is of around 15 ha; 33 ha in the north but only about 10 ha in the 
south. German farming, particularly in the south, is characterised by 
a substantial number of part-time farmers where the farmer spends most 
of his working time outside the farm in a job which provides most of 
his income. The incidence of off-farm earnings has helped to mitigate 
the problem of low average incomes from farming and the very large gap 
between farm earnings and those in other sectors. 
This problem of the income gap has been seriously exacerbated by 
German exchange rate policy, where the strength of the Deutsch mark has 
led to constant revaluations of the currency with consequential 
downward pressures on German farm prices. These downward pressures 
have been partly mitigated by the operation of a system of "monetary 
compensatory amounts" which have maintained German prices above those 
in the rest of the Community. Even so the increase in producer prices 
for agricultural products, which has averaged only 2.2 per cent per 
year for the past decade, is only one quarter of the rate of increase 
in the Community as a whole. German policy consists of two opposing 
trends on the one hand as the main paymaster into the Community 
budget there has been growing concern at the direct costs to the German 
economy of the costs of the CAP; on the other hand the very difficult 
financial circumstances of many German farmers is still an important 
factor on the Gennan economic and political scene. This dichotomy in 
the German attitude to the CAP, together with its implicit recognition 
of the understanding with the French on the basic nature of the 
economic accord on which the Community is based, has tended to make the 
German impact on agricultural decisions in Brussels less emphatic than 
they might otherwise be. 
The 
cent 
the 
The fourth largest agricultural producer in Europe is the U.K. 
U.K. is in some ways comparable to Germany with just over 2 per 
of its total national output coming from agriculture. However, 
British have a much smaller proportion of their workforce on farms 
than in Germany and consequently a much better farm income situation. 
In general the size of the agricultural enterprises in the U.K. is much 
larger than in other European countries. For exarnple the average dairy 
herd is 56 cows or four times the European average and over two thirds 
of all dairy cows in the U.K. are in herds of over 60 cows. Similarly 
the average pig herd, at 270 animals, is 8 times larger than the 
average for the EC as a whole and nearly 80 per cent of the total pigs 
in the U.K. are in herds of over 400. The 600,000 people working on 
U.K. farms (farmers and farm workers) represent a little over 7 per 
cent of the total EC farm labour force but the U.K. accounts for 13.5 
per cent of total EC farm output. 
The U.K. agricultural sector has grown quite sharply under the 
stimulus of EC membership. In the last decade Britain has become much 
more self sufficient in temperate agricultural products. Twenty years 
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ago Britain imported half the grain it consumed - now it is a net grain 
exporter. Butter production has quadrupled, in spite of the sharp fall 
in consumption. The large average size of farm business has meant that 
the U.K. farmer has enjoyed substantial benefits under the Common 
Agricultural Policy. The fact that the U.K. is a net contributor to 
the Community budget has not prevented its agricultural sector from 
enjoying a considerable boost from EC policies. This has been 
accentuated by the fact that British farm prices, like the German, have 
been supported at an artificially high rate in recent years through the 
operation of the monetary compensatory amounts system. This means that 
U.K. policy is by no means as concerned with cheap food for its urban 
population as in the past, as the proportion of disposable income of 
the overwhelmingly urban society spent on food has declined with the 
increase in wealth. The major U.K. concern in the operation of the CAP 
has been and still is the cost to the U.K. exchequer. The pressures of 
low farm incomes are not especially strong in Britain but the fact that 
the U.K., with its national income per head below the EC average, is 
the second largest net contributor to the Community budget has given 
sharp focus to efforts to reduce expenditure on the CAP. The British 
farmer is in a better position to earn his income directly from the 
market place than is the case in most other countries, so that the CAP 
price support mechanism is less significant to British farm incomes 
than to those of their European counterparts. Moreover, the British 
Government has maintained certain aspects of their pre-EC deficiency 
payments system in operation e.g. in the beef and sheepmeat sectors, 
but with partial or complete funding from the Community budget, and 
they have been anxious to preserve these very beneficial arrangements 
for the British farmer. 
The six smaller EC countries account for a little over 20 per cent 
of total EC output. Here the range of farming situations is just as 
great as within the larger countries. The Dutch farmers with their 
emphasis on intensive production systems in both crop and livestock 
enterprises have achieved relatively high farm incomes by European 
standards. The Dutch view is that producing enough food is no longer 
for them a farming problem. The farming objective is to switch over to 
management methods which will ensure profitability in the future; this 
involves major decisions regarding the means of production i.e. land, 
labour and capital and in many cases making a choice between 
enlargement of the farm or specialization, mechanization or 
collaboration with others and new investment or giving up. 
The position of Belgian farming is similar to that in the 
Netherlands, except that there is a greater emphasis on beef and 
pigmeat, largely at the expense of dairying. Average farm size is the 
same in the two countries at around 15 ha, and these farms are run 
typically by the farmer and his wife with little or no additional 
labour. The position in Denmark is broadly similar, except that cereal 
production is far more important than vegetables and the livestock 
sector is dominated by milk and pigmeat. 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark are among the most prosperous 
countries of the EC; this has helped their agriculture through 
providing off-farm jobs, a high price market for quality food products 
and a relatively large amount of Government funds for farm education, 
research etc. In the last two years this has changed, with 
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unemployment growing rapidly in these countries, large fiscal deficits 
and static or even declining incomes outside agriculture. In spite of 
this, these countries are perhaps the most Community minded in their 
approach to agricultural policy and have generally been more concerned 
with the reasonable development of that policy rather than an exclusive 
emphasis on the particular needs of their own farmers. 
The last two member States to be considered are Ireland and 
Greece, which are geographically at the two ends of the Community. 
Both these countries have relatively large agricultural sectors; for 
them the direct benefits from the CAP have played a major part in their 
reason for joining and continuing membership of the EC. Both countries 
have special problem areas of small poor farmers and special regional 
programmes have been agreed to give additional help, as these farmers 
otherwise derive relatively little from the general CAP price support 
measures. In their approach to the decisions taken on the CAP, these 
two countries, along with France, have been strongest in their demands 
for the full implementation of the three principles which underline the 
CAP - common prices, Community financing and Community preference. 
3.3 Revolution in European Agriculture 
The metamorphosis which European agriculture has undergone since 
the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy can be regarded in 
many respects as a 'silent revolution'. The main aspects of this 
revolution are the rapid decline in the number of persons working on 
farms, the restructuring of major sectors of production under the 
pressure of unremitting technical progress, increasingly close links 
with other economic sectors and, as a consequence of all these aspects, 
a major improvement in the efficiency of European agriculture. This 
does not mean that European agriculture is generally as efficient as 
that in other large developed economies; there are still large areas of 
small scale farming which have a considerable impact on the overall 
position. 
The rationalization of agricultural production is reflected in the 
restructuring of the factors of production. This process has affected 
mainly small farms of less than 20 ha, whose land is being taken over 
by bigger farms. In consequence, the number of farms with 50 ha and 
over tends to increase, and average farm size in the Community has 
grown from 12 ha in 1960 to just under 18 ha in 1980. Even so, over 40 
per cent of farms still cover less than 5 ha; these cultivate just 
under 7 per cent of the utilized agricultural area, while the 6 per 
cent of farms of over 50 ha work more than 40 per cent of the total 
farming area. 
In parallel with the change of farm structures, the agricultural 
production process itself has been 'revolutionized' by technical and 
biological progress. This has involved increasing specialization and 
intensification of agricultural production, the substantial 
mechanization of agriculture, an intensive use of fertilizers and 
pesticides, the use of much higher yielding plant varieties and 
livestock raised on concentrated feeds. 
It is sometimes maintained that, however considerable the 
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development of European agriculture, it is proceeding much too slowly 
and that in absolute terms the achievements of agriculture lag behind 
not only the results attained in some other sectors but also the 
average growth of the European economy as a whole. For instance, the 
share of agriculture in total gross value added at market prices in the 
Community was halved between 1960 and 1980. However, this argument 
overlooks the starting point for the development of agriculture in some 
Member States, where it was isolated from the rest of the economy for 
decades before coming within the orbit of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Considering this difficult initial situation with all the 
associated national and regional problems, the far-reaching changes in 
European agriculture since the beginning of the Common Agricultural 
Policy have taken place with surprisingly little social disruption. The 
common agricultural policy must certainly take much of the credit for 
this. 
3.4 Farm Structures Policy 
Much of the agricultural problem in the EC arises from the present 
farm structural situation. Structure in this context relates to the 
pattern of farms, and the combination of land, labour and capital in 
the individual farm business. The structural problem can be seen most 
clearly in the size of the farm enterprises on European farms. 
So far as the size of crop enterprise on European farms is 
concerned, the average for cereals is 7.6 ha, for sugarbeet 5.4 ha and 
less than 1 ha for potatoes. The average dairy herd is only 15 cows 
(ranging from 3 in Greece to 56 in the U.K.), and almost 55 per cent of 
dairy herds are of less than 10 cows. In the case of sheep the average 
flock size is 87, but the effect of the U.K. which accounts for over 
half the total sheep in the Community, is to raise this average 
substantially (excluding the U.K. the average sheep flock is only 46). 
Similarly in the case of pigs the average size of pig herds is 35 
animals (not just sows, but all pigs), but in Italy and Greece the 
average is only 10 pigs, while in the Netherlands and U.K. it is over 
200. These differences in the size of the main farm enterprises have 
been the major cause of the wide disparity in farm incomes. This 
income problem is inevitably far more serious in those regions where 
the typical farm enterprise is substantially below the average for the 
Community as a whole. 
So far as size of farm is concerned, the average for the EC as a 
whole of just under 18 ha covers a range from over 65 ha in the U.K. to 
just over 4 ha in Greece and 7 ha in Italy. Of the total of 5.78 m 
farms in 1977, (the most recent year for which the data are available) 
4.6 m were under 20 ha and only 330,000, i.e. less than 6 per cent, 
over 50 haG The 77 per cent of farms less than 20 ha in area occupied 
no more than 28 per cent of the utilised agricultural area but employed 
71 per cent of the active agricultural population. 
Part of the underlying philosophy of the Common Agricultural 
Policy has been that the income problem of the European agricultural 
sector can be resolved to a considerable extent through the operation 
of an effective farm structures policy. In their recent proposals to 
revise the existing structures policy the Commission have said that 
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"the common policy for agricultural structures is a vital element in 
the Community's agricultural policy. The long-term development of 
agricultural production on a sound basis, and satisfactory economic and 
social conditions for those engaged in agriculture, cannot be assured 
without common action by the Community and Member States in this 
domain. By its nature, and unlike the common policies for agricultural 
prices and markets, the structural policy for agriculture produces its 
effects mainly in the longer-term; and unlike them, it was developed 
gradually in successive stages during the first twenty years of the 
life of the common agricultural policy". 
The farm structures policy has been based on the view that a large 
number of farms could become permanently profitable only by making 
investments spread out over a number of years, which they could not 
possibly finance without public aid. For the effect of this investment 
to be a lasting one, farm structures would have to be improved. This 
is mainly a matter of farm size. Hence the need to encourage farmers 
to leave the land and turn over their holdings to others who have 
realistic prospects of operating profitably. This progress towards an 
up-to-date type of farming could be achieved only if those rema1n1ng in 
farming are given the opportunity to become more efficient by acquiring 
further occupational training. 
The approach adopted was a logical and valid one in the economic 
conditions prevailing in the early 1970s, when this policy was formally 
adopted. Circumstances decided otherwise. To start with, it 
transpired that the modernization required was beyond the reach of the 
weaker farms. In the less-favoured regions in particular, the poverty 
of the farmers and especially the employment, administrative and 
economic environment proved formidable obstacles to any improvement in 
agricultural productivity. Secondly, the impact of the general 
economic recession has severely restricted the application of the 
common policy on structures. The two factors essential for adjusting 
farm structures, namely the occupational mobility of farmers and farm 
workers and the "mobility" of land itself, were severely reduced or 
lost altogether. 
The effect has been that while substantial increases in farm 
productivity were achieved, these were primarily in good farming 
regions and came in particular from intensifying production and greater 
specialisation. Land mobility in the context of the common 
agricultural structures policy has been minimal - the increase in size 
of 'development' farms being, on average, less than 5 ha. In these 
circumstances, the progressive intensification of farm production has 
been reflected mainly by increasing levels of investment in equipment 
and livestock. Some 60 per cent of farm development plans provided for 
investments in cattle and cattle housing and over 66 per cent for 
investments in machinery. In this sense the policy has contributed to 
an increase in the output of surplus farm products. 
At the same time the "prudent" price policy, conducted against a 
background of increasing production costs, has exerted an increasing 
pressure on farm incomes. Farmers with the necessary financial means 
to participate in the Community's Farm Modernisation Scheme have become 
fewer in number in recent years. In fact, "modernising" farms 
represent a maximum of only 15 per cent of all farms in the Netherlands 
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but less than 2 per cent in Italy. 
In spite of a special progralllffie of aids for farms in the poor hill 
and mountain areas, it remained evident that the less-favoured areas 
suffered from other drawbacks which prevented normal agricultural 
development. It is for this reason that a number of "colllffion measures" 
were adopted, aimed at compensating for these shortcomings. These 
measures exist both on a general basis and for particular regions e.g. 
the Mediterranean, Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
Quite apart from the factors inherent in the agricultural 
structures policy itself which individually or collectively have 
reduced its effect from the original high hopes for the policy, the 
radical changes which occurred since 1972 in the general economic 
situation of the Community have been sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a revision of the totality of the policy. 
With the general European economy now in a situation of virtual 
economic stagnation, unemployment has become a crucial problem. The 
improvement in agricultural incomes has been reversed while economic 
disparities have increased among the various regions of the Community. 
Furthermore, the increasing surpluses on the markets for the main 
agricultural products no longer allow for the intensification of 
production, but necessitate the pursuit of a prudent or restrictive 
price policy more than ever before and require further adjustment of 
the structures policy. 
3.5 A New Farm Structures Policy 
In the current economic situation, and given the difficulties 
facing the market for many agricultural products, the view of the 
European Commission is that the agricultural structures policy must now 
become a more positive force in the development of agriculture. 
However, it has to achieve this objective despite the fact that the 
pressure on the market from many farm products now creates major 
constraints on structural adaptation. 
The aim of the new farm structure policy is, first of all, to 
promote technical progress and an' increase in the competitive position 
of farms, through productive investments, a more efficient use of 
production factors and better training of faluers. It is also aimed at 
promoting the structural development of agricultural processing and 
marketing. Moreover, the policy has to contribute to the maintenance 
of agricultural activity in areas where. despite natural handicaps, 
farming proves necessary in the absence of alternative employment 
opportunities, and in the interests of environmental conservation. 
The Commission therefore proposed to the Council in 1983 that in 
future greater emphasis be put on long-term structural action. as 
opposed to market intervention and price support as the means of 
alleviating social and income problems in agriculture. Expenditure on 
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the new policy is expected to amount to some 7,500 m ECU I in the first 
five years, as compared with the 3,750m ECU allocated for 1980-84 under 
the existing policy. To this must be added estimated expenditure of 
some further 3,000 m BCU for improving agricultural structures under 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. 
The reform of the agricultural structures policy reflects a number 
of objectives: 
to provide help for a larger number of small-scale farmers who are 
likely to be the most affected by the current economic 
difficulties and the lower guaranteed prices for many agricultural 
products to be expected in the future; 
to improve farm structures and incomes in the mountainous and 
less-favoured areas of the Community, particularly in those member 
States where the problems are most acute; 
to ensure that the aid programmes for improving farm structures 
and incomes take due account of the need to control the output of 
surplus farm products and for the most efficient use of limited 
financial resources; 
to stimulate the processing and marketing of agricultural 
products; 
to develop non-agricultural activities 
including forestry. 
in the rural areas, 
Under these new measures, it is proposed that all investment aids 
at both Community and national level be banned if they increase the 
output of products with market difficulties, particularly milk, with 
the exception of certain products in some less-favoured areas. By 
contrast, investment aids for the purpose of qualitative improvement or 
the conversion of farm production in line with market requirements will 
be actively encouraged. 
These new proposals recognise that the farm modernisation policy 
in the past has helped farmers who were in the best position to 
implement development plans. By so doing it is associated with an 
aggravation of the surplus situation on some Community markets. The 
new policy involves a change of direction, favouring farmers in lower 
income brackets who are in greatest need of investment aid. The aim is 
to help them to improve their income, living and working conditions 
without, at least in theory, inducing them to increase the production 
of products which are already in surplus. The Commission anticipates a 
significant increase in the number of farmers who will benefit from the 
Community aided investment measure each year up to 1990. 
It still remains to be seen how the Council of Ministers will 
finally resolve the conflicts in the structures policy_ The initial 
reaction to the new proposals has been broadly positive from the 
1. The ECU is the common unit of currency for the Community. It is 
currently worth approximately NZ$0.81. 
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countries with large numbers of small farms (Italy, Ireland and France) 
but less so from the countries which have a reasonably good 
agricultural structure at present and which would not be the major 
beneficiaries under the proposed new policy. In addition, the 
financial resources required for the new policy will require a 
satisfactory solution to the present budgetary difficulties. 
It is evident that the most effective way of making progress in 
the area of farm structures could be a growth in the national economies 
of member States, and in particular the development of new 
opportunities for off-farm jobs. The present level of unemployment, 
however, makes this extremely difficult. In the absence of an 
expanding off-farm sector, the resolution of the farm structures 
problem is going to be severely handicapped. The further growth of new 
farm technology will put the existing millions of poor fa.rmers under 
increasing pressure - a pressure which the current proposals will not 
even contain, let alone resolve. 

CHAPTER 4 
THE DAIRY SECTOR 
4.1 The Current Dairying Situation 
Agriculture in the EC has traditionally had a strong bias towards 
dairy farming. One fann in three (nearly 1.8 m in total) produces 
milk; virtually all of these are family farms where milk production is 
the main source of income. The majority of these farms are below the 
production level needed to provide a reasonable income, by todays 
standards, to the families involved. The average number of cows is 15. 
The structure of dairy farming in Europe is, however, very varied, with 
55 per cent of all dairy farms having less than 10 cows; this increases 
to 86 per cent in the case of Italy, which nevertheless has over a 
quarter of all dairy farms in the Community. If a figure of 30 cows is 
regarded as the minimum for a viable dairy enterprise by European 
standards, then 88 per cent of the dairy farms are below this viability 
threshold. Thus most dairy farmers look towards an intensive use of 
their very limited acres as a means of achieving a reasonable income, 
since their small farms are not suitable for more extensive farming 
systems such as arable cropping or beef production. 
The current number of dairy farmers is only just half the number 
in the early seventies. The loss of over 1.5·m dairy farmers in the 
past decade represents an extremely high rate of adjustment to the 
situation of the dairy market and should be seen against the nature of 
the "structural surplus" problems of the dairy sector. The change has 
come during years when the economic climate in Europe has been 
generally unfavourable, and jobs outside farming have been scarce. 
In spite of this fall in the number of farmers in dairy 
production, the number of cows has remained remarkably constant at some 
25 m head. Cow numbers are in fact slightly down on the number in the 
Community some 20 years ago although there has been a small increase in 
recent years. This recent growth follows the decline experienced 
between end-1973 and 1981, '-lhich reflected the limited impact of the 
non-marketing of milk and official "conversion" schemes from dairy 
production; the impact of other economic factors, particularly the 
"cautious" price policy and costs development (primarily high interest 
rates), have also been important. In 1982 the price/cost ratio of 
dairy production improved but the structural development continued, 
involving a further reduction of the number of smaller dairy herds 
offset by an increase in the number of bigger and more efficient ones. 
The rhythm of increase in milk deliveries to dairies continues 
unabated, with a further 3.5 per cent rise in 1983. This means that, in 
the two years 1982 and 1983, an extra 8 m tonnes of milk was produced, 
for which no additional internal or external markets have been found. 
The virtually static cow numbers in the past two decades have been 
accompanied by a steady increase in yields per cow of 1.5 per cent per 
year. Over the last few years, however, this yield increase has 
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gathered momentum and since 1975 has averaged some 3 per cent per year. 
In 1982, average yields per dairy cow increased by 3.8 per cent to 
4,332 kgs, an increase considerably above the longer-term trend. 
The growth in yields per cow has been ascribed to better stock 
selection, effective disease control measures, investment in modern 
accommodation and equipment, better grassland management and especially 
the more extensive use of purchased feed. The milk producer has in 
fact at his disposal unlimited quantities of feed from outside the 
farm. It is estimated that over 20 per cent of milk production 
originates from imported feed. The milk/purchased feed price 
relationship has been very favourable and this has inevitably led to 
steadily increasing feed consumption. It is generally assumed that 1 
kg of fodder concentrate produces at least 2 litres of milk, but as the 
price of 1 kg of fodder concentrate has usually been appreciably lower 
than the price of 1 litre of milk, the greater use of purchased feed 
has generated more income for the farmer. 
Twenty years ago deliveries to dairies represented only 60 per 
cent of total milk production. Dairies now receive about 90 per cent 
of the total milk produced in the Community. This percentage is 
continuing to rise since, because of the labour involved, processing at 
the farm (farmhouse butter and cheese) is dying out. The milk products 
industry, downstream from dairy farming, has become highly concentrated 
and is now part and parcel of the industrial sector. The process of 
concentration was particularly rapid in the sixties, the decade of 
general economic growth. Since 1965 the number of dairies has halved 
while in the meantime the supply of milk has risen by about 30 per 
cent. The tendency for units of production to expand and merge applies 
strongly in the dairy processing industry and has resulted in marked 
improvements in productivity. 
4.2 production and Consumption of Dairy products 
4.2.1 Drinking Milk 
The overall use of milk in the Community for liquid milk and fresh 
milk products has increased only marginally recently, with the 
consumption of drinking milk remaining practically unchanged over 
recent years. However, the picture showed a certain degree of 
differentiation as to individual products and member States. Thus, the 
general tendency of the last nine years to consume more semi-skimmed 
milk and less whole milk has continued. The total share of UHT-milk 
continues to increase. Consumption of cream and other fresh milk 
products (yoghurt, etc.) has also increased, but at a significantly 
lower rate, reflecting the impact of unemployment and other 
economic/social difficulties. 
4.2.2 Butter 
Total butter production in the Community increased hy 7.8 per cent 
in 1982 and by a further 10 per cent in 1983. This development 
resulted from the sharp increase in milk deliveries and the relatively 
10\v increase of milk utilization for other dairy products. The 
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internal consumption of butter at the normal market price has continued 
to fall and the total consumption increase of 1 per cent in 1982 was 
due to increased sales at reduced prices to the food industry 
(bakeries, ice cream) and non-profit making institutions and, finally, 
to the end-year cheap price sale ("Christmas butter"). However, the 
increase in consumption in 1982 due to cheap price sales should be 
considered as purely 'technical' as a high substitution effect occurred 
at the beginning of 1983, resulting in a decline in consumption in 
1983. Cownercial exports continued to decline and were 38 per cent 
lower in 1983 than in 1980; the export figure of 370,000 t was the 
lowest since 1978. 
Because of the large increase in production, the relatively low 
consumption and the decrease in total exports of butter, the end year 
stocks for 1982 were more than double the stocks at end 1981. The 
continued imbalance between supply and demand and the drop in exports 
resulted in stocks of about 850,000 t by end-1983; this is projected to 
increase further in 1984, even with the full implementation of the 
'super-levy' on all additional milk production. 
4. 2.3 Skinuned Hil k Pow de r 
Skimmed milk powder production has been increasing in recent years 
to reach 2.5m t in 1983. This increase is partly due to the increase 
in milk deliveries and in butter production and the consequential 
relatively limited use of milk in the production of cheese and liquid 
milk products. The use of liquid skimmed milk for animal feed declined 
by 35,000 t in 1982 but the introduction in that year of a special aid 
for skim powder fed to pigs and poultry resulted in sales of more than 
500,000 t in 1983. At the same time skimmed milk used for casein 
production increased in 1982 by 13 per cent, an increase which 
continued in 1983 but at a lower rate. 
The manufacture of skimmed milk powder in the Community far 
exceeds demand at market prices, which amounts to less than 15 per cent 
of total production. This is the background to the aid given to 
skinuned milk powder incorporated in animal feed compounds. In 1982, 
1.27 In tonnes (or 58 per cent of production) was sold for calf-milk 
replacers with a price reduction of 40 per cent. 
Both the commercial and food aid exports continued to decline in 
1983, when only 240,000 t were exported against 580,000 t in 1980. 
Exports in 1983 were the lowest since 1976 and the decline over recent 
years has continued in spite of the substantial export subsidies which 
have been paid. 
The large increase in production, relatively stable consumption 
and decline in exports has resulted in increased public stocks. The 
stocks of 279,000 t in 1981 increased to 574,000 t in 1982; by end of 
year 1983 stocks reached 1.1 III t despite the sales under the pigs and 
poultry feed disposal scheme. Some decline in stocks to just over 1m 
tonnes has been projected by end 1984, but the cost of the disposal 
programme is very large. 
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4.2.4 Cheese 
Community cheese production increased in 1982 by 1.7 per cent 
(against 3.6 per cent in 1981) while consumption increased by 2 per 
cent (against 2.5 per cent in 1981). Thus, the upward trend in 
consumption continued, but at a lower rate. No doubt one of the main 
reasons for this continued increase is the availability to the 
Community consumers of a wide range of cheese types and qualities, 
including imports of about 100,000 t of cheese from third countries. 
On the other hand, the Community is the world's biggest cheese 
exporter, exporting 390,OOOt in 1983. The increase of these exports in 
recent years, with the aid of export subsidies, has decisively 
influenced the total level of Community production. 
4.2.5 Other Dairy products 
The production of whole milk powder in the Community is 
traditionally linked to the development on the international market. 
Having increased by more than 60 per cent from 1978 to 1980, the 
international market stagnated in 1981 and exports decreased by 15 per 
cent in 1982 to 450,000 t. Community production decreased by 18 per 
cent in 1982 compared to 1981 and the decline continued in 1983, 
although at a lower rate. 
production of condensed milk increased by 1 per cent in 1982, 
mainly in response to export sales which, for the first time, reached 
600,000 t (19,000 t over the 1981 level). Although the EC share of the 
international market has been falling from 1977 to 1980, a recovery 
both in quantities exported and market share was recorded in 1981 and 
1982. However, a slowdown of production and exports has occurred in 
1983. 
EC production of casein is based on a system of aids paid for 
skimmed milk used in its production. These aids compensate for the 
very low import duties bound under GATT. With higher aid levels, 
production increased in 1982 by 20,000 tonnes to over 100,000 tonnes 
and the increase continued in 1983 although again at a slower rate. 
4.3 The Machinery of the Common Organisation of the Market for Milk 
and Milk Products 
The basic regulations for the dairy sector under the CAP have 
established a price system, an intervention system (designed to support 
the initial market) and rules for trade with non-member countries. 
Additional measures are designed to support and stabilise the milk 
sector. 
To underpin farmgate prices, the Community fixes a target price 
for milk delivered to dairies. This is the price of milk which 
Community policy seeks to ensure for all mi.lk sold by farmers during 
the milk year, either on the Community lllarket or external markets. Thus 
the target price is an objective but not a guarantee. The achievement 
of the target price is underpinned by intervention prices for butter 
and skim milk production. The intervention agencies, operated by each 
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member State, must buy in all butter and skim milk powder offered to 
them at the intervention price. 
These prices are normally the lower limit of market prices and 
thus guarantee a minimum income to fanners. The prices obtained for 
the other products (liquid milk, fresh products, cheeses) on the 
markets are such that in general the average prices actually paid to 
milk producers should be close to the target price. They may even 
exceed this price where demand is heavy for a given product but more 
often they are a little below it. On a market burdened by permanent 
over-production, the intervention price eventually determines the 
market price and, consequently, the farmgate price, i.e. what the 
farmer actually gets. Threshold prices apply in the dairy sector as a 
protective mechanism against imports, enabling the prices on the 
internal market to be brought near to the target price and only 
allowing imports should there be a shortage on the internal market. 
4.4 Trading Arrangements with Non-member States 
The threshold price for milk products is set each year; products 
are divided into groups and for each of these groups a pilot product is 
chosen for which a threshold price is fixed in the light of: 
the ratio of the fat content of the milk to the protein content; 
the target price of the milk; 
the need to ensure some degree of protection for the Community's 
processing industry (lithe Community preference"). 
The threshold price represents the lowest price at which the 
product coming from non-member countries may enter the EC market, and 
is used in the calculations of a levy on dairy imports. This levy is 
the difference between the threshold price and the import price for 
each product matching the most favourable opportunities for purchasing 
in international trade. In addition a given quantity of butter from 
New Zealand is imported at a special levy rate. On exports, the 
Conunission pays "refunds" to bridge the gap between prices in the 
Community and prices obtaining in world trade in milk products. The 
refund is the same throughout the Community, but may be differentiated 
according to country of destination to cover any special features of 
the market. It is reviewed at least once every four weeks. 
4.5 Additional Support and Stabilisation Measures 
A compulsory coresponsibility levy designed to encourage and 
broaden the disposal of milk products has been paid by milk producers 
since 1977, in the form of a ~ercentage of the milk target price. The 
yield from this levy is used to promote the disposal of milk products, 
but not the payment of the export refunds. 
The Community have also operated special incentive schemes to 
induce dairy farmers to go out of milk production and into other 
fanning systems, but in view of the difficulties and even fraud that 
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have been experienced these schemes have been suspended. It is not 
evident that the schemes have been cost-effective; they have provided 
substantial payments to producers who in many cases were giving up milk 
production for other reasons. 
4.6 Causes of the EC Dairy Problem 
The problems in the dairy sector have arisen from the relentless 
upward surge in milk production and a virtually static internal demand. 
The annual increase of domestic human consumption of all dairy products 
expressed in milk equivalent (fat basis), followed an upward trend in 
the period 1974-82 of about 0.5 per cent per year, reaching a level of 
85.3 m tonnes in 1982. This development covers very different trends 
for individual dairy products. In particular, the consumption of 
butter has been falling at an average of 2.8 per cent annually, despite 
the measures taken by the Community to subsidize sales. For all other 
milk products the increase in consumption has been of the order of 2.4 
per cent annually. If these trends continue unchanged, consumption in 
1990 could amount to 88 m tonnes milk equivalent. However, in view of 
the economic and demographic conditions forecast for the coming years, 
it seems probable that a lower rate of increase in consumption should 
be achieved than in the 1970s and that a realistic level of consumption 
in 1990 is unlikely to exceed 87 m tonnes milk equivalent. 
Against this current consumption of 85-86m tonnes of milk, 
production has continued to grow. By 1983 it had reached a total of 
111.6 m tonnes, i.e. some 30 per cent greater than the Community 
market can absorb. The extrapolation of the trend of milk deliveries 
in recent years (annual average increase of 2.7 per cent in the period 
1973-82) suggests that by 1990 deliveries would be at the level of 121 
m tonnes, unle~s measures are implemented to stop the further 
development of milk production. It is evident that such a volume of 
production would be far in excess of the realistic possibilities of 
disposal within the Community and on external markets. Recently the 
Director-General for Agriculture in the Commission pointed out that the 
marginal cost of disposal of milk products in 1984 is, according to his 
own experts, more than 100 per cent of the target price. As the target 
price is now considerably above the actual farm-gate price for milk in 
the Community, this means that the marginal disposal cost is well above 
the average price of milk currently received by farmers. In other 
words the returns on additional milk produced in the Community do not 
pay the manufacturing, storage and selling expenses; when these are met 
the net sum left to reward the farmers involved is negative, and 
substantially negative at that. 
Outlets on the internal market of the Community are circumscribed 
by a shortage of finance. In 1982. about 88 per cent of the skimmed 
milk powder and around 40 per cent of the butter consumed on the 
domestic market was subsidised. The average cost of disposing of 
surplus butter . internally is still about twice the cost of export 
(about 3,000 ECU/tonne). The cheapest outlet for surplus output of 
these two products has ah,Tays been the export market but, despite 
increases in 1982 in export refund levels, quantities of most dairy 
products exported in 1983 were well below those for earlier years. In 
addition, the existence of high stock levels in other developed 
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countries, particularly in the United States, are not contributing 
towards price stability on the world market. 
The serious market imbalance in the EC dairy sector is not a new 
problem but the situation has deteriorated sharply in recent years. 
World market prospects do not indicate the possibility of further 
significant increases in the Community's exports. The cost of 
subsidised disposal on the Community's own markets has reached very 
high levels. The Community is, therefore, faced with the need for 
radical action to correct the situation. 
It is quite evident that the price decisions taken over the last 
10 years have not been sufficient to redress the market imbalance. The 
Commission has estimated that, in order to avoid the "guarantee 
threshold" of 97m tonnes delivered to dairies being exceeded in 1983, 
the milk price for 1984/85 would have to be abated by as much as 12 per 
cent. A measure of this kind would evidently have grave and immediate 
effects on the revenues of producers, yet there would be some delay 
before the full effect on production was achieved. In the light of the 
gravity of the imbalance in the milk sector and the economic and social 
aspects of the situation, the Commission has proposed that in future 
the principle of the guarantee threshold in this sector should be 
implemented through a quota system, accompanied by a restrictive price 
policy. 
At the meeting of the Council of Ministers at the end of March 
1984, it was agreed that a reference quantity (quota), corresponding to 
the concept of the guarantee threshold, would be established based on 
deliveries in 1981 plus 1 per cent (but in 1984/5 at 1981 plus 2 per 
cent). Italy and Luxembourg quotas were set at the level of their 1983 
deliveries and for Ireland the quota was 1983 deliveries plus 4.63 per 
cent. All deliveries in excess of this quantity will be subject to a 
supplementary levy, calculated in such a way as to cover the full cost 
of disposal of the additional milk. The dairies in turn would apply 
the charge to producers. The Commission have argued that such a 
measure should stabilize milk deliveries without aggravating the 
problem of the income of small producers. It would have a rapid effect 
in discouraging additional production. To provide for the possibility 
of establishing newcomers (such as young fanners) the transfer of 
quotas from one enterprise to another has been proposed. 
An increasing output of milk through purchases of concentrated 
animal feed is leading to the development of so called 'milk 
factories' • Where the connection with the land is of little 
importance, the Commission had suggested the introduction of a special 
levy on milk from intensive farms (for example, those which deliver 
more than 15,000 kg per ha of forage), but no agreement has so far been 
reached in the Council on the introduction of any such system of 
levies. 
In addition, the high cost of disposing of butter on the 
Community's internal market particularly through general consumer 
subsidies has led to only a small increase in consumption. This has 
led to a proposal to eliminate, in two steps, the special subsidy for 
butter consumption. This would result in some loss of butter sales, 
but it is argued that compensating increases in disposal of milk fat 
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can be obtained by more cost-efficient measures (e.g. the extension to 
other foods of the aid for butter used in pastry and ice-cream and the 
introduction of a special aid for concentrated whole milk). 
4.7 The Future of Dairying in the Community 
The enormous problems of the EC dairy sector will almost certainly 
worsen in 1984. It is unlikely that the steps taken will hold 
production even to its 1983 level, and some further production 
increases seems inevitable. This will further aggravate the problems 
of surplus stocks which, particularly in the case of butter, have grown 
far beyond the level that can be disposed of by almost any steps that 
would not totally destroy the precarious balance of the world market. 
Production of whole milk powder and condensed milk has been falling 
over the past two years and there is no possibility of these recovering 
sufficiently to overcome the present surpluses of milk. Skimmed milk 
powder can be disposed of for animal feed, but the increasing use of 
liquid skim in the Community is limiting the growth in the consumption 
of dried skim. In any event, very high subsidies to feed skim either 
in liquid or dried form to animals can not be justified as an efficient 
use of resources in agriculture. 
Nor is it apparent that the Commission's proposals could halt the 
expansion of milk production. Their proposals have met with stiff 
opposition in certain countries which stand to loose substantially from 
their introduction. The present measures are far from being 
sufficiently strong to bring about a complete halt to growth in mIlk 
output, though they would certainly reduce the rate of growth to only a 
fraction of its recent level. If however, there is a sharp reduction 
in the real price of milk, ar~s~ng from both a low rate of price 
increases and supplementary measures to reduce the effective price of 
intervention purchases, then it Is possible that the consequential loss 
of income might induce farmers to reduce output. Such a policy would 
be a rational response; while some individual farmers Illay increase 
output to compensate for the sharp drop in their incomes that would 
otherwise arise and while European farmers have increased output in 
spite of falling milk prices in real terms over many years, it seems 
unlikely that a really sharp fall in prices could continue to give rise 
to a growth in total output. The Commission estimates that a price 
reduction of the order of 12 per cent would lead to a static or 
declining level of total milk output. This price decline could become 
a reality in real tenns, particularly in countries with large increases 
in production costs. Certainly a drop in real prices of this magnitude 
might well occur over a two year period and the farmer response could 
be more significant than has generally been allowed for. Such a 
development would, of course, have a severe effect on farm incomes, 
with consequential political problems for the agricultural ministers. 
What the outcome would then be is very .difficult to foresee, but the 
change in the economic and political climate in which price decisions 
are made, particularly in the dairying sector, may create a quite 
different direction for the CAP, with the most immediate impact on 
dairy production itself. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE SHEEP SECTOR 
5.1 The Current Sheepmeat Situation 
Sheepmeat and goatmeat account for about 2 per cent by value of 
the Community's total agricultural production and 4 per cent of total 
meat production. Sheep are raised on approximately 600,000 farms in 
the Community, with four member States having 92 per cent of the 
Community flock (38 per cent in the United Kingdom, 23 per cent in 
France, 16 per cent in Italy and 15 per cent in Greece). Sheepmeat 
accounts for about 20 per cent by value of the production of all types 
of meat in Greece, and about 13 per cent in the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy. 
The Community, with its output of 700,000 t, is the world's second 
largest producer. The USSR has the highest output (800,000t), then the 
EC, followed by Australia and New Zealand (600,000t each) and China 
(400,000 t). 
The number of sheep in the Community has risen virtually without 
interruption since 1972 to reach 59 m head by 1982, including 40 m 
ewes. The rate of increase, at 3.3 per cent, was slightly higher in 
1982 than the 2.9 per cent in 1981, but it varied considerably among 
Member States. Numbers fell sharply in France by 7.5 per cent, 
remained steady in the United Kingdom, and increased in the other 
Member States. A further rise, by 1.7 per cent to 60 m head has been 
estimated for 1983, coming mainly in the UK, Ireland and Italy. 
A large proportion of the sheep production in the Community is 
concentrated in the mountain and hill fanning areas, where farm incomes 
are considerably below those in agriculture generally. Incomes of 
sheep producers in these areas are, however, supported by special 
headage payments paid out of Community and national funds, as well as 
by the general market support measures for sheepmeat. 
Community production of sheepmeat tends to run in cycles, but the 
underlying trend has been upwards since 1970. Thus, from 1973 to 1981 
there was an annual rate of increase of 2.7 per cent. In 1982 
production rose to 706,000 tonnes and is estimated to have increased 
more sharply (by 3.4 per cent) to 730,000 tonnes in 1983. This 
represents a new record level of production and is 164,000 tonnes (30 
per cent) more than the quantity produced ten years earlier. 
Consumption of sheepmeat in 1982 at 975,000 tonnes, increased 
sharply (4.5 per cent) due to a steep rise in the United Kingdom (7.6 
per cent) and a somewhat lower one in Greece (5.5 per cent) and France 
(4.0 per cent). A further increase to 980,000 tonn~s is estimated for 
1983, which would leave total consumption some 50,000 tonnes higher 
than in 1973. 
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5.2 The Trend in the Community Deficit 
Sheepmeat is the only meat in which the EC is not self-sufficient. 
By 1983, the level of self-sufficiency had risen to 75 per cent, 
compared with only 56 per cent back in 1972. The deficit has fallen 
from around 360,000 tonnes a decade ago to 250,000 tonnes in 1983. 
There is surplus production in only two Member States, Ireland and 
the Netherlands, both of whom export to France. In 1982 the United 
Kingdom produced only 64 per cent of what is consumed, but it is at one 
and the same time the COMnunity's biggest producer, importer and 
exporter, accounting for 37 per cent of Community production, 74 per 
cent of imports and 46 per cent of exports to other Hember States. 
Production and consumption forecasts for 1985 and 1990 prepared by 
the European Commission show: 
(1) Total output should increase. Community production in 1985 and 
1990 is likely to be of the order of 770,000 tonnes and 810,000 
tonnes respectively, an annual increase of 1.2 per cent over the 
period 1980-1990. This assumes that the current system of 
premiums to producers is maintained. (This rate of increase does, 
however, appear remarkably low when compared with the 2.9 per cent 
that occurred frrnn 1970 to 1980 and implies a sharp decline in 
growth in the second half of the 1980s. Given the prospect of 
resources in other farming enterprises being moved into sheep, 
this projection of only 1.2 per cent per annum looks even more 
unlikely). 
(2) Consumption is likely to 
1,020,000 tonnes in 1990. 
increase to 980,000 tonnes in 1985 and 
This assumes that the current variable 
premium system in the United Kingdom, which underpins the increase 
in per capita consumption in the Community, is maintained. It 
gives an annual rate of increase in total consumption of 0.5 per 
cent over the period 1980-1990. This, however, seems 
exceptionally high when compared with the increase of 0.1 per cent 
from 1970 to 1980, particularly as economic growth generally may 
be below that in the 70's and the higher prices under the sheep 
meat regime lIlay deter increased consumption. 
(.3) On the basis of the Commission's projections, the common 
organisation of the market should hold the Community's deficit 
steady at around 210,000 tonnes in both 1985 and 1990. The 
Commission's view is that without the common organisation, the 
shortfall would be smaller i.e. there would be more 
opportunities for 3rd country suppliers to export to the EC. on 
the basis of their assumptions about the rates of change in 
production and consumption of sheepmeat. 
Against this projected deficit of some 200,000 tonnes by the 
Commission, a projection of the actual trends in production and 
consumption from 1970 to 1980 from the 1983 actual levels, gives a 
deficit of less than 100,000 tonnes by 1990. The Cownission has not 
produced any explanation of the rates of increase that they have used 
in their own projections, and on the face of it they seem to be 
unlikely. 
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The current EC deficit is made up mainly by imports of frozen lamb 
into the United Kingdom from New Zealand. West Germany, Greece and 
Italy also import significant quantities of sheepmeat from third 
countries, notably from Argentina, Australia and Eastern Europe. Italy 
is also the main importer of live sheep from third countries, with 
smaller quantities of live sheep imported from Eastern Europe into West 
Germany, France and Greece. Most of the Community's export trade is 
conducted within the EC itself and only relatively small quantities of 
sheepmeat or live sheep are exported outside the Community. 
5.3 The Organisation of the Market for Sheepmeat 
While the markets for the major agricultural products in the 
Community had been brought under a common organisation before the U.K., 
Ireland, and Denmark joined in 1973, the sheepmeat market was still 
subject to national rules in each Member State. In the original six 
member States, sheepmeat output was less than 1 per cent of total farm 
output and sheepmeat tended to be regarded as a luxury product not 
widely consumed in ordinary households. 
With the entry of the me and Ireland into the EEC in 1973 the 
position changed. Lamb consumption is a major element in the everyday 
diets in these two countries and both of them have a substantial sheep 
production sector within their agriculture. The need to harmonise the 
sheepmeat market was quickly acknowledged but early agreement on a 
common organisation of the market proved impossible. The conflict of 
interest between the French and the UK was the major problem. The 
French have a high priced sheepmeat market in order to support the 
incomes of their own producers, the U.K. a low priced market as part of 
their general cheap food arrangements. Furthermore, the element of 
community preference which would have to be incorporated in any EC 
market regime was limited by the bindings in GATT on the existing 
customs duties on sheepmeat imports. A more restrictive import regime 
would involve considerable compensation to existing exporters to the EC 
if these GATT bindings were to be "deconsolidated". As this might 
prove very costly, there was a reluctance within the EC to become 
involved in any steps in this direction. 
At the same time the French market offered by far the most 
profitable outlet for producers in other member States. The operation 
of the French market arrangements, however, created great difficulties 
for potential exporters to this market. The French were unwilling to 
see their market taken over by suppliers from other member States, 
particularly the U.K. who "ould then import much of their domestic 
requirements from outside the Community. This situation obliged the 
member States to get down to serious negotiations on a sheepmeat regime 
and by late 1980 a common organisation of the market came into 
operation. 
The structure of the organisation involves a basic price, prem.iums 
and an intervention system. 
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5.3.1 The Basic Price 
The Council of Ministers fixes for each marketing year a basic 
price for fresh sheep carcases. This price takes into account the 
situation on the EC market, the prospects for development, and 
sheepmeat production costs in the Community; it is related to the 
normal seasonal price variations on the Community sheepmeat market. 
Member States can choose either an intervention buying-in scheme 
or a variable slaughter premium scheme, in conjunction with an annual 
ewe premium scheme. Alternatively a member State may operate the 
annual ewe premium scheme only. It is this combination of 
intervention, variable slaughter premium and ewe premium which provides 
the basic support for sheep farmers' incomes. France has opted for 
intervention and the United Kingdom for variable premium, both in 
connection with the annual ewe premium. All the other member States 
operate the annual ewe premium scheme only. 
5.3.2 The Annual Ewe Premium 
In order to maintain producer's incomes, any gap between the basic 
price and the actual market price for the marketing year is estimated 
annually at the beginning of the marketing season. This difference (or 
loss of income) is multiplied by the tonnage of sheepmeat produced in 
each region concerned during the previous calendar year. The total is 
divided for each region by the number of ewes, to give the estimated 
amount of the premium payable per ewe in each region. The premium paid 
corresponds to the "effective loss of income" for the producers 
resulting from actual level of market prices. 
In the first two marketing years (1980/81 and 1981/82) the market 
prices in Ireland and the United Kingdom were such that this annual ewe 
premium was paid only in these countries. By the 1982/83 marketing 
year the situation had changed; not only Ireland and the U.K. fulfilled 
the conditions required for receiving the ewe premium but also France, 
Benelux, Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany. These premiums 
reached 18.85 ECUs per ewe in Belgium and ranged downwards to 0.5 ECUs 
in France. Total expenditure on ewe premiums in 1982/83 amounted to 
100m ECUs. 
5.3.3 The Variable Premium 
Variable slaughter premium measures are 
and provide for a direct payment to producers 
below a "guide level" Le. 85 per cent of the 
level is adjusted weekly in the same way 
intervention prices. 
in operation in Britain, 
when market prices are 
basic price. This guide 
as the basic and the 
Hhen the average market price is below the weekly guide level, a 
variable slaughter premium equal to the difference is paid out on sheep 
marketed either live-weight (the most common practice in Britain) or 
dead-weight in that week. Whenever live sheep or carcases on which the 
variable slaughter premium has been paid are exported from the UK to 
another part of the Community, a charge equivalent to the variable 
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premium is made ("clawback") so as to prevent any disturbance of the 
smooth operation of the market in the region of destination. However, 
exemption of the variable premium "clawback" is allowed on British 
sheepmeat exports to traditional non-Community markets. 
5.3.4 Intervention Buying-in Scheme 
Intervention buying-in measures can be applied to a Member State, 
provided that it is operating a national carcase classification system 
which makes it possible to identify the qualities which will give best 
support to the market and a representative survey of prices paid for 
those qualities. Weekly intervention prices have also been fixed for 
France, but no buying-in has actually taken place. 
There is also prOV1Slon for aids for private storage to be 
operated when the EEC market price falls below 90 per cent of the basic 
price. Although these conditions have arisen on a number of occasions, 
this system of aids for private storage of sheepmeat has not been 
introduced and no budgetary provision has been made for its operation. 
5.4 The Effects of the Sheepmeat Regime 
Expenditure on the sheepmeat regime has grown very rapidly~ Total 
expenditure on the ewe premium and on the variable premium rose from 
53.5 m ECUs in 1980 to 360 m ECUs in 1983 (although the 1984 budget 
provides for expenditure to drop slightly to 350 m ECUs). In 1983, 
however, it was found necessary to delay payment of the first 
instalment of the ewe premium until 1984 and it is likely that the 
original 1984 prOV1Slon will prove to be inadequate. Much of this 
expenditure has been in the U.K. and Ireland, which have seen sheep 
prices increase very sharply under the stimulus of the sheepmeat 
regime. 
Price movements at farm level reflect market conditions and 
Community actions. As in the case of other farm products, the real 
market price for sheep (adjusted for inflation) had been falling since 
1960/61 over the Community as a whole. Since the common organisation 
of the market in sheepmeat was set up however the situation has been 
largely reversed. Even so, the average market price in each marketing 
year has been below the basic price in Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
and above it in Italy and Greece. In the other regions the average 
market price fell below the basic price for the first time in 1982/83 
and will probably remain below in 1983/84, with the exception of 
France. 
The United Kingdom market price is consistently around 70 per cent 
of the French price. The advent of the common organisation has thus 
not led to the price upsets so much feared by certain sectoral 
interests (i.e. collapse of prices in France, steep rise in the United 
Kingdom) • 
The development of prices under the sheepmeat market regime, as 
for other products, has been influenced by the operation of the 
Community's monetary policies in the agricultural sector. Unlike other 
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major farm products, however, the system of special "green" exchange 
rates, with the consequential monetary compensatory amounts, does not 
apply to trade in sheepmeat. However, in working out the ewe premium 
it is necessary to compare basic prices with market prices, which 
involves a conversion of the latter into ECU; the conversion rate 
applied is the special 'green' rate. The application of the green rate 
rather than the market rate means that Member States whose market rates 
are higher than their green rates may be attributed a somewhat higher 
income loss and therefore a higher Ewe Premium than countries whose 
market rates are lower than their green rates. In spite of this, the 
Commission has proposed to continue the use of "green" rates, without 
the introduction of MCAs in this sector. 
The basic sheepmeat Regulation provided for an advance on the ewe 
premium to be paid in any region or regions in which the forecast 
market prices are lower than the basic prices. This has proved to be a 
somewhat hazardous exercise; the practical implications of inaccuracy 
in forecasting the market price level and the variable slaughter 
premium of the marketing year are that member States that enjoy 
over-payments can and do profit for a large part of the marketing 
period from the interest they receive by using these funds. However, 
at producer level there can be some injustice involved, since in a 
given marketing year in which over-payment has taken place, sheepmeat 
producers are over-compensated for their loss of income at the expense 
of other producers whose flock is expanding during the next marketing 
year. In the light of experience of the problems involved and as a 
means of saving money the Corunission has proposed that advance premiums 
be deleted and that payments be made in arrears, when the national 
market prices are known. The Council has broadly accepted this 
proposal, with the qualification that an advance payment of 30 per cent 
of the premium be made in the hill and mountain areas of the Community. 
The Commission has become concerned at the costs of the sheepmeat 
regime, particularly in the UK. Sheepmeat output in the UK fluctuates 
much more than that of other meats and since the common organisation of 
the market was set up the degree of variation has increased. The 
Commission have proposed that a ceiling of 25 per cent of the guide 
price be put on the variable premium in the UK, in the expectation that 
as soon as this ceiling is reached some producers will decide not to 
send their animals for slaughter, in the hope of profiting a few weeks 
later, from a higher guide level and a variable premium with no 
ceiling. This proposal has however met with considerable resistance 
from the UK. 
5.5 The Trade in Sheepmeat 
The Community's main suppliers are New Zealand, Australia, 
Hungary, Argentina and Yugoslavia. In 1982 New Zealand accounted for 
83 per cent of total imports, and together with the other four 
countries accounted for 96 per cent of the Community's imports (280,000 
tonnes). The United Kingdom is by far the Community's main importer. 
In 1982 it accounted for three-quarters of imports from outside the 
Community i.e. 207,000 tonnes carcase weight, including 201,000 tonnes 
of frozen meat from New Zealand. The remaining quarter was divided 
between the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Greece, France and 
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others. The Community's exports on the other hand are tiny: about 
5,000 tonnes going mainly to Switzerland and some Arab countries. 
So far as the European Commission is concerned, their view is that 
the trade mechanisms worked well in 1981 and 1982, as none of the 
countries concerned exceeded the limits laid down under the voluntary 
restraint agreements negotiated with the main suppliers. However, the 
Community's actual imports have been less than the total possible 
imports negotiated under the voluntary restraint agreements of about 
320,000 tonnes carcase weight (Table 1). In 1981 imports of 226,000 
tonnes were well below the limits laid down and the Community market 
was maintained without any major interference with normal market price 
formation. This was not the case in 1982, when imports amounted to 
281,000 tonnes carcase weight, which led to an increase in stocks in 
the Community of about 8,000 tonnes. It is worth noting that in 1982 
the market price in the Community increased by about 5 per cent on 
average as against 14 per cent in 1981. In view of these developments, 
the Commission wants to reduce the current quantities of about 320,000 
tonnes allowed under the voluntary restraint agreements and the 
introduction of a minimum import price. 
TABLE 1 
Market Balance - Sheepmeat: 1981-83 
(000 Tonnes) 
Change 
production Trade in 
Consumption Production Balance Imports Exports Balance Stocks 
1981 933 701 -232 226 6 220 -12 
1982 975 706 -269 281 4 277 +8 
1983* 980 730 -250 255 5 250 0 
================~===~=============~==================================== 
* estimated 
5.6 The Future for Sheep production in the Community 
The Commission have proposed a lengthy series of adjustments in 
the way the system operates, in order to keep down budget expenditure. 
One of their main proposals, a reduction in quantities of imports under 
the voluntary restraint agreements, COlnhined with the introduction of a 
minimum import price could have a substantial effect on costs to the 
budget, and of course on the trade in sheepmeat. Other proposals 
include a different manner of calculating the ewe premium (which has 
been accepted by the Council), a reV1S10n of the seasonal adjustment of 
the basic price, and a change in the date of the marketing year. These 
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proposals are aimed at tightening up U'ie. ;,(2,n2geme[)t~ of the market, blll 
they would not make any fundamental d:Lffe;:'2!lcf' to the operatiori of the 
sheepmeat: regime. 
While the detailed changes 'which ha.ve been adopted \<7i11 no doubl 
provide some savings to the budget, t:)e bs;:.j,C: pI'ohlem of market bal<'FlCe 
still remains. The two sheepmeat m9xket: f)>-,ilo:3'J i'28 (i,2< a luxury 
high priced meat in France and a regular part of the ordinary family 
diet in the U.K.) have not been reconciled. The EC system tries to 
embrace both approaches - but this gives rise to considerable problems 
in the operation of the regime. The proposal for further limiting 
imports coupled with higher prices, is likely to have a serious impact 
on consumption levels, especially in the U.K. where price elasticity of 
demand is particularly high. Such a sten, in reduc1ng total 
consumption, might sharply reduce the cota.t sbeepmeat deficit and 
eventualli lead to the same serious disposal problems which have arisen 
for other products. This may be more acute if the system of quotas or 
other limits are imposed on production I.n other fanning sectors and 
producers then turn to sheep product ton as a means of maintaining their 
incomes. It is clear that~ while the sheepmeat regime has its o\.Jn 
special characteristics, it is basically subject to the same 
longer-term constraints that underline the Cl\.P genera.lly and therefore 
to the same longer-term problems. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE BEEF SECTOR 
6.1 The Current Beef Situation 
Raising cattle is one of the most important farm enterprises in 
the EC. Beef production accounts for about 15 per cent of the value of 
total farm output. Over 2.5 m farmers, or one in every two in the 
Community, are involved. The average size of cattle enterprise is just 
over 30 animals per farm. The total cattle herd in the EEC is fairly 
constant at around 73 m head, of which 31 m are cows. About 80 per 
cent of beef production comes from herds which also produce milk, so 
that specialised beef cow herds are the source of only a minority of 
beef output in the Community. In recent years, the structure of 
cattle-raising has undergone far-reaching changes. The number of 
cattle farmers has declined by almost 4 per cent per year, mainly 
through the fall in the number of small farms involved and consequently 
some increase in the average number of animals per farm. 
Production of beef depends on the size of the total cattle herd, 
the proportion of the herd that is slaughtered and the average 
slaughter weight. The stAtic character of the cattle herd has been 
offset in the most recent years by the recovery, from the trough in 
1982, in the slaughtering coefficient (the ratio of slaughterings to 
cattle numbers) and the upward trend in average slaughter weight of 
both cattle and calves. The changes in the slaughtering coefficient 
have been one of the major factors in the cyclical nature of beef 
production over recent years. It seems possible that 1984 may be a 
peak year in this cycle and that some fall might occur in subsequent 
years. The trend in slaughter weight is influenced by the level of 
cattle feed prices and may decline as feed prices increase but the 
evidence on this is still very uncertain. 
Beef production in the Community has been subject to cyclical 
change, with an underlying long-term trend of an annual increase of 
between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent. The most recent trough in the 
cycle was in 1982, when total beef and veal production was 6.65 m 
toones. This was only slightly above total consumption, with an excess 
of some 50,000 tonnes. However the upward phase of the beef cycle will 
hring production to 7 m tonnes in 1984 while consumption has remained 
c.onstant at 6.6m tonnes. In these circumstances the surplus has risen 
10 If 00 , 000 tonnes - or some 6 per cent above the level of consumption. 
Consumption hAS been static for the past 3 years, but the 
mediUm-term trend is downwards. The current consumption of just over 
:U, kgs per head. is some 7-3 per cent below the level of the late 
':lpventies. Competition from alternative lower priced meats, the low 
l(~vel of economic growth in the Community, the rapid increase in the 
number of unemployed and the 810\.0,1 rate of population growth have all 
contributed to the static level of total beef consumption. It would 
seem unlikely that these factors will change sufficiently to reverse 
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the medium-term trend of some decline in total beef consumption. 
The degree of self sufficiency has grown from 90 per cent in 1970, 
when there was a significant opportunity for external suppliers to sell 
on the Community market, to 106 per cent in 1984. Since 1974 imports 
of beef have been running at about 400,000 tonnes. Exports have shown 
greater fluctuation, growing from 160,000 tonnes in 1978 to around 
650,000 tonnes in 1980/81 and then falling to just under 500,000 tonnes 
in 1982. Third country producers now face sharp competition from EC 
suppliers on world markets. 
6.2 Organisation of the Market for Beef 
Like most of the common market organisations, that for beef/veal 
involves detailed price arrangements which hinge on the guide price 
i.e. the price applying to all categories of adult cattle marketed on 
representative markets of the Community. It is the price which is 
aimed at in normal market conditions and is fixed annually at the price 
negotiations, in theory to operate during the following marketing yeare 
The Community also fix an intervention price, which for some years now 
has been 90 per cent of the guide price. The intervention price is a 
determining factor for the calculation of the buying-in price where 
quantities of beef/veal are taken off the market by the intervention 
agencies of the member states. 
The main support measure is the intervention system. The 
intervention agencies must, on certain conditions, buy in specified 
categories of beef/veal at a given price. The beef is subsequently 
sold usually at prices well below the buying-in price, the loss being 
born on the Co®nunity budget. Certain limited measures have been 
introduced to stimulate consumption, including the sale of frozen meat 
from intervention stocks to any taker (wholesalers, processors, 
exporters), the supply to processors of a quantity of frozen meat from 
intervention stocks for processing within the Community and sale of 
intervention meat at reduced prices to welfare institutions. 
Private storage aids may be paid when the market is weak, covering 
various products (carcases and quarters). In the United Kingdom 
variable premiums are paid; this is similar to the system of deficiency 
payments that was operated in the UK prior to EC entry. 
A suckler cow retention premium has been paid from the beginning 
of the 1980/81 marketing year; it is an income supplement for producers 
and is paid to farms which do not deliver milk and keep only cows 
producing calves for fattening. A calf prelnium is also paid in some of 
the poorer member states. 
6.3 Trade with Non-Member Countries 
6.3.1 Imports 
All categories 
subject to customs 
non-member countries. 
of cattle, beef/veal and preparations are normally 
duties when imported into the Community from 
In addition to import duties there are also 
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variable levies on imports. The levy is calculated by stages: 
(a) the basic levy is the difference between the guide price and the 
import price or, for certain non-member countries, the market 
price. Customs duties are added. 
(b) the levy actually applied is calculated by multiplying the basic 
levy by a coefficient which is derived on a weekly basis from the 
ratio of the EC market price to the guide price. 
The import levies may be applied differently depending on the type 
of meat, the country of origin, and the basis of bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements. Because sea transport takes so long, the 
Community operates a scheme for the advance fixing of levies in respect 
of certain origins. For all imports into the Community, a 90-day 
licence is compulsory_ 
6.3.2 Exports 
To limit the need to purchase beef by the intervention agencies, 
store it for some months and then dispose of it often on export 
markets, a system of direct export subsidies the export refund - is 
operated to encourage the direct disposal by traders of beef and live 
cattle for which there is no market within the Community. The refunds 
are not fixed automatically, but take account of: 
the present and future situation on the world market. 
the state of the market in the Community and 
developments. 
expected 
the competitive position on the markets of non-member countries. 
Generally, the refunds are fixed on a quarterly basis, although 
they can be adapted between quarterly dates to allow for changes 
affecting market conditions. Refunds may be varied according to the 
destination of the products. Most of the refunds can be fixed in 
advance. All exports must be covered by a 90-day export licence. 
6.3.3 Prices 
Market prices of beef have tended to remain some 15 per cent to 20 
per cent below the guide price, in spite of the intervention in the 
market to try to maintain the returns to producers. Meanwhile consumer 
prices expressed in national currencies have shown an average increase 
of more than 10 per cent per year in recent years. The Commission have 
projected some recovery in the market prices of adult cattle in the 
medium term but, in the face of the problems facing the EC both on the 
consumption and production side, the basis of this projection is not 
clear. 
The level of intervention purchasing over recent years has been 
related to the level of total output. Years of high output, such as 
1979 and 1980 and again forecast in 1984, have led to substantial 
increases in direct buying-in by the public intervention agencies of 
around 400,000 tonnes a year. Years of lower output such as 1982 have 
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seen intervention buying falling to just over 250,000 tonnes. 
6.4 The Level of Budgetary Expenditure 
Budgetary expenditure on beef/veal was 1,160 m ECU in 1982; it is 
estimated at 1,283 m ECU in 1983 and to increase to 1,400 m ECU in 
1984, i.e. just under 10 per cent of total farm price support 
payments. The 1983 figure of 1,283 m ECU breaks down into 753 m ECU in 
export refunds, 289 m ECU in intervention expenditure for public and 
private storage and 241 m ECU in premiums, mainly the calf premium and 
the suckler cow premium. 
Although there has not been the same problems of market surplus in 
the beef sector as in the dairy sector, the European Commission has 
expressed concern about the risk of these problems arising in the 
future. It has therefore made proposals to adapt the intervention 
measures more to market realities, through reducing the operation of 
intervention at certain times of the year, by operating a uniform 
classification system for the Community to bring a greater degree of 
cohesion into the system and by withdrawing certain national exemptions 
which give additional support in some EEC countries. They have also 
proposed to end the UK variable premium system and special aids for 
Galf production paid in some of the poorer EC countries. They have 
also proposed to adapt the import concessions in beef, clearly with the 
intention of reducing the present volume of beef imports. Not all of 
these proposals have been accepted by the Council, but some limitations 
of the UK variable premium and the calf premium in Italy, Greece and 
Ireland have been adopted for the 1984/5 marketing year. 
6.5 The Future for Beef Production in the Community 
The Commission medium-term forecasts of beef production at 7.5 m 
tonnes by 1990, with consumption at between 6.5 m and 7.0 m tonnes, 
show that the current Community surplus of 0.4 m tonnes could be 
doubled, or more than doubled, by the end of this decade. This would 
mean that Community production may exceed the realistic possibilities 
of disposal on the internal and export markets of the Community. The 
present proposals for changing the intervention rules seem unlikely to 
have any major impact, but the more restricted pricing policy now being 
followed could have a somewhat greater effect. Furthermore policies 
followed in the dairy sector would almost certainly have an effect in 
the beef sector; there are however two opposing possibilities: 
(a) a fall in beef production from the dairy herd, if the squeeze on 
the dairy sector results in any appreciable fall in cow numbers; 
(b) a substitution of beef cows for dairy cows by farmers seeking to 
maintain their farm business in the face of pressure on dairy cow 
numbers. 
In the light of present knowledge it is uncertain as to what the 
net effect of dairy sector policy on beef production will be but it is 
possible that there will be some curtailment of growth in production. 
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It is unlikely that EC market prices or those in the rest of the 
world will be strong enough to resolve any of the EC budgetary 
problems in so far as these arise in the beef sector. Clearly the beef 
sector is not in the same disarray as the dairy sector, and the trends 
towards a growing surplus are not as sharp. However, as expenditure 
ar1s1ng from the beef sector represents 10 per cent of total 
expenditure on the CAP, any limit on the funds for the CAP as a whole 
could well have serious consequences for beef producers. 

CHAPTER 7 
AGRICULTURAL TRADING POLICIES 
7.1 The Background to the Trade Problem 
Within the Community the major issues of debate on agricultural 
policy are farm incomes and the budgetary problems to which income 
support measures have given rise. Outside the Community the major 
debate on its agricultural policy has been on the effects on world 
trade in farm products. This debate is itself largely a consequence of 
the effects of EC farm policies on farmers incomes in non-EC countries 
and of the subsequent consequences for the economic situation in these 
countries. 
These issues should be seen against the wider background in which 
the major decisions are made - in particular the economic problems 
within the Community, the effects of technological change on the level 
of farm output, the political strength of the agricultural producers 
within the Community and the general constraints on agricultural trade 
in virtually every country in the world. The Community's agricultural 
trading policies have evolved in response to the changes in the 
internal level of output and consumption of fann products and the 
evolution of international trade policies under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade. 
7.2 Hechanisms of Community Trading Policies 
The aim of the trading policies of the Community is to protect 
internal agricultural prices against cheaper imports, while enabling it 
to export to the rest of the world through the provision of export 
refunds. The instruments used to regulate trade between the Community 
and non-member countries are essentially only three in number: levies, 
customs duties, and refunds. Levies are chargeable either on imports, 
or (less frequently) on exports; duties are chargeable on imports; and 
refunds are paid on exports. 
The import levies, related to the prices within the Community, are 
designed to negate the impact of price fluctuations on world markets 
and thus to help stabilize the domestic market. The levy is therefore 
a variable charge. Its role is not directly comparable to that of a 
customs duty: when the world price of a product is running at or above 
the Community threshold price, the levy is zero. Horeover, when world 
prices are higher than threshold prices, the Community can charge 
levies on its own exports so as to limit European agricultural products 
being sold on world markets and thus to ensure reasonable prices for 
the goods supplied to consumers at home. While this has been done in 
the past for several products, it was only for limited periods of time 
and has been of small extent in comparison with levies on imports. 
The agricultural import duties are based on the principle of 
43. 
44. 
'Community preference'. This principle is a rule of almost universal 
application defended even by the countries producing and exporting 
agricultural products on a large scale. The usual way of operating 
preferential arrangements for home-produced products consists of 
protection at the frontier in one form or another. Non-EC countries 
which are major net exporters of farm products operate protective 
arrangements at frontiers such as customs duties, quantitative 
restrictions and even the actual prohibition of such imports. Cases in 
point are Australia with regard to sugar and the United States and 
Canada for certain milk products. The principle of Community 
preference is implemented by the charging, at varying levels according 
to product, of certain customs duties vis-a-vis non-member countries or 
by the establishment of threshold prices serving as a reference for the 
calculation of a levy so as to ensure a trading advantage for Community 
producers. 
The export refunds are normally the counterpart of the import 
levies. They are designed to bridge the gap between the internal price 
of a product and its world market price, so that the Community's 
agricultural products can be exported. 
7.3 The EC and GATT 
The creation of a single market in the Community has encouraged an 
expansion of internal Community trade which has encroached on imports 
of some products from non-member countries. These changes in trade 
flows are the logical and indeed the inevitable - outcome of the 
creation of a customs union. Despite these developments, the Community 
has remained the largest world importer of agricultural products. The 
arrangements for Community trade with non-member countries in 
agricultural products have taken into account the international 
obligations assumed by the various member countries and by the 
Community as such, including the requirements of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The Common Customs Tariff, which is the legislative instrument 
applying to imports into the Community of any product entering into 
international trade, reflects the picture of EC commitments to its GATT 
partners. The 'conventional' duties in the Tariff - i.e. duties that 
are covered by agreements or conventions - express the concessions 
granted by the EC in the form of 'bindings'. For a number of 'unbound' 
agricultural products, the EC is free to apply any import arrangements 
it deems fit. The Common Customs Tariff as it now stands is the 
cumulative result of the various negotiations conducted by the EC from 
its inception. The freedom the Community enjoys in respect of certain 
products, for example the products subject to levies, has often been 
"paid for" in full by concessions in respect of other products of 
special interest to non-member countries. 
The Community's policy on trade in agricultural products is thus 
designed to achieve, in relations with developed countries, a trade-off 
of mutual advantages; the economies of the various countries complement 
each other in some respects at international level and, in general, 
Community policy turns this to good account. As for relations with the 
developing countries, the Community's policy on trade in agricultural 
products encourages 
complementary needs, 
ignored. 
as fully as possible trade 
but generally the principle 
on 
of 
the basis 
reciprocity 
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In the various multilateral negotiations in GATT in recent decades 
the main objective has been the reduction of customs tariffs and other 
barriers to trade; agricultural products have always been included in 
these negotiations along with manufactured goods. During these 
negotiations, the Community has entered into major commitments 
'binding' the arrangements for imports of important agricultural 
products, in particular oils and fats and cereal substitutes: either 
the duties applied are minimal or the products incur no duty at all. 
Agricultural policies pursued by the various countries however seldom 
rely on customs duties as the only, or even the main, instrument of 
defence. Governments operate a wide range of schemes which, not being 
open to negotiation, continue to underpin the expansion of the home 
agricultural industry by sheltering it from the impact of free 
competition at world level. The protectionist policies generally 
followed towards agriculture, and in particular. the non-tariff barriers 
that have been built up, do not make trade negotiations very meaningful 
in many instances. 
7.4 The Community's Export Situation with Regard to Agricultural 
Products 
The EC countries have a long tradition of exports of agricultural 
products and make a major contribution to supplies on world markets. As 
world requirements develop and as the Community has achieved 
self-sufficiency in regard to a number of agricultural items, exports 
of agricultural products have become an important factor in ensuring 
the continuity of the common agricultural policy. The Community's 
trade in agricultural products with the rest of the world has grown 
steadily over the years, but there has been an overall deficit on the 
agricultural trade balance, which was 24.9b ECU in 1979 and 22.7b ECU 
in 1980. 
The deficit on trade with the developing countries in 1980 was 9.6 
b ECU in 1980, of which 5.8 b ECU were accounted for by Latin America 
and 3.6 b ECU by the Lome Convention Countries (Le. the countries 
which signed a special agreement on trade and development with the EC; 
they are the countries in Africa, the Carribean and the Pacific which 
were formerly associated with individual member states of the 
Community). The deficit with industrialised countries was somewhat 
larger at 12.3 b ECU, of which 6.1 b ECU was on trade with the United 
States of America, 1.3 b ECU on trade with Canada and 0.5 b ECU on 
trade with Australia. The deficit on agricultural trade with the 
State-trading countries was 0.8 b ECU. 
EEC agricultural imports from non-member countries rose from 24.4 
b ECU in 1973 to 42.2 b ECU in 1980, an increase in value terms of 73 
per cent. The largest increase was from developing countries, though 
the volume from these countries was still somewhat smaller than from 
the industrialised countries. 
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7.5 Problems of 
States-
Agricultural Trade The Case for Non-Member 
In spite of the lengthy negotiations in GATT and all the efforts 
they have required, the EC's trading policies in agricultural products 
have given rise to serious concern from non-member states who are 
substantial exporters of these products. This concern has been voiced 
Inost vigorously by the United States but other agricultural exporting 
nations have joined in these sentiments. The view of the U.S. has been 
that when EC policy, implemented 1n pursuit of the internal objectives 
for the agricultural sector, becomes detrimental to the well being of 
U.S. farmers, it becomes imperative that the U.S. Government act to 
protect the interest of its own farmers. 
Their objections to the CAP centre around three issues: 
(1) the effect of the CAP on the level of internal demand for food 
products; 
(2) subsidised competition from the EC with other agricultural 
exporters on the world market for food; 
(3) the instability that the EC transmits into world markets by 
maintaining stable internal prices and thus insulating the EC from 
adjustments signalled by international market developments. 
The USDA have quoted a number of studies that showed the effects 
of the CAP on the internal demand for food within the Community. These 
were, however, primarily concerned with the cost to consumers and the 
welfare transferg to producers rather than with the effects on the 
level of demand for food as such. While it is true that the average 
per capita levels of various food products in the EC are different from 
those in the U.S. and in other developed countries, the EC average 
itself involves wider differences as between different member States. 
Differences in per capita consumption are far more than just a 
reflection of the effects of the CAP on food prices and of the delnand 
for food within the EC, as they reflect long established patterns of 
dietary preferences. The low elasticity of demand for most foodstuffs 
and the small proportion of expenditure in the Community that is now 
spent on food make it unlikely that the price levels under the CAP have 
had any substantial effects on the level of total food consumption. 
It is the second aspect of the CAP criticised in the U.S. study 
i.e. the subsidised competition on third markets, which has given rise 
to the strongest adverse reactions. The study stated that "since its 
inception the Co~non Agricultural Policy has operated to maintain high 
and stable internal prices without any mechanism to limit the extra 
production elicited by these high and riskless price support measures. 
This excess and growing production has first displaced EC imports and 
then, as it grew larger, has been disposed largely through subsidised 
2. This section is based on a paper on "U.S. 
Agricultural Policy" prepared by the Foreign 
the USDA. Washington. February 1982. 
Views of the Common 
Agricultural Services 
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prices onto the international markets, thus further displacing our and 
other countries more efficient exports. During the period of the 
operation of the CAP the EC has moved from a substantial importer to a 
significant exporter of a large number of major agricultural exports." 
Thus the complaint is that the first stage of expansion of farm 
output on the basis of high support prices reduced the market 
opportunities for traditional exporters to the Community; the second 
stage "spilled over onto international markets through subsidised EC 
exports that compete unfairly with traditional exporters in third 
markets". This latter state was illustrated by the growth of grain 
exports such that the EC has now become a net grain exporter, the 
growth of sugar exports to 4.5m tonnes in 1980/81, the transition from 
the world's largest importer of poultry to the world's largest 
exporter, the transition from a net importer of beef and veal to the 
world's second largest exporter (after Australia) and the effects of EC 
fruit processing subsidies on U.S. producers. (It is, however, of 
significance that the U.S. study does not quote the effects of EC 
policies in the dairy sector in the developments on the world market 
for dairy products). 
The third issue raised by the U.S. is the effects of the CAP on 
the stability of world markets for agricultural products and 
specifically that "by maintaining a rigid internal price structure 
under the CAP and insulating the EC agricultural sector from the 
international market, the EC forces other countries to bear the brunt 
of international stability. Although some of the less developed 
countries are least able to cope with these distortions, the U.S. also 
must adjust production and consumption to acconwodate EC market 
distorting forces". The USDA refers to the 'political difficulty' 
arising from the 40 per cent decline in U.S. farm incomes in 1981, 
which in real terms constitutes the lowest level of net farm income 
since the Depression, arising in part from the decline in exports. 
This study concludes that "EC subsidised exports are hurting the 
U.S. High internal EC prices stifle food demand by consumers ••• 
subsidised exports and supplies onto the world markets" and results in 
"higher farm progralmne costs for both the EC and the U. S. EC consumers 
bear the burden. U.S. producers bear the burden and the tax payers on 
both sides of the Atlantic bear the burden". 
In practice of course the burden is borne by other agricultural 
exporting countries as well as the U.S. and it is not only on both 
sides of the Atlantic that the problem arises. The smaller developed 
economies which have a large part of their total exports coming from 
the agricultural sector have to bear a relatively larger proportional 
burden than that borne by the U.S. The economic and political 
difficulties to which this burden gives rise in these countries is 
equal to if not greater than those experienced in the U.S. but the 
strength of the U.S., and the resources they have for expounding their 
views, have led to this view being the most clearly set out in the 
current debate. 
48. 
7.6 The Response of the EC 
It is of course in the very nature of the CAP that it is based on 
a high level of direct market management, designed to sustain internal 
farm prices and incomes. Inevitably it involves a considerable measure 
of protection and the control of imports from third countries. The CAP 
system could not operate, and the budgetary costs would become 
intolerable, if imports were allowed when market prices were low or 
when a substantial measure of intervention was in operation. 
So far as the U.S. complaints are concerned, the EC 
Director-General for Agriculture has argued that it is a myth that the 
EC and its agricultural policy is responsible for the difficult 
situation in which American farmers find themselves. The EC remains 
the world's major importer of agricultural products; the EC's deficit 
with the U.S. in farm trade grew from $5.8 b in 1979 to $6.8 b in 
1980. U.S. fann exports to the EC had grown much faster than farm and 
food exports in the other direction. In his speech the 
Director-General denied that the EC was responsible for the decline in 
world coarse grain prices in 1980. The EC imported nearly 10 m tonnes 
of maize, almost 12 m tonnes of soyabeans and over 7 m tonnes of soya 
cakes, while EC exports of barley were only 4.3 m tonnes. He commented 
that the main problem with wheat exports was the size of the U.S. crop 
itself which has increased from 58 m tonnes in 1979/80 to 76 m in 
1981/82. This increase of 18 m tonnes was more than double total EC 
wheat exports. The Director-General has also drawn attention to a 
study by the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the effects of U.S. 
monetary policy on the demand for U.S. farm exports which concluded 
that the price competitiveness of the U.S. agricultural export sector 
in the 1970's was brought about by relatively loose monetary policy, 
and this policy was one of the main reasons for the boom in U.S. farm 
exports in that period, a boom which was cut off by much tighter 
monetary policy in the early 1980's. 
In putting forward the point of view of the EC the 
Director-General reiterated the Community's desire to avoid a trade war 
over farm policy and acknowledged that, in response to the current 
economic recession, the natural reaction of some governments has been 
to look for scapegoats outside their frontiers. Most governments are 
trying to escape from this crisis by boosting exports and sometimes, 
also, by slowing imports. He has expressed concern at the plans of the 
U.S. Agriculture Secretary John Block for working aggressively to 
stimulate long-term growth in exports of U.S. farm products. The 
resources available in both the European Community and the U.S. to 
engage in "dynamic" export policies for farm products is however of 
major concern to other agricultural exporters, who do not have the same 
economic and political leverage at their disposal. 
7.7 Trade with the Developing Countries 
The discussion of agricultural trade so far has not taken into 
account the particular issues of trade with the less developed world. 
The developing countries have always had important trade relations with 
the Community in which agricultural products have ~layed a major role. 
The Community's agricultural imports from the developing countries rose 
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during the period 1973-80 from 10,000 m ECU to 19,000 m ECUs, an 
increase of about 90 per cent in nominal terms. These imports 
increased more rapidly than the Community's total imports of 
agricultural products, which, over the same period, rose by 75 per cent 
in nominal terms. 
Almost half the Community's total agricultural imports come from 
the developing countries (45 per cent in 1980), taking approximately 
one-third of their total exports of agricultural products. An analysis 
of the tariff arrangements applicable to agricultural imports from the 
developing countries shows that in terms of their total value, 60 per 
cent enter the Community duty-free, over 30 per cent face only a 
relatively low level of duty and 7 per cent are in fact subject to 
levies. Since these trade arrangements are much more favourable than 
the national provisions of the member States before the introduction of 
the CAP, one might have expected a greater volume of agricultural 
imports from the developing countries. 
This has not been the case. The introduction of the CAP has had 
some small effect on the developing countries' share of the Community's 
agricultural imports. 
The proportion of the EC's total imports of agricultural products 
coming from the developing countries was only slightly higher in 1980 
(45 per cent) than in 1962 (43 per cent), the year the CAP came into 
being. Nor does the CAP seem to have had any substantial effect on the 
composition of agricultural imports from the developing countries. 
Those products for which the developing countries are net exporters and 
which are imported into the EC subject to rules adopted under the CAP 
(primarily beef and sugar) only account for some 17 per cent of their 
agricultural exports to the Community. 
There are cases, however, where Community exports do compete with 
developing countries' exports. Some 20 per cent of the EEC's 
agricultural exports to the world comprise products, largely sugar and 
beef and veal, of which the developing countries taken as a whole are 
net exporters. Present trends suggest that, in the medium term, sugar 
from developing countries is likely to be faced with ever-increasing 
competition on the world and EC markets alike. 
Just as the Community is an important market for the developing 
countries, they are an important market for the Community, taking 47 
per cent of its agricultural exports. This percentage is on the 
increase, even though the EC's share in world trade in agricultural 
products has remained constant, at around 10 per cent, after a slight 
increase when the CAP machinery was set up. 
7.8 The Resolution of the Trade Problem 
The basic point at the centre of the problem of the agricultural 
trading policies is the economic situation of the prbducers within the 
EC and in other food exporting countries and the social and political 
consequences which arise from this situation. While there are good 
economic grounds for developing a more liberalised policy in regard to 
world trade in agricultural products, this would result, both in the 
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short and the long-term, in significant resource flows. In particular 
such a policy would benefit farmers with favourable ratios of land to 
labour and who are in a position to exploit new production 
technologies. Conversely such a policy would hurt farmers with poor 
and inadequate land resources, who tend to have least opportunities for 
developing their farm business and farm incomes. 
The longer term answer to such a transfer of resources is that 
smaller and more disadvantaged farmers should be encouraged to cease 
fanning altogether and to take up alternative emplo~nent. However, 
such alternative eluployment is becoming increasingly difficult to find. 
The level of unemployment within the Community has grown very sharply 
in recent years and shows no sign of any decline. Indeed, the 
possibility now has to be faced that the economies of the EC may 
experience unemployment rates of 10 per cent or more for many years to 
come. In these circumstances the pressure to maintain small farmers on 
the land and the implications for external trade policies, become 
stronger and stronger. 
Nor are the traditional outlets of emigration to the "new world" 
countries now open on any scale. These traditional opportunities of 
emigration were of major importance for countries like Ireland and 
Italy and also of considerable significance to the development in other 
European countries over the past century. To some extent the growth in 
agricultural exports from EC member States can be seen as a response to 
the decline in alternative outlets for the resources involved, 
particularly the labour resources. The very strong protectionist 
policy in regard to agricultural products can be seen as, in part, a 
response to the protectionist policies towards the movement of the 
resources, particularly labour, by countries which previously had been 
the "safety valve" for countries with severe population pressures. 
Nevertheless it has to be accepted that the consequences of the 
present international trading policies in agricultural products of the 
EC give rise to a very serious cost burden. This is now clearly 
evident within the EC itself, where the cost of export refunds on 
agricultural products is a major factor in the budgetary difficulties 
of the Community. It is not only a budgetary issue, for the costs to 
domestic consumers are also very substantial. 
It is unlikely that there will be a full solution to these 
problems in the foreseeable future. The further growth of these 
difficulties is, however, likely to be curtailed and may be reversed in 
the longer term by the measures that the EC is obliged to take in the 
light of its current financial situation. These new policies are 
likely to involve two aspects of immediate importance to the 
agricultural trade situation. The first aspect is the measures taken 
to curtail the growth in output, through sharper cuts in the real 
support prices for farm products and through effective quota 
limitations on production with consequent curtailment of the 
'structural' surpluses. The second aspect is the more restricted 
applicf.ltion of the market support measures, such that farmers and 
merchants will be encouraged to find outlets for their produce without 
the benefit of aid from Community financial sources. 
At the same time, there will be even greater pressure for stronger 
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protection from external supplies on the EC's domestic food market. 
Such action can help to sustain farm incomes without direct demands on 
the Community budget. The Commission has said that in its various 
applications, the policy on trade in agricultural products must respect 
the objectives and the need for the proper operation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, particularly Community preference. It is 
difficult to see how, in the current economic circumstances of farmers 
in Europe, the need for the "proper operation of the CAP" can but 
involve a greater restriction of imports of farm products into the 
Community. It is clear that the member States are not prepared to face 
the depopulation and the social and economic consequences of policies 
that would abandon those sectors of their agriculture which are 
inefficient in economic and commercial terms. To the extent that the 
position of these fanners can be protected by measures which restrict 
access of third country suppliers to the Community market, then these 
measures will be taken. Indeed such policies are virtually inevitable 
given the political pressures for their adoption. 

CHAPTER 8 
THE FARM INCOME SITUATION 
8.1 Growth of the Farm Income Problem 
The evolution of the CAP has in recent years been dominated by two 
issues: the income situation of farmers and the Community's budget 
problem. The changes in the level of farm incomes are an essential 
aspect of agricultural policy decisions both at Community as well as 
national level. This is most important in connection with the annual 
decisions on the common agricultural prices; while the farm income 
situation is not the only criterion, it has been the main one until 
recently. This is only what is to be expected in view of the objective 
of "increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture", under Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, as one of the 
main aims of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Concern over farm income changes has grown sharply in recent years 
in the Community, especially since increases in farm incomes began to 
fall behind the rate of inflation and behind increases in incomes for 
the economy as a whole. Political and economic considerations relating 
to income improvements have consequently become even stronger than in 
the past. 
Since the full ilnplementation of the common agricultural policy in 
1968 the trend in farm incomes in the EC was one of substantial 
improvement in the first five years (i.e. 1968-73) when average farm 
incomes in real terms grew by over 40 per cent. From 1973 onwards, 
however, the underlying trerid has not been maintained in an upwards 
direction and indeed has been downwards. The fall in 1974 was 
partially restored over the years 1975-78 but even so in the peak year 
of 1978 farm incomes were 5 per cent lower than in the earlier 1973 
peak. Incomes have fallen again since 1978 and, in spite of the good 
recovery in 1982, average incomes in real tenns were still somewhat 
lower than in 1973. A further decline of 7 per cent for the EC as a 
whole has occurred in 1983. 
It is necessary to consider how the changes in average real 
incomes in farming actually occur. While the focus is usually on 
changes in total net farm income, changes in the labour force amongst 
whom this income is shared is equally important. Much of the 
improvements in per capita incomes has occurred through the sharp 
decline in the agricultural labour force. Generally speaking this 
decline is concentrated among those with the lowest incomes. If no 
other changes in the income situation occurred over a given time period 
other than. the decline in the numbers of those with very low incomes, 
then the per capita incomes of those remaining would tend to rise. 
Given that over the past decade the per capita incomes of those 
remaining in farming in the EC has tended to fall, while those with the 
poorest incomes have fallen out of the equation altogether, those nm, 
fanning in Europe have seen their real incomes falling by much more 
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than the decline shown in the official statistics. This group would by 
definition have had incomes above the average for farming as a whole, 
but not necessarily as good as those in the non-farm sectors. 
8.2 Farm Income Trends Within Member States 
While reliable income distribution data for European farming are 
not available, the Commission have published figures which show that in 
1977/78 80 per cent of "market-oriented" farms in the Community had 
farm incomes that were below the average incomes in off-farm jobs. 
This was the position in spite of the sharp drop in the total farm 
labour force in Europe; in the decade of the seventies alone the total 
number on farms fell by about 40 per cent. Even with this sharp fall 
in the numbers working on farms, average incomes of farmers have not 
even been maintained in real terms, let alone kept pace with 
improvements in the rest of the economy. These changes are by no means 
uniform. German farmers for example experienced a strong decline in 
incomes from 1976 through to 1980 and the recovery in 1981-82 has been 
eroded by the further sharp decline in 1983. This has occurred in 
spite of the benefits which German farmers derive from the special 
exchange rate policy operated under the Common Agricultural Policy. 
These incomes and trends, particularly when contrasted with the 
considerable improvements in real incomes of people at work in the 
other sectors of the German economy. have been a very significant 
factor in the German policy stance in Brussels, as their aim of 
constraining expenditure on the CAP has had to be tempered by the very 
large problems faced by their own farmers over recent years. 
French farmers have found themselves faced with very similar 
income problems except that, in their case, real incomes have been 
falling since the early 1970's. Farmers incomes fell continuously from 
1973 down to 1978 and, after some fluctuations around the 1978 level, 
have again declined in 1983 to around 75 per cent of the level 
prevailing a decade earlier. Over these years the rest of the French 
economy has also experienced a steady improvement in incomes, so the 
gap between urban and rural incomes has widened very substantially over 
the past decade. Again this has happened in spite of the very large 
benefits accruing to French farmers from participation in the CAP. As 
France is a beneficiary under the CAP, there has not been the same 
pressures to contain expenditures as in the case of Germany. The 
French policy position has been dominated by the need to achieve 
effective action at Community level that would be of direct help to 
their agricultural sector in improving its income situation. 
The income trends in Germany and France are in considerable 
contrast to those in Italy. Italian farmers are in general much poorer 
than those in the Northern European countries but their incomes over 
the past decade have tended to increase, though not in any consistent 
fashion. However, these increases have not brought Italian farm 
incomes generally up to the level of the average of the rest of the EC, 
primarily because of the serious structural problems of Italian 
agriculture. Furthermore Italian farmers have not enjoyed the same 
degree of price support for their particular mix of farm output, so 
that the Italian policy stance on income and price supports has not 
been motivated by the same factors as those of northern Member States. 
55. 
The farmers in Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have 
not suffered the same downward income trend of German and French 
farmers, but neither have they tended to improve their farm income 
position over the past decade. Farmers in these countries are among 
those with the highest levels of per capita incomes, and they have in 
general been able to maintain these in real terms ~ though they have 
experienced some very sharp year-to-year changes. Except for 
Luxembourg, there has been an appreciable improvement in real incomes 
in the non-farm sectors of these countries, so that while on average 
farmers have been able to maintain their real incomes (but subject to 
the proviso about the nature of the income trends within the farming 
sector set out above) they have not been able to keep up with the 
improvements in incomes of people in other sectors. 
The income experience of farmers in Ireland and the U.K. has been 
different again~ Irish farmers have traditionally been much poorer 
than those in most other European countries; in the years immediately 
preceding EC membership they enjoyed a very rapid income boost which, 
after a sharp set back in 1974, was continued up to 1978. By 1978 the 
CAP had been implemented in full in Ireland and farmers found that the 
promise of a major transformation in their economic situation, which 
had been held out as the carrot to EC membership, had in fact beconie a 
reality. However, the reality was very short lived. The following 
year, 1979, saw a very sharp fall in incomes, a fall which was 
continued into 1980 and then, at a much lower rate, on into 1981. By 
1981 Irish farmers were considerably worse off then they had been in 
1973, when Ireland first joined the Community. There has been some 
small improvement in the following two years, but this has still left 
farmers far worse off than they were in 1978 and no better off than in 
1973. 
U.K. farmers found their incomes falling in the first couple of 
years of EEC membership; a fall that continued after a temporary 
improvement in 1976. By 1980 this income fall had left the U.K. 
farmers over 25 per cent worse off in real terms than in 1973. 
However, the next two years, and particularly 1982 saw considerable 
recovery - not enough to restore real incomes to their 1973 levels, but 
at least sufficient to bring some measures of relief to British 
farmers. 
These many different trends in income have tended to cancel each 
other out at Community level, so that by 1982 real farm incomes were 
almost back to their 1973-75 average, but the fall in 1983 has left 
farmers 10 per cent worse off than a decade earlier. 
8.3 Effects on Price Decisions 
The year to year fluctuations have been much smaller at Community 
level than at the level of the individual member State. However, 
decisions on price supports and other measures affecting farm incomes 
are taken by the Council of Ministers with regard to the position of 
the farmers in their own country rather than with great concern for 
average income trends in the EC as a whole. 
There is therefore, a greater pressure for price increases than 
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might be the case if the decisions were taken with regard to the 
situation of Community farmers generally. This is reflected in the 
fact that the original price proposals put forward by the Commission in 
any year tend to be somewhat more restrictive than the decisions on 
prices finally taken by the Council of Ministers of Agriculture 
although the size of this gap should not be exaggerated. 
The income problems of European farmers have, therefore, remained 
substantial in spite of all the benefits conferred on them by the CAP. 
While the decisions on the CAP over the past decade have been strongly 
criticised, the nature of the underlying problem, particularly in terms 
of the social needs of maintaining and protecting the fabric of rural 
society in Europe, should not be under-estimated. The fact that, in 
spite of so much that has been spent, so little has been achieved in 
terms of income improvement is a very real measure of the size of the 
problem. 
8.4 Consequences of Inflation for Real Incomes 
One of the major issues in recent years was the position of real 
farm incomes in member countries with high rates of inflation. This 
was the subject of a detailed report by the European Commission, which 
concluded that it does not appear that a higher than average rate of 
inflation has been associated with a lower than average rate of 
increase in agricultural incomes. 
The European Parliament found this conclusion hard to swallow and 
said that it seemed so contradictory to the reality experienced by 
farmers in member States with high rates of inflation that a Motion for 
a Resolution was signed by members of the parliament expressing serious 
reservations and requesting the Commission to re-examine its 
conclusions. The contention of Parliament was that the study of the 
Commission can be considered coherent only if the underlying concept 
and the means chosen to estimate farm incomes are accepted. 
It was the underlying concept that Parliament did not accept. It 
argued that the Commission based its conclusion on averages over long 
time spans, for all products, costs and producer prices calculated in 
European currency (ECU) and not in terms of national currencies. 
Parliament therefore said that this approach camouflaged completely the 
harsh economic reality faced by farmers in member States with high 
rates of inflation. The second criticism by Parliament was that the 
Commission looked at the value-added of agriculture as a whole and that 
in attempting to deal with the incomes of all engaged in agriculture it 
measured the income of none, since the resultant index was an average 
of large and small, full-time and part-time, intensive and extensive, 
arable and poultry etc. In other words, no attempt was made to take 
account of the diversity that is to be found in the agricultural 
structure in all Member States. 
According to the European Parliament, while the Treaty of Rome 
provides an obligation to ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture, the Conunission's study 
refused to look at farmers as individuals with very different economic 
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situations and problems. 
8.5 Measurement of Farm Income 
The European Community in spite of all of its efforts, is still a 
long way from achieving an agreed measure of the income problem of 
farmers. Different groups clearly have a vested interest in the way 
the data are analysed and presented, and this is both a horizontal 
problem (i.e. it applies to farmers throughout the Community), and 
vertical problem, (i.e. different analyses can have different outcomes 
for farmers in different member States). 
An approach to the assessment of the farm income situation through 
a detailed statistical exercise which measures the income requirements 
of farmers to maintain existing parities with incomes in off-farm jobs 
the "objective method" - was abandoned by the Commission in the late 
1970's when this approach showed clearly the growing divergence between 
farm and off-farm incomes. The Commission argued that the method 
encountered "fundamental difficulties" in its application to the 
situation in 1980/81, particularly arising from the effects of monetary 
exchange rate changes and the effects of technological change in the 
levels of incomes earned by farmers. While these problems were real, 
it is difficult not to conclude that this method was abandoned because 
of the embarrassment caused by the results that the method generated, 
rather than from the inherent weaknesses of the method itself. 
8.6 The Income Problem and the political Consequences 
The Community policy of support for incomes (which is only one of 
the objectives laid down for the CAP in the Treaty of Rome), is a 
consequence of a political decision by the meruber governments. At a 
time of the most serious unemployment and other problems of urban 
society, particularly among younger people, it is not easy to explain 
or understand the rationale for devoting so much of the total Community 
budget to farm price supports, much of which goes to the prosperous 
farmers for production which at the margin has only a very low, or in 
the case of milk a negative, value. The explanation would seem to lie 
in the ability of farmers to use their political strength in 
influencing Government, many of which hold office by only slender 
parliamentary majorities, to spend very large sums (in 1984 some 
18,000,000,000 ECUs froln the Community budget plus further large sums 
from national budgets) to support the farm sector. The other groups in 
European society affected by farm policy decisions, for example the 
European consumers though numerically much larger have had little 
success in using their influence on food prices, and their opinions 
play virtually no part in the annual price decisions taken by the 
Council of Ministers for Agriculture. Nor has the sharp decline of the 
contribution of the agricultural sector to the Gross Domestic product 
of the Community, or to the total level of employment, had any serious 
effect on the political strength of the farm lobby. It would seem 
unlikely that if the European Community was to be established in the 
economic social and political climate of the 1980's, the role of 
agriculture would be so dominant, but the system was a consequence of 
the situation in the mid 1950's and having been established on that 
58. 
basis, it has proved virtually impregnable to subsequent economic and 
political change. 
3.7 The Farm Income Situation Overtaken by the Budgetary Crisis 
The income problem of European farmers has, however, now become 
overwhelmed by the wider budgetary problems of the Community. The 
future policies taken to support incomes - either through farm prices 
or by other support methods - will depend upon the solution of the 
budgetary difficulties. This is so fundamental to the whole question 
of the future of the European Community itself - not necessarily as to 
whether it will break up altogether but at least as to the fundamental 
character of the Community - that the farm income problem itself is no 
longer at the centre of the European stage. But this problem has not 
been resolved, indeed is more serious now than ever before. The farm 
income issue has, however, brought the EC to a crisis in its 
development and is likely to remain of major concern for years to come. 
CHAPTER 9 
MONETARY PROBLEMS AND THE CAP 
9.1 The TWo Currency Exchange Rates System 
The operation of the CAP has been made extremely complex by the 
changes in market exchange rates in the major European currencies that 
have occurred with great regularity over the past 15 years. These have 
led to a system involving special exchange rates for agricultural 
purposes for the currencies of most major States of the European 
Community. The two currency exchange rates that operate within the 
Community the normal market rate for non-agricultural purposes and 
the "representative" rate for the purposes of the Common Agricultural 
Policy - are inter-related, but not in a uniform or consistent fashion. 
The two rates are subject to quite different influences, although there 
have in the past been strong pressures to bring the agricultural rates 
back into line with the prevailing market rates (though it is not clear 
what affects the recent agreement on agricultural exchange rates in the 
1984 price agreement of the Council of Ministers will have in the 
longer term). 
The problem of special agricultural exchange rates (often called 
"green" rates) arose from the farm income and other economic 
consequences that would otherwise follow in the operation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy from changes in the market rates for the currencies 
of the individual member States in the Community. Maintaining the 
exchange rates used for purposes of the Common Agricultural Policy at 
whatever the prevailing market rate happened to be during periods of 
sharply fluctuating exchange rates would have a major repercussion on 
the prices received by agricultural producers. The policy of 
insulating, at least in part, the prices of agricultural products from 
the effects of changes in the market rates of individual currencies of 
the EC is however an unprecedented development in market policy. Its 
effects have led to widespread representations on behalf of those 
groups who have been adversely affected, particularly farmers whose 
prices and incomes are very directly affected by decisions on the 
exchange rates actually used in the day-to-day implementation of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. 
9.2 Evolution of Monetary Factors in the CAP 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community lays down 
(in Article 38) that "the operation and development of the common 
market for agricultural products must be accompanied by the 
establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy among member States" and 
that the common organisation of agricultural markets may include 
"regulation of prices, aids for the production and marketing of the 
various products, storage and carryover arrangements and common 
machinery for stabilising imports or exports", with any common price 
policy being based on "common criteria and uniform methods of 
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calculation" (Article 40). The implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy has involved fixing of co®non price arrangements 
and the joint financing of expenditure on market price supports and 
farm structural improvements. The common price arrangements determine 
the level of prices at which agricultural imports may enter the 
Community as well as the level of internal market support. 
In order for the common agricultural policy to function. some 
co®non denominator is required for the currencies of the member States. 
The original 'unit of account' (u.a.) was the notional unit used for 
official transactions between the European Community itself and the 
member States, with a value of 35 u.a.'s equal to 1 ounce of gold (i.e. 
gold value of the u.s. dollar in 1962 when the unit of account was 
first established). It was the obvious choice as the basic accounting 
unit; all the member States at that time had a declared par value of 
their currencies with gold and, of course, the parity with the U.S. 
dollar was appropriate, for it was then. and still is, by far the most 
dominant currency in international affairs. 
In 1962, it was decided that the exchange rate to be used for the 
conversion of "units of account" into the domestic currencies of the 
member States for the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy would 
correspond to the official par value of the currency declared to the 
International Monetary Fund. As long as currencies of the member 
States remained at fixed parities against gold - and therefore, against 
each other under the Bretton Woods monetary system - the operation of 
the common agricultural policy involved no monetary difficulties. This 
was the position throughout the sixties right up until 1969, when the 
French franc was devalued in August and the German mark was revalued in 
October. Although this occurred many years ago, it led to consequences 
that have been a major problem virtually ever since that time. 
The devaluation of the franc by 11 per cent in 1969 should, under 
the operation of the system of fixing prices in units of account, have 
led to an equivalent increase in the prices for farm products and all 
the monetary factors (e.g. import levies and charges, export refunds, 
intervention prices etc.). Under this system, any devaluation of a 
currency of a member State carried through to its full conclusion would 
automatically lead to an equivalent upward change in support prices for 
farm products in the country concerned. Conversely any country 
revaluing its currency upwards against its gold parity and, therefore, 
against the unit of account, would automatically result in a fall in 
the support prices paid to its farmers. 
The prospect of an 11 per cent increase in the prices of the farm 
products produced in France for which a co®non organisation of the 
market existed was of serious concern to the French Government. Such a 
change would add to the problem of inflation, which was a major cause 
of the devaluation in the first place. Furthermore an increase in farm 
prices would have changed the distribution of income in favour of 
farmers and against the other social and professional groups in 
society. If, on the other hand, prices for fann products were left 
unchanged in terms of French francs, this would have created great 
difficulties for the operation of the CAP, for it would have given 
French producers an exchange rate advantage and distorted competition 
in agricultural trade both inside and outside the Community. 
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In this situation there were, in practical terms, only two 
realistic policies which could have been adopted. The full 
consequences of a currency devaluation under the system of common 
organisation of the market, on prices paid to French farmers could have 
been introduced immediately or could be delayed through steps to offset 
the "exchange rate advantages" which would otherwise accrue to French 
farmers and traders. The Council of Ministers, with the agreement of 
the French government, decided on the latter course as a temporary 
measure. 
The French Government's aim was to align prices at the new parity 
for the franc within 18 months or so. In the meanwhile, a system of 
monetary compensatory amounts was introduced which, in effect, made up 
the difference between French farm prices at the pre-devaluation parity 
of the French franc and the prices which were paid for French farm 
produce in trade, both within and outside the European Community, which 
were paid at the current market exchange rates. Under this system a 
charge was made on exports of those French farm products covered by the 
Common Agricultural Policy; at the same time a payment was made on 
equivalent imports in order to reduce their price. As the alignment of 
French farm prices to those appropriate to the new parity of the franc 
took place, so these monetary charges were phased out and the full 
effects of the devaluation then took effect in prices to farmers, and 
of course in the prices paid by consumers. 
The devaluation of the franc in 1969 was followed very rapidly by 
the revaluation of the German mark. As in the case of the change in 
the parity of the French franc, this change in the value of the deutsch 
mark should have led to a revision in the prices for farm products in 
Germany. In this case, however, the reV1Sl0n would have meant that 
prices paid to farmers would have fallen by almost 10 per cent. This 
was unacceptable to the German government because of the inevitable 
reaction that would have followed from their farmers to a fallon this 
scale in the prices paid for their products. 
The solution to this problem created in the agricultural sector by 
the German revaluation was to follow the principle already established 
in the case of the French devaluation. The prices paid in German marks 
for farm products in Germany was left unchanged and, again a temporary 
system of payments and charges on trade in farm products was instituted 
in order to compensate for the difference in the changes in the value 
of the mark in external trade. The Council of Ministers agreed to a 
programme for phasing out the monetary compensatory amounts in order to 
restore the unity of the Community market for the main farm products. 
9.3 Permanence of "Temporary" Solutions 
Thus the system of monetary compensatory amounts had been put into 
effect before the end of 1969 for both devaluing and revaluing 
currencies. This created a new phase and a new problem in the 
development of agricultural policy within the Community. In the case 
of both France and Germany these compensatory amounts were a temporary 
measure to enable the prices of farm products in the two countries to 
be brought back gradually into line with those appropriate to the new 
official parities. 
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However, while on these particular occasions the arrangements were 
in fact temporary, they represented the beginning of an entirely new 
set of difficulties for the CAP. This has resulted in a whole new 
dimension in the trade in farm products of individual member States, 
not just for trade with other countries inside the Community but 
equally for trade with third countries. This has meant that the 
unified price system of the Common Agricultural Policy has in effect 
been disrupted by the division of the Community into separate markets 
for farm products, differentiated according to the strength of the 
national currencies involved. 
Monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs) were introduced in order to 
maintain the system of "common prices" for farm products within the 
European Community. Changes in the parities of currencies of 
individual member States would, unless some action were taken, lead to 
a change in prices received by farmers and thus, it has been held, a 
change in the levels of "common prices" in national currencies. 
However, this interpretation of "common prices" involves an underlying 
concept of constant exchange rates at the representative or declared 
exchange parities. These cannot be regarded as unalterable during 
periods of substantial changes in market rates of exchange. The 
monetary compensatory amounts originally introduced as a temporary 
transitional measure, have subsequently been applied without any really 
effective time limit, or indeed any specific limitation on the levels 
of charges or subsidies which are paid. In practice the periodic 
adjustment of representative (i.e. agricultural) rates does create 
such a limitation and it is the declared policy of the Commission to 
phase them out as rapidly as possible. Nevertheless MCAs have become a 
major feature of the day-to-day operation of the CAP. 
The agricultural products which are covered by the riCA system are 
primarily those for 'which a common organisation of the market exists 
and for which intervention measures are laid down within the framework 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, i.e. cereals, rice, pigmeat, beef 
and veal (but not sheepmeat), eggs and poultry, milk and dairy 
products, wine, sugar, tobacco and olive oil together with the main 
processed agricultural products which have undergone a relatively 
simple degree of transformation. In the latter case the distinction 
between those products where the cost of raw agricultural material 
represents a significant proportion of the final value of the product, 
and therefore subject to monetary compensatory amounts, and those where 
the raw material costs are not a significant proportion and not subject 
to MCAs, is an arbitrary one. For example trade in chocolates and 
chocolate confectionery are subject to monetary compensatory amounts 
while bread and flour confectionery is not. Boiled sweets are subject 
to monetary compensatory amounts but not che\ving gum. Processed fruit 
and vegetables (including jam) are not covered because the raw fruit 
and vegetable ingredients are themselves not subject to monetary 
compensatory amounts. 
9.4 Effects on Trade in Farm products 
Trade in farm products accounts for a very substantial part of 
total EC trade, both within the Community and with third countries. 
Total agricultural imports and exports of the member States of the EC 
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were valued at some 150 billion ECUs in 1983. Much of this trade was 
subject to monetary compensatory amounts - the main exceptions during 
1983 being trade to and from Italy, Ireland and Belgium whose 
agricultural rate has been aligned with its market exchange rate, and 
those farm products not covered by the common agricultural policy. The 
problems that this system has generated are both of an immediate 
character, which affect the current level and direction of trade in 
agricultural products, and of a longer term nature which affect the 
whole development of agricultural trade not only within the Community 
but also between individual member States and third countries. 
On the whole, the monetary compensatory amounts have so far made 
it possible to preserve the single market, at least in principle, in 
spite of different prices in national currencies (i.e. different when 
translated at the central rate), thus ensuring the survival of the CAP. 
However, this itself is not without defects. 
Firstly, it has cost a lot of money. Some 14.5 per cent of total 
agricultural expenditure from the EC budget was accounted for by 
monetary compensation in 1977, though by 1983 this had fallen to just 
under 3 per cent. Secondly, the system has imposed a new set of 
burdens on the administration of the member States and on the problems 
of traders in their day-to-day trading activities. It must be 
recognised that changes in the market rates of currencies of member 
States is bound to cause very great problems for the administration and 
trade of the CAP; the system of monetary compensatory amounts is, 
however, no simple solution in administrative terms. It is not only 
the national administrations which are involved; the present system 
means that European traders in fann products on international markets 
have to cope both with the normal trading problems and also with the 
complex changes in market exchange rates and the consequential 
adjustment to monetary compensatory amounts. The efforts to reduce the 
economic disadvantages have added to the administrative complexities of 
the system. 
Thirdly, the long-term effects have, however, been the most 
important. Persistent differences between the central and green rates 
of exchange may distort competition, impede structural change in 
agriculture and prevent the most efficient utilization of the resources 
available in the Community. The MCA system artificially ensures that 
trade between the various domestic markets and with third country 
markets takes place at the common level while in reality domestic 
prices remain either above the common level in the case of strong 
currencies or below the common level in the case of weak currencies. 
By the application of the green rates in a country which has 
revalued, agricultural prices in that country, expressed in national 
currency, at first remain at the pre-revaluation level instead of 
falling. However, some imported agricultural raw materials are paid 
for at the official (revalued) central rate of exchange and thus become 
cheaper. A devaluation has the opposite effect. The unequal treatment 
of raw materials imports and agricultural produce may have important 
effects in certain sectors of production (e.g. pigmeat, poultry, eggs 
and to some extent also milk and beef and veal). Hence if the 
differences between the central and green rates remain fixed for too 
long or are even increased over the years owing to frequent 
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revaluations, this may give rise to serious distortions which may in 
turn call the CAP itself into question. 
9.5 Long-Term Solution 
The nub of the problem is that as long as full economic and 
monetary union has not been achieved in the Community, differences in 
economic trends (in particular differing inflation rates) in the Member 
States will necessitate market exchange rate adjustments. Since the 
central rates change but farm prices in the member countries are not 
always fully adjusted immediately, "green" exchange rates are 
necessary. Differences between central and green rates would give rise 
to total distortion of trade flows in agricultural products and make 
monetary compensatory amounts unavoidable. 
If the problem is to be tackled at its root, there is only one 
solution: European economic and monetary union. The introduction of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 was a step in that 
direction. In spite of all the difficulties, the EMS has worked 
reasonably satisfactorily, even if it has not yet been possible to 
integrate sterling fully within the system. It has actually proved 
possible to create a European area of some stability in an otherwise 
turbulent monetary world. However the ID1S, even when it involves all 
the members of the Community, is still a long way from full economic 
and monetary union. 
In the meanwhile the political problems arising from MCAs have 
become of major concern. Countries with high positive MCAs (i.e. 
strong currency countries) face substantial cuts in farm prices - and 
consequently even bigger cuts in farm incomes - in the event of the 
withdrawal of MCAs. The Commission have over the past decade 
repeatedly pressed for the elimination of these MCAs, on the grounds 
that agriculture in the Community has been suffering from the 
consequences of the lack of monetary union between member States. The 
single market originally achieved by means of common prices in units of 
account has subsequently disintegrated because of the changes in 
exchange parities which have been made. 
The recent proposals by the Commission for the rationalisation of 
the CAP include the dismantling of existing MCAs in two identical 
stages at the beginning of the next two marketing years, with any new 
MCAs being dealt with in three stages i.e. when the exchange rate 
realignment occurs and at the beginning of the two following marketing 
years. The Commission have also proposed to amend the rules for 
calculating MCAs so that they are restricted to the amount strictly 
necessary to ensure that the market organisation functions properly and 
trade distortions are prevented. 
For countries which had substantial current positive MCAs, such as 
Germany with over 10 per cent and the Netherlands and the U.K. with 
around 7 per cent, reduction of half these levels would have a severe 
repercussion on farm income. Reductions in the past have been 
implemented at times of general support price increases, so that any 
decline in MCAs has not led to an actual fall in prices in countries 
with revalued currencies. At present, however, the scope for higher EEC 
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support prices is minimal and proposals for no change, or for just 1 
per cent or 2 per cent for some products, would not alleviate the 
burden of a sharp decline in positive MCAs. It is, therefore, clear 
that the political problem of MCA reductions has now become of major 
concern in the Community. 
At the same time, the pressure from countries which are exporters 
of agricultural products within the Community with low or negative MCAs 
to have the entire system phased out have become increasingly strong. 
Protection through the MCA system for countries with strong currencies 
has a most serious effect on the prosperity of other countries who find 
market access for their farm exports severely restricted by high MCAs. 
Moreover, positive MCAs can have a major impact on Community farm 
output, for example in the field of dairy production, and their 
continued existence in some member States has added substantially to 
current surpluses of farm products (particularly dairy products). 
9.6 Policy Adopted in the 1984-85 Prices Decisions 
The MCA problem has, therefore, become a substantial element in 
the discussions on the rationalisation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The 1984/5 Farm Price decisions taken by the Council of 
Ministers represent a major step towards phasing out MCAs, but whether 
this plan will work in the longer term still remains to be seen. The 
new system involves the creation of an "agricultural ECU", some 3 per 
cent above the market ECU, and the reduction in MCAs in Germany and 
Netherlands to this new agricultural ECU. In return, the German 
government will provide special assistance to its farmers to offset the 
reduction in farm prices brought about by the reduction in MCAs, the 
cost to be met in part from the Community budget. The increase in the 
value of the ECU for agricultural purposes has meant an increase in 
prices for farm products in national currencies for most member states, 
and this will add substantially to the total bill for fann price 
supports to be met out of the EC budget in 1984/5 and subsequent years. 
Whether the new system in fact represents a permanent solution to the 
problem will depend on currency developments in the coming years; 
certainly the proposal to index the green currency system to the 
strongest national currency (Le. the German mark) would have further 
very serious consequences for the Community budget. It could also have 
significant repercussions on the trading developments in farm products 
between the Community and the rest of the world. 

CHAPTER 10 
THE BUDGETARY SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
10.1 Current Budget Crisis of the Community 
In recent years the budgetary question has moved into the 
forefront of discussions concerning the future of the European 
Community. In its most direct form the possibility has arisen, at 
least in theory though hardly in practice, that the Community may go 
bankrupt in the sense that agreed common policies and common activities 
cannot be pursued or implemented for lack of cash. 
The budget has now become the most important instrument in the 
integration process between the individual European nations into a 
cohesive Community. This concern over hudget matters is based on two 
fundmnental issues. First there has been a detailed debate on the 
level of net contributions; this has focussed on the economic costs and 
benefits that arise directly in the budget related to those parts of 
the Community system which lead to financial flows between Hember 
States. The UK i.n particular has felt that its net contribution to the 
Community budget involves an economic cost out of proportion to the 
benefits to them and consequently they have demanded a fundamental 
budget reform covering expenditure as well as receipts. Most other 
member States, however have rejected this approach on the grounds that 
the budget considered in isolation does not properly reflect the true 
costs and benefits associated with membership. These members would 
hold that the notion of the "juste retour" - the princiDle of payments 
and receipts being equal for each country - is against the very spirit 
of the EC. 
Second there is th~ very real possibility that the Community will 
run out of funds in a very sh'brt time. It would, indeed, be a most 
serious breakdown of theEC as it now operates if the Community could 
not pay for the activities approved by the Council of Ministers. There 
is no doubt that, in the event of financial resources being exhausted, 
the Community \vould corne to a virtual standstill and would then find 
itself in a major crisis. Those countries who favour radical reform of 
the budget are likely to use the prospects of such an outcome to impose 
their own conditions for agreeing to any further additional finances 
for the Comnunity to meet existing conunl tments. 
The crucial element in the budgetary crisis is that the Community 
is now living, to quote the Budget Conunissioner, "within the shadow of 
the exhaustion of its O\vn resources". To understand the nature of this 
Crl.S1.S it is necessary to consider briefly how the financing 
arrangements of the EEC actually operate. 
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10.2 Basic Financial Understanding in the Community 
When it was first set up, the Community was financed by direct 
cantributions from the Member States. However the Treaty of Rome made 
provisions for the Commission to examine ways in which these financial 
contributions could be replaced by the Community's "own resources" -
i.e. by sources of finance which were the Community's autornatically and 
independent of decisions by the individual Member States or by the 
Council of Ministers. 
The Community's revenue under the system of own resources was 
introduced by a Treaty of 1970. This provided that the Community 
should receive all custorns duties, agricultural levies and an amount 
equivalent to a 1 per cent VAT rate on an agreed base of sales and 
services. VAT is the only flexible element among these sources of 
funds. By 1975 all customs duties and agricultural levies had been 
fully transferred to the Community. For the VAT resources to be 
brought into effect, a harmonised VAT base had first to be established 
and this came into effect in 1979. This Community VAT rate is 
independent of the rate or rates levied by the Member States under 
their own national system. 
The original VAT rate required to replace the remalnlng financial 
contributions from the Member States was about 0.7 per cent so that, 
even from its beginning, the own resources system had already used up a 
considerable part of the maximum 1 per cent VAT rate provided for in 
the new system. A 1 per cent VAT rate yields at present about 15 b 
ECU, equal to about 60 per cent of the current (1984) budget total, 
which is of the order of 25 b ECU. The difference is accounted for by 
customs duties and levies. 
The EC Commission had warned in 1978 that the 1 per cent VAT rate 
could well be fully utilised in a relatively short time span and had 
put forward a variety of alternatives for supplementing the Community's 
own resources. In fact, the 1 per cent VAT ceiling took rather longer 
to reach than the Commission had originally expected, as the world 
prices for farm products remained relatively high until 1982 and 
agricultural intervention expenditure consequently grew more modestly 
than had been originally forecast. In 1983, however, a radical change 
in the agricultural situation, with a corresponding increase in farm 
price support payments occurred. A record supplementary budget of 
about 1,700 m ECUs for agricultural expenditure was necessary and the 
increase in total fann price support spending over 1982 approached 30 
per cent. This increase in expenditure, coupled with a poor economic 
perfonnance generally and a consequential lack of buoyancy in the 
Community receipts, led to a very tight financial situation. The 
budgetary problem was highlighted in the most dramatic manner at the 
end of 1983 when the European Commission suspended the advance payments 
of certain export refunds and aids because the funds were not available 
to meet these costs. This had the effect of deferring until 1984 some 
600 m ECUs of payments due in 1983. 
It is perhaps useful to explain that 
between the Community Budget and that of a 
the Community does not in theory have the 
finance its expenditure. On the contrary, 
one of the major differences 
typical Member State is that 
power to borrow in order to 
it is a fundamental Treaty 
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obligation that budgetary expenditure must be balanced by Community 
receipts. Until additional own resources are approved and made 
available to the Community, the existing limit is one within which the 
Community has to live. In these circumstances there is a very real 
possibility that the present Community policies may become 
unsupportable and that policy changes will be implemented for purely 
budgetary reasons. However, in the dire financial situation of 1984, 
various measures are being considered to circumvent the restrictions on 
borrowing; it is quite possible that some device may be adopted which 
will overcome the limitation which hitherto has been regarded as an 
absolute prohibition on borrowing to meet the Communi.ty's expenditure 
programme. 
A further complicating and important factor in the situation is 
the role of the European Parliament. Although the Parliament's powers 
generally are limited, they are strongest in the budgetary field, where 
the parliament can reject - and indeed has in the past rejected - the 
entire budget. It is inevitable that the elected Parliament should 
seek to influence the policies operated by the Community and, in doing 
so, should use whatever means it finds at its disposal. 
10.3 Underlying Nature of the Budget Problem 
The fundamental causes of the present budgetary crisis are simple 
enough in themselves, but very difficult to resolve. The problem can 
be seen quite clearly from the course of the 1983 budget. The original 
budget was twice amended, first in the spring to provide funds for UK 
and Gennan compensation for 1982 and later in the year to cover the 
sharp rise in farm price support expenditure. 
In total, 1983 spending was just over 25 b ECU. 
virtually exhausted the financial resources available, 
full 1 per cent VAT rate. Of the total, about 15.8 b 
under two thirds, was budgeted for farm price supports. 
agricultural expenditure on farm structural improvement 
ECU i.e. less than 3 per cent of the total. 
This total 
including the 
ECU, or just 
By comparison, 
\>1as some 650m 
The budgetary crisis has arisen primarily because the measures to 
increase the proportion of expenditl1re on the non-agricultural policies 
has not he en matched either by the growth in total financial resources 
or the diminution of the proportion spent on agricultural support. 
This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that the benefits of 
agricultural expenditure accrue unequally in different regions of the 
Community, which has created a considerable measure of instability in 
the budgetary situation. 
The scale of the problem can be assessed frOIn the experience of 
the 10 years 1974-83. Over that period, expenditure on agricultural 
price supports grew more than five-fold, from about 3b ECU to almost 
16b ECU. Over the same period, 'own resources' increased by only two 
and a half times, from about 9b ECU to some 24b ECU. This unequal 
growth has occurred in spite of the attempts to contain the volume of 
spending on agriculture price supports. The Commission's proposal in 
1980, that such expenditure should grow at a slower pace than the 
growth in the Community's O\..rn resources, has been totally unsuccessful. 
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It should moreover be recognised that the 
arrangements do provide for a steady growth in 
both in nominal terms and in real terms as long as 
growing in real terms. 
existing financing 
the income of the EC 
the total economy is 
From 1974 to 1979, the annual increase in the cost of supporting 
agricultural markets and guaranteed prices averaged 23 per cent; there 
was then relative stability in 1980-82, largely because of a favourable 
situation on world markets, which reduced the cost to the Conununity 
budget of export refunds. This favourable situation postponed the day 
of reckoning; now, after years in which agricultural production has 
increased faster than consumption and the rate of increase in overall 
budgetary expenditure has outpaced the grmvth in own resources (customs 
duties, agricultural levies and up to 1 per cent of VAT), the 
irresistable force of the Conununity's agricultural expenditure has come 
up against the (at least temporarily) immovable object of the 
Conununity's budget. 
The Commission has made proposals to increase "own resources" by 
raising the VAT ceiling to 1.4 per cent, with provision for further 
adjustments in later years, and these proposals were subsequently 
revised upwards to a 2 per cent ceiling on the direct VAT related 
contribution. This proposal for increasing the member states direct 
budgetary contributions has been put forward to avoid the need for 
frequent smaller increases (particularly as it has become clear that 
the likely 1984 CAP expenditure and the costs of enlargement of the 
Community to include Spain and Portugal \vould largely exhaust the 
original proposal of an extra 0.4 per cent VAT contribution). Hmvever. 
because of the large share of agricultural expenditure in the overall 
budget spending, it is clear that adaptation of the CAP is an integral 
part of budgetary reform and has become a matter of great urgency. 
10.4 Position of the Major Net Contributors 
The financial problems of the Community have been made far more 
difficult to solve by the strength and nature of the U.K. budgetary 
problem. This problem is itself to a considerable extent a consequence 
of the agricultural problem. The United Kingdom, whose GDP per head is 
close to the Community average, contributed in 1982 almost a quarter of 
total Community finances and received in return just over half of this 
sum back from Community expenditures. This resulted in 1982 in a net 
United Kingdom contribution of more than 2 b ECU. This was almost 
the 
same net contribution as that of Germany, \"hose level of economic 
wealth is substantially greater than the U.K. While the idea of the 
'just return' is an anathema in EC circles, it is not so among the 
major net contributors to the financial burden (and particularly to the 
U • K. ) • 
The problem of the other major net contributor, Germany, differs 
from that of the United Kingdom in that the Germans accept in principle 
the obligation of making a substantial net contribution to the 
Community. However, they are understandably concerned that, as the 
richest Community country, the expansion of the Community budget could 
result in very large additional demands on them. In recent years the 
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German domestic economic policy has been concerned particularly with 
the need to contain their own budgetary situation and it would be quite 
unrealistic to expect that a member State would swallow the politically 
unpopular consequences of severe budgetary restraint at home while 
contributing substantially more funds to the European Community for the 
benefit of other countries. 
At the same time a number of member States, particularly those who 
have large agricultural sectors and are major beneficiaries of payments 
under the CAP, are concerned that budget reform should not imply a 
dismantling of the present agricultural policy. This concern is 
readily understandable in the case of countries with a large 
agricultural sector and whose GDP per head is relatively low. The 
benefits from the CAP have become a major part of the incomes of 
fanners in these countries and both economic and political forces 
require these member States to support the fundamental objectives and 
mechanisms of the CAP. 
The problem of the U.K. and German position has been accentuated 
by the attitude of the European Parliament, which has pressed for the 
solution to be found in the development of general Community policies 
rather than in the form of cash repayments. parliament's position on 
this point was made clear at the end of 1983, when it rejected the 
supplementary budget which would have authorised refunds to Germany and 
to the United Kingdom, even though these refunds were agreed by the 
European Council. As the European Parliament has no direct governing 
responsibility, as is the case of national parliaments, the pressure to 
swallow difficult and unpopular decisions is far less strong. The fact 
that an agreement to the budget has to be found not only to the 
satisfaction of all ten member Goverrunents bllt also to that of the 
European Parliament clearly renders the situation even more complex and 
delicate. 
10.5 Elements in Any Solution 
The solution to the EEC budgetary problem therefore has to take 
account of the following elements:-
1. The Commission's view that a 
agricultural guarantee spending, 
the total budget and in relation 
the growth of own resources. 
limit must be placed upon 
both in relation to its share of 
to its future growth relative to 
2. Structural surpluses in agriculblre will over time have to be 
eliminated, either directly through budgetary constraints 
themselves or by some other mechanism. 
3. 
4. 
The United 
contribution 
recent years 
U.K. 
Kingdom will only be satisfied when its net 
is held to the level which has been achieved in 
by refunding part of its contribution directly to the 
Germany requires some guarantee that its O\.;rn contributions to 
Community spending \.;rill not be an open ended commitment and that 
such spending will be cost effective. 
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5. The European Parliament is keen that the operation of the new 
budgetary system will result in the growth of Community policies, 
particularly those in the non-agricultural sector. 
6. Those member States heavily dependent on agriculture will seek to 
ensure that any limits on agricultural spending and the reform of 
the Common Agricultural Policy will not fundamentally alter the 
basis on which their own partnership in the Community is based. 
7. The problem is complicated still further by the forthcoming 
enlargement of the COIPJuunity to include portugal and Spain, which 
is forecast to impose an additional net cost of about 5 per cent 
to 7 per cent on the current budget. 
The list of difficulties in the way of solving the Community's 
present financial crises illustrates just how difficult it will be to 
reach a solution. These difficulties are compounded by the basic legal 
framework of the Community which governs the procedure to be followed 
for increasing the financial contribution by the member States. The 
basic procedure as laid down in the Rome Treaty requires not only the 
unanimous agreement of all the member States, but also the ratification 
by all ten national parliaments. In other words, not only can anyone 
member State effectively veto any agreement between the other nine, but 
each government must be sure that its own national parliament will 
endorse any new agreement. A member State government with uncertain 
parliamentary support could therefore find its negotiating position, in 
what is already an extremely complex and delicate issue, further 
circumscribed by the need to ensure parliamentary approval at home. 
This process of negotiating a new level of financial resources for 
the Community and then securing the agreement of all ten member State 
parliaments is bound to be a lengthy procedure. The general 
expectation is that it is likely to take up to two years to complete, 
even given a genuinely positive approach by all of the different 
parties concerned. As this is a political question of a fundamental 
character, it is inevitable that political issues in the different 
member States will playa major part in the negotiations, as well as in 
the ratification procedure involving national parliaments. These 
negotiations could well lead to major changes not only in the way the 
Community operates its different policies but also in the orientation 
of the policies themselves. Indeed, even in the interim period before 
any additional financial resources became available, it is clear that 
there are going to be substantial modifications both to the operations 
of the Community policies and to the development of both these policies 
and to those new policies currently under consideratio~. 
10.6 Procedural Difficulties 
These modifications will be influenced to a considerable degree by 
the procedural arrangements under ~hich EC policies are operated. In 
the first place, most of the day to day operations are within the 
"competence" of the Commission (i.e. the Commission can take the 
decisions affecting the management of the policies, with only limited 
scope for individual member States to affect these decisions). It is 
evident that whenever changes affecting expenditure can be effected, 
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they will be taken in order to conserve the funds now available. 
Where, however, decisions involve the Council of Ministers and where 
the national interests of member States are much more to the forefront 
in the decision, then policy changes which adversely affect the 
payments to the different sectors of the member State concerned will be 
much more difficult to achieve. 
A second factor complicating the way in which the Community's 
financial policy will be managed in the interregnum before any revised 
level of resources actually materialises, is the categorisation of 
expenditure into 'obligatory' and 'optional'. These two categories are 
not simply a reflection of the degree of importance or inherent 
benefits from the expenditures involved, but rather reflect the nature 
of the legal basis for them. Expenditures which are in the 'optional' 
category are considerably more at risk to severe cuts in the event of 
total expenditure being likely to exceed total revenues. Most of the 
expenditure on the CAP is, however, in the 'obligatory' category and to 
that extent is a priority in budgetary allocations. Thus if it becomes 
necessary for the Community to prune its expenditure severely, in order 
to live within its means, the pruning would be of an uneven nature and 
have regard to a substantial degree to factors other than the social 
and economic consequences of the particular cuts that were made. 
10.7 Current Proposals 
In 1984 the European Community's budget will use practically all 
the money available under the present system of 'own resources'. A new 
financial basis will be needed if the Community is to finance current 
policies, including the CAP. The European Commission has submitted 
proposals for increasing the Community's income. This was the major 
subject for discussion at the European Council in Stuttgart in June and 
again in Athens in December 1983. 
The Commission believes that its proposals will not only provide a 
more diversified form of finance for the Community, but will also help 
to resolve the problems set out earlier. In the face of the strongly 
voiced views of the U.K. Government on the existing budgetary 
arrangements and the emphasis on the need to find a solution acceptable 
to all member States, the Commission has set out proposals under which 
the U.K. share of budget financing would be reduced as long as 
agricultural spending remained the dominant element of expenditure. 
The Commission's principle proposals are:-
that the present 1 per cent ceiling on VAT should be abolished; 
that a special decision-making procedure, involving unanimity in 
the Council and a qualified majority in the Parliament, should be 
introduced for the approval of each further tranche of 0.4 per 
cent of VAT in excess of the proposed 1.4 per cent (but this has 
now been superseded by the proposal for a 2 per cent VAT 
contribution) ; 
that part of the Community's VAT revenues should be paid in the 
form of a "modulated" VAT, ,-lith variable rates applying to the 
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different member States; 
that customs duties on imports of European 
Community (ECSC) products should henceforth 
Community rather than to the member States; 
Coal and Steel 
accrue to the 
and that the reimbursement to member States of 10 per cent for the 
cost of collecting customs duties and agricultural levies should 
no longer be automatic. 
One of the most interesting features of the Commission's proposal 
is the "modulated" VAT rates. These would be determined on the basis 
of three indicators: 
the share of member countries in final agricultural production of 
products falling within the common agricultural policy; 
gross domestic product per head in each country; 
member countries' shares in the Community's net operating surplus. 
The choice of agricultural production as one of the factors 
detennining the level of contribution reflects directly the need to 
ensure a better relationship between the revenue side of the budget and 
its expenditure side. As agricultural expenditure occupies such a 
prominent role in the budget it is argued that there should be some 
agricultural-based element in the Comraunity's revenue system. 
The other Cwo indicators reflect the relative prosperity of member 
States and the dynamism and profitability of their economies. The 
Commission has said that taken together the use of the three indicators 
produces a balanced result which provides a substantial eleraent of 
diversification in the Community's revenues and which makes a realistic 
contribution to the resolution of the problems of budgetary imbalances 
in a way which is equitable for all member States. 
The aim of these proposals is basically to provide a greater total 
income while at the same time overcoming objections to the present 
burden of the budget borne by the U.K., without seriously increasing 
the net contributions of those countries with a relatively large 
agricultural sector. These proposals are also intended to ensure that 
the growth in farm price supports is lower than the growth in the total 
income of the Community. 
major hurdles. First the 
the meeting of heads of 
considered not only the 
put forward by a number of 
been, however, no general 
that there has been little 
These proposals have run into the t,..JO 
Council of Ministers, and especially 
governments (the European Council) have 
COlmnission's ideas but additional ideas 
member States themselves. There has 
concessions by the member States, 80 
progress made in the negotiations. 
Secondly the Commission's proposal,") have also been considered by 
the European Parlialilent (whose role on budgetary matters is much 
stronger than in other policy areas generally). The reaction of 
Parliament \\1 as to make the conditions for any increase in funds far 
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more restrictive than that proposed by the Commission; in particular it 
wanted any VAT increase to be conditional (a) on measures to reduce 
surplus production in agriculture due to 'structural' factors and (b) 
on the annual growth in agricultural expenditure being held below' the 
growth in resources generated within the present 1 per cent VAT 
ceiling, rather than by reference to any higher VAT ceiling. 
10.8 Pressures for a Solution 
It would appear inevitable that the negotiations on the budget 
will involve the most profound reconsideration of the nature and 
objectives of the Community since it was first established. The debate 
is likely to go to the very heart of the "acquis communitaire" i.e. the 
basic understanding on which the EC rests. 
The negotiations are of an overwhelmingly political nature; they 
are not just a matter of bookkeeping or even of economic and social 
policy generally. Thereis no doubt that the individual member States 
recognise the need to succeed in these negotiations, as failure would 
reverse the integration of European countries into a unique Community. 
Every member State has more to lose from a failure to agree on a new 
budgetary system than on the concessions that will be needed to bring 
agreement. Nevertheless the conflict of interests between the 
different member States is very large and the negotiations are bound to 
be extremely tough. What the eventual outcome will be is impossible to 
foresee, but the future of the Community will be largely decided by the 
solution that is eventually reached. 

CHAPTER 11 
FACTORS WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF THE 
CAP 
11.1 Basis of the Cownission's Proposals 
In a 1980 document on 'Reflections on the CAP', the European 
Commission concluded that the Common Agricultural Policy has broadly 
achieved its main goals; free trade in agricultural commodities, 
security of supply of basic foodstuffs at stable prices for the 
Community's 260 m consumers, growth in productivity and protection of 
the incomes of 8 m farmers, fair share of agriculture in world trade 
and in the contribution of the agricultural sector to thp Community 
trade balance. 
The Commission recognised, however, that the CAP has met with 
serious difficulties:-
(a) the open-ended 
between supply 
milk being the 
guarantee system has led to major imbalances 
and demand in several major agricultural markets, 
main problem; 
(b) price guarantees or product subsidies have worked out in an 
indiscriminate manner between producers and have been of greater 
assistance to the richer regions than to the least-favoured areas 
of the COIffiUunity; 
(c) although the financial impact of the CAP is not excessive in 
relation to the GDP of the Community, it has tended to increase 
too rapidly in real terms and the way in which the money is spent, 
for instance on milk surpluses, has been justifiably criticized. 
The adjustments to be made to the CAP must reconcile three main 
objectives:-
(a) to maintain its three fundamental principles; unity of the market 
(through common prices); COIffiUunity preference (mainly through 
variable levies); financial solidarity (through the agricultural 
budget) ; 
(b) to set up mechanisms whereby the financial consequences of 
production surpluses may be held in check; 
(c) to concentrate financial resources on the least-favoured farms and 
regions. 
The Commission in 1980 proposed to overhaul the CAP along three 
lines: 
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(a) the adjustment of the common market organisations by the 
introduction of a new basic principle; coresponsibility or 
producer participation in the form of either a levy (as already 
existing for sugar and milk) or other mechanisms; 
(b) a new approach to the Community's external agricultural trade 
policy, both on the import and the export side; 
(c) a readjustment of structural policy. 
For over three years now, the reform of the CAP has been to the 
forefront of discussions on the evolution of European agricultural 
policy. In its most recent set of proposals on the fixing of prices 
for agricultural products and related measures for 1984/85, the 
Commission has warned that every week's delay in reaching agreement on 
this makes the market problems of the CAP more difficult to solve. In 
so far as the final decisions on the 1984/5 prices went only part of 
the way to meet the criteria set out by the Commission, the solution of 
the market problems still remains to be settled. 
The factors which will primarily determine the future development 
of the CAP are: 
(a) farm income position; 
(b) the state of the markets for agricultural products; 
(c) the budgetary situation; 
(d) the strength of production technology; 
(e) the trends in resources, particularly labour. 
These will in turn be reflected in the decisions on prices which 
have a major effect on the first three of these factors. The decisions 
on prices are, however, also affected by the general economic climate 
of the economy of the Community as a whole, as the relative income 
situation of farmers and of those in other occupations is of major 
importance in the fixing of prices for fann products by the Council of 
Ministers. 
11.2 Farm Income Position 
The farm income position has become over recent years the most 
important single determinant of the operation of the CAP and only the 
present budgetary problems have moved it from the very centre of the 
stage. The farm income problem involves the trend in farm incomes over 
time, particularly in real rather than nominal terms, the distribution 
of those incomes between the farmers of the Community, the trends in 
incomes in the non-agricultural sector and the alternative ways in 
which farm incomes can he maintained. 
Over the past decade the overall trend in farm income per head in 
real tenns has been static. Relatively good years, such as 1973, 1978 
and 1982 have been followed by much poorer ones 1974, 1980 and 1983, so 
that the average European fanner has seen no improvement in his living 
standards for many years. The 1983 average farm income, as measured by 
the "sectoral income index" >vas about 4 per cent helmv the 1973-5 
average in real terms. Furthermore as this index of farm incomes makes 
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no allowance for the growing burden of debt servicing which has built 
up over these years, the underlying trend in real net farm incomes is 
downwards rather than just static. This contrasts sharply with the 
earlier years of the Community when real incomes in agriculture 
increased rapidly. 
At the same time, the trend in the real incomes of people at work 
in other sectors in Europe has continued upwards over the past decade. 
It is true that this concept of income development makes no allowance 
for the increasing number of people in Europe who are unemployed, but 
for those who are at work there has been a significant improvement in 
living standards, amounting to around 2 per cent per annum over most of 
the past decade. Thus, although it is difficult to make direct 
comparisons between farm and non-farm incomes in Europe, it is clear 
that the trends in incomes since 1973 have been clearly in favour of 
the non-farm sectors. Even, for example, in Ireland, which had 
expected farm incomes to benefit substantially from participation in 
the CAP but incomes in manufacturing industry to be in some jeopardy, 
the gap between farm and non-farm incomes has grown wider, to the 
disadvantage of the farmer. 
Trends in average farm incomes for the whole of the Community 
conceal enormous variations both geographically and between different 
categories of farm. The efficient medium to large farms of northern 
Europe, particularly in Denmark, England and the Netherlands have much 
larger incomes than those in the southern countries, particularly Italy 
and Greece. This income distribution pattern within Europe can be 
found within some of the larger member States. The present system, 
whereby farm incomes are supported primarily by action on prices, has 
been criticised as a source of social inequality, under the cloak of 
economic equality. This is an extension of the criticism that the 
Common Agricultural Policy itself has been of greater assistance to the 
regions which were already rich than it has been to the least-favoured 
areas of the Community. This latter criticism is clearly a consequence 
of the differences in natural resources and the structural disparities 
which already existed when the Community was set up. However the large 
differences in income and productivity between the Community's 
agricultural regions have if anything widened during the '70s. There 
are two basic reasons for this. Firstly, the richer Conwunity regions 
produce commodities (cereals, milk and sugar) which receive more 
substantial support than those produced in the less-favoured regions, 
which are largely in the Mediterranean area and mainly produce fruit 
and vegetables and wine. Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the 
nature of the system of 'organisation of the market' for the individual 
farm products is such as to favour the more well-to-do producers, who 
are mainly concentrated in the richer regions. 
11.3 Prospects for Direct Income Aids for Poorer Farmers 
In a Europe facing a long slowdown in its economic growth, voices 
have been raised in protest against Community funds being used, for the 
most part, to support the incomes of the richest farmers. There has, 
therefore, been a recurrent discussion on systems of farm income 
support which would be more directly aimed at those most in need. There 
is indeed a clear lack of consistency in providing income support for 
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the agricultural sector on the grounds that average farm incomes are 
below those in other sectors, and then providing this support through a 
system which totally ignores this principle and gives a great deal more 
assistance to those who are already the best endowed and most wealthy 
in the sector, and very little to the genuinely poorer farmers. In the 
discussions on the most appropriate policy that should be pursued, it 
is acknowledged that the most appropriate form of aid for the poorest 
farmers would be that provided in the form of direct income 
supplements. These have the advantage that:-
(1) they can be geared to provide help to those most immediately in 
need; 
(2) they can be organised so that, as distinct from 
payments, less is paid to the larger, and more to 
farmers; 
price support 
the smaller, 
(3) they are not tied in any way to production and therefore do not 
generate an additional volume of .output for which there may be no 
commercial markets; 
(4) they could be paid in some member States from Community funds 
without necessarily generating an irresistable demand that they be 
paid in other member States. 
At the same time serious objections have been raised against them, 
primarily from farnlers themselves who tend to be strongly opposed to 
direct income support payments because:-
(1) the level of assistance will be directly known to society at large 
and, if they are at a level that would substantially remedy the 
current farm income problem. then they are likely to give rise to 
very strong demands for equivalent support from other sectors who 
are in real financial difficulty, 
(2) a redistribution of support via direct income supplements rather 
than through higher farm prices ",auld hit larger fanners in 
particular; it is generally these farmers who hold the dominant 
positions among those who speak on behalf of farmers and they have 
considerable direct influence with Govermaents and Hinisters for 
Agriculture, 
(3) farmers may be opposed to direct income supplements because they 
are associated with "dole" payments and argue that they should be 
in a position "to earn a decent living in the market place and not 
through charity". 
(4) income supplements could prove to be transitory; they might easily 
be ",ithdrawn if the pressures on the Community budget were strong 
enough. 
So far there is little concerted support for direct farm income 
supports in the Community. There has been a strong feeling that the 
right way to support agriculture is not through a system of income aids 
of this kind. In the present budgetary situation, any significant 
measure of this nature would have to be financed by savings elsewhere 
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in the agricultural budget, i.e. by reductions in other support 
measures of an equivalent cost. Such reductions might well be 
politically unacceptable; failure to provide something not previously 
available is generally less politically damaging than taking away some 
support that previously has been paid to fanners. 
11.4 Situation and Outlook on Agricultural Markets 
In considering market prospects for Community farmers, it is 
necessary to examine the situation on the domestic markets, those on 
external commercial markets and those of the developing world. On its 
domestic market, the Commission has estimated that the total population 
of the Community of Ten will only increase from 270.9 m in 1982 to 274 
ill in 1990, an annual rate of increase of only 0.14 per cent; the rate 
was 0.35 per cent during the period from 1971 to 1981. The level of 
total private consumption per head is projected to increase between 
1983 and 1990 at an annual rate of 1.9 per cent; this rate was 2.9 per 
cent during the period from 1970 to 1980. 
During the past two decades, food consumption in the Community has 
increased by about 0.5 per cent per annum. Of this, some two-thirds 
was accounted for by population growth, so that per capita consumption 
was growing by only about 0.15 per cent per year. This trend is likely 
to fall even further in face of the slowing down of economic growth 
generally and the high levels of per capita consumption already 
achieved. Thus the level of growth in total internal food consumption 
in the future is likely to be of the order of 0.25 per cent per year, 
of which 0.14 per cent would be generated by population growth and 0.10 
per cent in consumption per head. This would mean that internal total 
food consumption will grow over the coming years at only half the rate 
of recent decades. 
vlith the growth of production at 1.5 per cent to 2 per cent a 
year, the Cownunity has gone well beyond the point of self-sufficiency 
for most of the main agricultural products. It has therefore become 
more and more dependent on world markets to dispose of production in 
excess of its own domestic requirements. In the last ten years, 
agricultural exports of the Community have increased twice as rapidly 
as agricultural imports. It is however no· longer financially possible 
nor economically sound to expand EEC farm exports. The Commissioner 
for Agriculture Mr Dalsager has recognised that the problem of surplus 
production is unhealthy on the grounds that it is bad for the 
Cownunity, because of the high costs involved. Moreover intervention 
and public subsidies are not the market. A policy which removes the 
market and removes risk is a policy which cannot last. 
Faced with difficulties of disposal on its own markets and 
increased competition on external markets. the official policy of the 
Community is to base its agricultural trade policy on a combination of 
three elements: 
international co-operation with the principal exporting countries, 
to prevent the further deterioration of world prices; 
the development of a policy at the .Commllnity level for promoting 
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exports of farm products on an economic basis; 
the exercise of the Community's international rights, particularly 
in GATT, for the revision of the external protection system in 
those cases where the Community is taking measures to limit its 
own production. 
The Commission have argued that the introduction of measures 
involving guarantee thresholds on Community fanners, particularly the 
participation of producers wholly or partly in the cost of disposal, 
should penuit agricultural exports from the Community to develop on a 
sound basis. This policy should create the necessary conditions for 
concluding long-term contracts for the supply of agricultural produce 
to third countries, including certain developing countries, in the 
framework of their policies for food security. 
As regards agricultural imports, the Community will undoubtedly 
re-examine the regimes applicable for the different products, with a 
view to "adapting" them to the market situation. In some cases, \.;rhere 
the Community has contracted international co~uitments concerning 
agricultural imports in exchange for reciprocal concessions in these 
cases, an adjustment of the import regime must take account of the 
possibilities of negotiation and of the reactions of the Community's 
trading partners. In other cases, autonomous concessions have been 
granted for reasons of general commercial policy and foreign policy. 
However, the Co~uission has maintained that if the Community is to 
demand greater discipline of its own agricultural producers, it must 
take parallel action in respect of imports to ensure a satisfactory 
observance of Community preference. This approach is likely to be 
pressed even more strongly by a number of Ministers when this issue is 
before the Council. 
In addition, in the light of experience, the Commission considers 
that the rational management of the agricultural markets has 
encountered difficulties because the automatic nature of certain 
instruments (intervention, etc.) does not allow a flexible reaction to 
the development of the market situation. It is evident that decisions 
at the level of the Council for the management of the agricultural 
markets can lead to linkage with other questions, which is detrimental 
to the proper execution of the CAP. The Co~nission have proposed to 
take further powers in the context of agricultural management, with the 
objective of making the management of the policy more flexible and less 
automatic, so as to make the most efficient use of the existing 
instruments and financial resources. 
11.5 Budgetary Factors 
The budgetary problems of the Community have been the subject of 
concern for some years. The level of expenditure on agriculture 
doubled between 1976 and 1979, and a financial crisis was anticipated 
as the total Conununity budget rapidly approached the limit provided 
under the Treaty. The improvement on world markets and the opportunity 
this gave to a more effective policy of market management in 1980 and 
1981 gave a purely temporary reprieve. In fact 1981 saw a fall in 
budget expenditure in farm price supports and this, together with a 
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reduction of expenditure on export subsidies and on net monetary 
compensatory amounts, meant that over the two years 1979-81, total CAP 
expenditure rose by only 6.6 per cent, in spite of the fact that the 
latter year expenditure included that on Greece for the first time. 
However, the sharp upward trend was resumed in 1982, and accelerated in 
1983 with a growth of over 40 per cent over these two years. In the 
light of this increase, the budget was not sufficient to meet all the 
expenditure co~nitments, and this has precipitated the current crisis. 
In their price and CAP reform proposals for 1984-5, the Commission 
has estimated that there would be savings of 875m ECUs from the 
implementation in full of their various proposals (including savings 
achieved from adjustments in the day-to-day operation of the CAP). 
However, these savings will be required to offset the over-runs on the 
funds provided in the 1984 budget - in particular the additional costs 
of supports in the dairy sector - together with the costs of payments 
that were deliberately delayed from the end of 1983 into 1984. The 
Commission's aim is to contain the increase in agricultural expenditure 
at a level below the growth of total financial resources. Given the 
nature of the support systems under the CAP, it is accepted that regard 
must be had to the trend in expenditure over a period of years, rather 
than in anyone year. Taking the three year period 1983-85, the 
COimnission has estimated that the growth in the average rate of 
agricultural expenditure would be 11 per cent, compared with a 
projected growth of financial resources of 6.6 per cent. However, the 
1983-85 period is heavily influenced by the 1983 year, when. 
agricultural expenditure went up by 29 per cent. It is now evident 
that the out-turn for 1984 will not be as favourable as the Commission 
has anticipated; their projection is based on the assumption that the 
Council would adopt all the proposals that have been put to them - and 
this has now proved to be far from the case. The revised estimate of 
CAP expenditure in 1984 of 18.6b ECUs is 13 per cent above the original 
provision of 16.5b ECU, and it is far from certain that expenditure 
will in fact be contained within the revised figure. 
The Commission has had strong support for its policy from the 
European Parliament, which in November 1983 declared that "reform of 
the CAP can no longer be postponed, both to ensure the possibility of 
financing the policy, and also if the aims set out in Article 39 of the 
Treaty are to be attained". A month later in its resolution on the 
1984 budget, Parliament again demanded that "the Council should decide, 
at the latest by 31 March 1984, on the improvement of the CAP, so as to 
eliminate the expenditures due to production of structural surpluses, 
expenditures which the COlmnunity budget can no longer assume". 
11.6 Changes in Technology and Resources 
The Community's agricultural problems have stemmed basically from 
the inability of the agricultural sector to adjust to the changes in 
its technology and resource environment. During the last two decades, 
since the CAP ,vas developed, the advance of technical progress and 
productivity in agriculture has been rapid. This, of course, is not 
just an European phenomenon; it is part of the world wide technological 
impetus arising from large investments in research and development. 
The long-tenll trend in the volume of agricultural production in the 
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Community has been between 1.5 per cent and 2 per cent per annum. Not 
all of this is due to new technology; part of it has arisen from the 
substantial capital investment that has been made on modernising farms 
in Europe, farms which were often very backward in terms of the level 
of their production systems. Part has also come from the structural 
developments in European agriculture, in particular the transfer of 
land from smaller and often traditional farmers to larger units run by 
better educated farmers able to utilise more up-to-date production 
methods. 
These three factors making for growing agricultural output are 
still very strong. In spite of cut backs in research budgets, there is 
a large volume of new technology being developed that will continue to 
increase the production potential of resources in agriculture. While 
there have been significant steps to cut the level of state or 
Community aid to new investment in certain areas of agricultural 
production and the general investment climate in European agriculture 
is far less buoyant than a few years ago, there is still a considerable 
volume of new investment being undertaken. Again, while the structural 
reform programme may slow down, particularly in face of the general and 
economic difficulties in Europe, the transfer of land to more efficient 
fanners will continue for many years to come. 
Thus the underlying factors making for increased farm output will 
continue to exist even in the face of a restrictive implementation of 
the Common Agricultural Policy. While there may be some slowing do"m 
in the rate of expansion under these circumstances, it would be quite 
unrealistic to expect the problems arising from the creation of 
substantial surpluses in a number of important sectors to resolve 
themselves. 
It would of course be possible to offset this upward trend in 
output by reducing the level of resources involved in European 
agriculture. In this context, the most significant input is labour. 
However, over the past two decades, the total number of persons 
employed in agriculture in the ten member States has fallen by 60 per 
cent from over 20m to less than 8m and there has been an increase in 
part-time farming as farmers have sought to supplement their incomes 
from off-farm jobs. The exodus from farms has, however, slowed down in 
the face of growing unemployment in other sectors and the greater 
difficulties of finding off-farm jobs. It is now about 1 per cent per 
year; the rate of decline has been somewhat lower in the more 
industrialised countries but higher in the more agricultural ones. It 
would be unrealistic to expect this exodus to grow again in the near 
future; it is more likely to remain at the most recent rate of a 
decline of only 1 per cent or so per annum. 
The decline in the agricultural labour force has been of 
particular consequence for the trends in per capita farm incomes. 
Without it, per capita farm incomes would have fallen very sharply in 
real terms over the past decade. However, it is evident that this 
decline has not seriously hampered the growth in production, as the 
substitution of capital for labour has facilitated the continued growth 
in total farm output. The slowing dmvn of the exodus of labour from 
agriculture will however exacerbate the decline in per capita farm 
incomes and this in turn will increase the pressures for a more 
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protected and heavily supported agricultural sector. 
11.7 Role of Prices 
The most immediate key decisions on agricultural policy are those 
on prices. These decisions in the past have been taken by the Council 
of Agricultural Ministers with particular regard to the current needs 
of the farmers of the Community. However, prices play an economic role 
that extends considerably beyond the requirements of farmers for income 
support. They have the major function of bringing about an equilibrium 
between the supplies on the market at any particular time and the 
demand for those supplies. Prices also have the longer-term function 
of guiding the decisions of producers on their future production 
programmes, both the mix of products ';vhich they produce and the level 
of output in terms of the intensity of their production systems. 
Prices also have an impact on the distribution of income betvJeen 
producers of the different agricultural commodities. 
The free market function of market clearing can tend to create 
wide short-term fluctuations that can obscure the longer-term function 
of guiding production decisions. The CAP system of target prices 
supported by intervention is intended to avoid the instability of the 
short-term market situation. Unfortunately, the use of the price 
mechanisms as a means of farm income support has overshadowed the 
resource allocation function; this is at the root of much of the 
problems that have arisen with the CAP. Yet in spite of the 
considerable volume of resources that have been devoted to price 
support mechanisms, the level of farm incomes has not been maintained 
in real terms, particularly ~Jhen compared with the trends in the 
non-farm sectors. Thus. even with all the budgetary and other resource 
costs involved in maintaining farm prices, the income problem has 
remained a serious one for the farmers of Europe. Unfortunately the 
pressures to increase prices for income reasons have swamped any 
realistic regard to the other economic functions of the price mechanism 
and there is little if any evidence of a willingness to allow prices to 
play their role in bringing an equilibrium in the supply and demand 
situation. Certainly the Commission has expressed their concern that 
prices should be such as to prevent the continuation of "structural 
(i.e. long-term) surpluses". but there is no evidence that the Council 
of Ministers would regard this as a factor of the first priority. 
The factors 'which have determined the development of the CAP over 
the past two decades - the need for high output and improved incomes, 
the availability of financial resources and the trends in resources and 
technology - have all had a basically positive character. In the 
prevailing conditions today, particularly the lack of cownercial 
external markets and the severe budgetary limitations, the determinants 
of the agricultural policy followed by the Community have become of a 
much more negative nature. How the Community will respond to this is 
far from certain; initially there can be a belt tightening exercise as 
the Community adapts to the factors which now shape the course of 
agricultural development. Whether this exercise will really meet the 
needs of today, or whether some more fundamental change will have to 
take place, remains to be considered. 

CHAPTER 12 
THE FUTURE OF THE CAP 
12.1 Need for Reform 
The Common Agricultural Policy is generally regarded by the 
European Community as one of its major achievements. There is however 
agreement that Europe must adapt its agricultural policy, but changes 
in policies which themselves were adopted only after difficult 
political compromises will require a firm political resolve. 
The reform of the CAP is not d technical affair but a political 
challenge which can be successfully accomplished only if the costs 
involved are distributed equitably between the different Member States, 
the different market organisations and in general between the various 
interested parties. At the same time the agricultural policy, like 
other policies, must respond to the need for the efficient use of the 
Community's financial resources. 
The budgetary costs of the CAP are a consequence of the measures 
adopted to implement its social and economic objectives. Those 
objectives, which include the assurance of a fair standard of living 
for the agricultural community and the availability of supplies to 
consumers at reasonable prices, are common to agricultural policies in 
all developed countries of the world. The European Commission no\~ 
accepts that these objectives should be pursued at a cost which is 
reasonable and not disproportionate to the costs experienced in other 
countries. 
The Commission has for a number of years advocated the reform of 
the agricultural policy. In 1981, in a melllOrandum on "Guidelines for 
European Agriculture:! it outlined a programme for adapting the CAP to 
the "new realities" both of general economic conditions and of the 
agricultural sector itself. This programme included in particular the 
establishment of "guarantee thresholds" to which the price guarantees 
would apply. These would take account of the long-term prospects for 
production, consumption and trade for individual agricultural products. 
Subsequently in June 1983, the Commission presented a further 
statement of its vie\vs in its communication "Further guidelines for the 
development of the CAP" which developed further this concept of supply 
management to complement the existing market management system, which 
has been a fundamental feature of the CAP as it has operated up to now. 
12.2 Response of the Hember States 
In reply, the Heads of Government set out a long list of factors 
taken into account in deciding on the future CAP policy: 
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price policy 
guarantee thresholds, in relation to objectives for production 
coresponsibility of producers 
intervention arrangements 
export refund arrangements 
substitutes and Community preferences 
monetary compensatory amounts 
aids and premium arrangements 
internal barriers 
type and size of farms and particular situations of various 
categories of farmers 
the need for strict financial guidelines 
external agricultural policy 
special problems arising in certain regions such as in the 
Mediterranean regions, in mountain areas or other regions at a 
disadvantage because of natural or economic features. 
It is of note that the list makes no specific reference to farm 
incomes, although the income position is no doubt implied in the 
reference to the "particular situation of various categories of 
farmers". 
The Commission's detailed reply underlined the fact that the 
situation cannot be remedied by short-term palliatives, or economies of 
an ad hoc nature and went on to say that "determined action to adapt 
the CAP in a rational long-term framework will be necessary to place 
the agricultural policy in a sound economic and financial context for 
the coming years". 
12.3 Adaptation of Agriculture in the Community 
The adaptation necessary in European agriculture is part of the 
general adaptation of its society, faced with rapid technological 
progress but a rate of economic growth lower than in earlier years. 
The diverse structure of agriculture i.n the Hember States is the 
inheritance of many generations, and its well-being is regarded as 
essential to the fabric of rural life. But this well-being can be 
ensured only by a better integration into the economy as a whole, not 
by its isolation from the underlying factors which are affecting modern 
society. 
(a) 
(b) 
Two factors of particular importance are the following: 
overall demand for food will 
past. On world markets the 
increase 
capacity 
less rapidly than in the 
to pay - i.e. effective 
demand will depend on economic 
possibilities which are uncertain. 
continue to play an important part in 
growth and on credit 
l>Jhile the Communi ty will 
food aid, it must at the 
same time encourage the developing countries to satisfy more of 
their food requirements from their own resources. 
scientific research and development generates a constant 
improvement of crops and breeds of animals, machinery and 
techniques 'which mean that the factors of production can be 
combined more and more efficiently and at lower real cost. These 
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trends are expected to continue and may even accelerate in the 
coming years. 
The Commission has promised suggestions on the relationship 
between agricultural policy and fundamental research. For this purpose 
it accepts the need for a system of forecasting the fundamental changes 
which may take place in the medium and long-term and also an 
examination of the possibilities for new outlets for agricultural 
production, particularly for products in surplus. In view of the 
earlier problems with medium to long-term forecasts in the agricultural 
sector, it is not clear what the Co~nission intends to do in terms of a 
new set of forecasts. Nor are the medium-term forecasts that have been 
published by the Co~nission at all convincing. The basis of the 
projections has not been given and the results that have been published 
show quite unrealistic changes in the current trends of supply and 
consumption of some of the major farm products. Even so in view of the 
future perspectives, it is clear that the Co~unity has no choice but 
to revise its policy of guarantees for production. If Community 
agriculture is to expand its exports and maintain its share of world 
markets, it must increasingly accept the market disciplines to which 
other sectors of the Co~unity's economy are subject. In tbis 
approach, the Commission nmv- put more and more emphasis on production 
at a competitive price. Hitherto, the price guarantees for most 
products have been unlimited in nature, but this situation cannot 
continue if the CAP is to develop on a rational basis. 
12.4 Rationalization of the Harket Organization 
The stagnation or decline in demand, both in the Community and on 
external markets, for products such as milk, wheat and beef shows that 
it is no longer reasonable to provide unlimited guarantees of price and 
intervention where there is considerable doubt about the possibility of 
outlets in the corning years. The current proposals from the Commission 
would involve farmers more fully in the cost of disposing of production 
beyond a certain threshold. Measures in respect of such guarantee 
thresholds constitute the centrepiece of the Commission's philosophy 
for the reform of the CAP. 
Guarantee thresholds 
according to the product 
applied by: 
can be applied 
concerned. For 
by different producers 
example, thresholds can be 
(a) lowering the increase in the target price or intervention price if 
production exceeds a global quantum; 
(b) limiting the aids paid under the market regulation to a global 
quantum; 
(c) participation of producers, by means of a levy, in the cost of' 
disposing additional production; 
Cd) quotas at national level, or at the level of the enterprise. 
All these variolls approaches have in fact been used, in differing 
degrees, in the context of the existing market organisations. For 
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example, the approach to (a) was followed in the decisions concerning 
the common prices for cereals and milk for 1983/84; approach (b) exists 
in the market organisation for cotton (and has been proposed for dried 
raisins); the coresponsibility levy introduced for milk in 1977 goes in 
the direction of (c); and quotas on the model of (d) have existed for 
sugar since the inception of the market organisation. However, these 
proposals for a system of supply management have had only limited 
success in the past and it is not clear that the agreement of the 
Council of Ministers would be forthcoming for a really effective system 
that would resolve the present imbalance on the markets for the major 
European farm products. The likely outcome of qualified agreement 
could stem the growth of this problem without really resolving it. 
12.5 Guidelines for the Principal Sectors 
In order that the agricultural policy be brought more into line 
with the market conditions prevailing in each product sector, the 
Commission has proposed that expenditure be streamlined in such a way 
that the available financial resources are concentrated on the areas 
where there is the greatest need, where the interest of Community 
action is most clearly demonstrated and where budgetary intervention 
can be most cost-effective. 
The economic context of each market organisation for which 
adaptations are required has been examined; this has taken account of 
all market organisations with a share of more than 2.0 per cent of the 
expenditure of the agricultural budget (Milk, Cereals and Rice, Beef, 
Sheepmeat, Fruit and Vegetables, Oilseeds, Olive Oil, Tobacco and 
Wine) • 
12 • 5 • 1 Mil k • 
Milk production presents the most urgent problem. In this sector 
the trend of annual increase of milk deliveries of about 2.5 per cent 
in the period 1973-1981, has accelerated to about 3.5 per cent in 1982 
and 1983. Meanwhile domestic consumption of milk products in all 
forms, which showed an annual increase of the order of 0.5 per cent in 
the 1970s, is now tending to stagnate though there is some change in 
the product mix. The milk sector is different from other agricultural 
sectors because of the unremitting and even accelerating divergence of 
the trends of production and consumption. The volume of milk produced 
in the Community now exceeds all realistic possibilities for additional 
disposal, even at rates of subsidy which are themselves no longer 
acceptable for the Community taxpayer. 
The market imbalance was already very serious when the principle 
of a guarantee threshold was first introduced in 1982 and has 
deteriorated further since then. World market prospects indicate that 
further significant increases in the Community's exports are no longer 
possible. The cost of subsidized disposal on the Community's own 
market has reached very high levels indeed. The Community is therefore 
faced with the need for urgent and radical action to correct the 
situation. 
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It is quite clear that the price decisions taken over the last 10 
years have done little to redress the rnarket imbalance. Although the 
guarantee threshold has been applied in such a way as to limit severely 
the 1983/84 milk price increase, this did not have any significant 
effect so far in restraining production. Nor are the 'ordinary' price 
decisions the only factors affecting prices, as changes in 'green' 
exchange rates can give substantial price increases in national 
currencies when there are only small 'ordinary' price increases. The 
production threshold fixed for 1983 was exceeded by at least 6 per 
cent. It has been estimated that, in order to offset the additional 
expenditure likely to arise from the guarantee threshold being 
exceeded, the milk price for 1984/85 would have to be cut by as much as 
12 per cent. A measure of this kind would evidently have grave and 
i~nediate effects on the incomes of producers yet at the same time 
there would be some delay before the full effect on production was 
achieved. 
One alternative that has been proposed is an increase in the 
existing coresponsibility levy in the milk sector (currently applied at 
the rate of 2 per cent) but differentiated according to the volume 
produced so as to alleviate the effect on the incomes of small 
producers. This measure has, however, been rejected as a solution to 
the problem because to be financially effective it would involve a 
differentiation so great as to result in inequalities between Member 
States and thus run into severe political difficulties. This does not 
rule out some adjustment in the co-responsiblity levy as a part of any 
revision of the support price for milk. 
The Commission therefore proposed that in future the principle of 
the guarantee threshold in this sector should be implemented through a 
quota system accompanied by a restrictive price policy. A reference 
quantity (quota) would be established for each dairy, based on 
deliveries in 1981. All deliveries in excess of this quantity would be 
subject to a supplementary levy, calculated in such a way as to cover 
the full cost of disposal of the additional milk. The dairies in turn 
would apply the charge to producers. The charge would be so large as 
to leave the producers with little or no income from milk delivered 
above their quota. The Council, in its 1984/5 agricultural price 
decisions broadly accepted these proposals subject to an extra 1 m 
tonne quota for 1984/5 and for additional quantities for Ireland, Italy 
and Luxembourg. 
Such a measure should stabilize milk deliveries. It would have a 
rapid effect in discouraging additional production; if production did 
increase the levy would give sufficient income to cover the cost of 
disposing of milk in excess of the threshold. At the same time the 
levy will be so large that no rational farm production system would 
expand beyond its quota level. 
There is considerable concern that increasing output through 
purchased imported concentrated animal feed is leading to the 
development of 'milk factories' where the connection with the land is 
becoming less and less important. The Commission proposed that a 
special levy on milk from intensive farms be introduced for those which 
deliver more than 15,000 kg of milk per ha of forage, but this has not 
been accepted by the Council of Ministers. 
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The problems in the milk sector have been aggravated by the 
availability of intervention as a more or less permanent outlet for 
production. The Co~nission has proposed that intervention be suspended 
for skimmed milk powder during the winter months, but even this very 
limited step towards restraining the volumes being put into store was 
not accepted by the Council. 
The present cost of disposing of some of the quantities of surplus 
butter on the Community's internal market through general consumer 
subsidies is high because the price elasticity of butter is such that 
the volume of extra butter consumed cl.S a result of the subsidy (paid on 
all butter consumed) is relatively small. The Commission has taken the 
view that the cost does not seem to be fully justified and it is the 
consumer, in his capacity as taxpayer, who finally has to hear the 
cost. It has therefore proposed the elimination of this special 
subsidy for butter consumption. This would result in some limited loss 
of butter sales but the Conunission has suggested that compensating 
increases in disposal of milk fat can be obtained by more cost 
efficient measures, including an increase in the fat content of 
whole milk for human consumption. In practice, the butter subsidy from 
Community funds has been cut back, not eliminated altogether. 
The problem in the milk sector is not just to restrain the present 
growth in output, but to cut production back to the level which current 
consumption (including suhsidised disposal on both internal and 
external markets) would justify. This requires a reduction of over 6 
per cent of the 1983 output level. This is equivalent to almost 6m 
tonnes of milk, which for all interests and purposes wOllld give a zero 
or negative return to the farmers having regard to the net earnings on 
the marginal sales outlets. The consequences of policies that will 
actually achieve this position, both on farmers' incomes and the 
position of the dairy processors has not been made clear, but these 
could well have serious repercussions over the next few years. 
12.5.2 Sheepmeat. 
The principal expenditure on sheep production, where a market 
organisation was introduced in 1980, arises from the payment of 
premiums to producers. The Community's level of self-sufficiency in 
sheepmeat is relatively low. To curtail further increases in 
expenditure, the Commission has proposed that the system of premiums 
should be modified without, however, radically changing the market 
conditions. The main modification proposed was to limit the payment of 
the variable premium in the United Kingdom to 25 per cent of the basic 
price. This should result in an increase in market prices, which would 
hopefully be sufficient to maintain producers' revenue. In addition 
changes in the ewe premium including the withdrawal of advance payments 
have also been put forward. The Council accepted the proposal to 
withdraw the advance payments of the ewe premium except in the hill and 
mount.qin areas, where an advance paYlaent of 30 per cent of the premium 
will be made, and the method of calculation of the premium will be 
revised, othenl7ise the system of lilarket support for the sheepmeat 
sector will remain basically unaltered. 
The Conunission has also proposed negotiations on a reduction in 
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the quantities of sheepmeat imported in the framework of the voluntary 
restraint arrangements with third countries and, at the same time, the 
introduction of a minimum import price. Such an adaptation could lead 
to a reduction of Community expenditure in this sector as a result of 
the strengthening of the marketplace, while in theory maintaining the 
receipts enjoyed on the EC market by third country suppliers. The 
effects on consumption have not been articulated, but the UK market in 
particular could be seriously affected by higher sheepmeat prices. 
The Community has not faced up to the prospect of a rapid increase 
in supply of sheepmeat from domestic production and a reduction of 
consumption, which the present policies will generate. The present net 
import situation is generally regarded as a justification for 
expansionist production policies while the need to sustain consumption 
has been given much less consideration. 
12.5.3 Beef. 
Although the Community's beef production tends to follow a 
cyclical pattern, the long-term trend is for an increase of bet\-Jeen 0.5 
per cent and 1 per cent a year; meanwhile consumption of beef is 
expected to stagnate because of competition from lower-priced meats and 
the limited growth in purchasing power of consumers. The Community has 
passed during the last decade from a situation of deficit to a position 
as a net exporter of beef. The Commission's proposals for avoiding 
market surpluses in the future include a further restriction on the 
availability of intervention buying and the termination of calf 
premiums paid in Italy, Ireland and Greece and the special variable 
premium system operated in the U.K. These proposals were only 
partially accepted by the Council and the present system will remain in 
operation though on a considerably reduced scale. These measures would 
help the budget problem but would do little to restore greater market 
equilibrium. There is, however, concern at the current situation on 
the COllU11Unity beef market; the most likely solution could come from a 
restrictive dairy policy that would result in a significant reduction 
in the Community's total cow herd. 
12.5.4 Cereals and other products. 
A guarantee threshold was first fixed for cereals for 1982/83 at 
the level of 119.5m tonnes. The Council of Ministers decided that if 
average production of cereals (excluding Durum wheat) in the three most 
recent seasons exceeded the threshold, the intervention price would be 
cut. However, it also decided that if imports of cereal substitutes 
exceeded 15m tonnes, the guarantee threshold would be increased 
accordingly. Since the threshold for 1982/83 was exceeded. the 
increase in the intervention price for 1983/84 was cut by 1 per cent. 
In practice a 1 per cent cut in the intervention price is of very 
little consequence in the prices paid to farmers for cereals. 
The Commission has, therefore, proposed that the objective in its 
future proposals for common prices for cereals should be the reduction 
of the gap between EC prices and those applied by its main competitors. 
A prerequisite for implementing the guarantee threshold in future is a 
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rapid and effective limitation of imports of substitutes. The 
Community has already limited the import of manioc and bran; and the 
import of molasses is subject to a threshold price fixed in the 
framework of the sugar market organisation. As regards corn gluten 
feed and citrus pellets, it is proposed that limitation should be 
achieved by negotiations under GATT, but this will certainly run. into 
stiff opposition from the U.S. as well as from some member countries 
within the Community. 
Changes designed to cut the cost of present policies are also 
under consideration for other farm products. In the case of fruit and 
vegetables, a restrictive price policy is advocated by the Commission 
to avoid the development of excessive intervention, withdrawals and 
other expenditure. For oilseeds the system of guarantee thresholds has 
led to some reduction in the target prices; this system will be 
continued to limit the level of budgetary expenditure in the support 
payments for olive oil. 
The development of the market in oils and fats in the Community is 
giving rise to increasing concern. Supplies imported free of duty have 
added to the imbalance in the market situation as between olive oil and 
other vegetable oils on the one hand and butter and other fats on the 
other. This has had two consequences for the Common Agricultural 
Policy: 
(a) the consumption of butter and olive oil has fallen; 
(b) it has pushed up budgetary costs in the oils and fats sector. 
In order to restore balance on the market the Community is already 
operating a coresponsibility levy on milk and a guarantee threshold for 
milk and oilseeds. The Commission has proposed to introduce an 
internal tax on the consumption of oils and fats other than butter, 
irrespective of their origin. Again this has been strongly opposed by 
the U.S. which has a substantial trade in these products and also by 
member States with a high consumption of oils and fats other than 
butter. 
12.6 Agri-Monetary Problems 
For many years, the Commission has pressed for a system of 
automatic dismantling of the special exchange rate levels for 
agricultural products (the 'green' rates) and the associated monetary 
compensatory amounts that are charged on agricultural trade by 
individual Member States. The negative }lCAs that arise from a 
devaluation of the market rates of the currency of any member State can 
be dismantled by bringing the green rate of that currency back into 
line with its market rate, with a corresponding increase in the support 
prices for farm products in the country in question. In spite of the 
effect of this on conswner food prices, it has not proved difficult to 
bring green and market rates into line in the case of devaluing 
currencies. However, in the case of revaluing currencies, where 
bringing green rates up to the ne\\T market rates involves a reduction in 
farm support prices, the problems of alignment have in the past proved 
virtually insoluble. 
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The system of an automatic phasing out of MCAs proposed by the 
Commission would create great difficulties in countries with positive 
MCAs even though arrangements agreed at the 1984/5 Agricultural Prices 
meetings to create an artificial "green BCU" have partially overcome 
the problem but at very substantial costs, particularly when these are 
applied to a full financial year. The fact that the resources 
necessary to meet these costs have not yet been agreed is an example of 
the procedures of the Community, in which new expenditures are agreed 
that are way in excess of the available financial resources, and the 
financing problem is left to be solved subsequently. 
12.7 Complementary Heasures 
The present crisis in the financial situation has given the 
Commission the opportunity to press for the solution of other long 
standing probleIlls. One of the special features of the administration 
of the agricultural regulations is that it is undertaken by member 
States, who in many cases have a strong incentive to be less than 
diligent in the proper and effective use of market regulations. 
Opportunities also exist for deliberate fraud and unlawful expenditure 
to which the complex managed market system gives rise. The Commission 
has therefore pressed the member States to take steps to achieve 
greater rigour in spending the Conununity's money. It is also pressing 
for full harmonisation in veterinary plant health and other areas to 
reduce the current proliferation of barriers to trade within the 
Community. Whether these proposals 'will have any effective result is 
not at all certain; some of them reflect long standing efforts by the 
Commission that so far have produced few results. 
12.8 Financial and Other Economic Consequences 
The aim of the Commission, so far as financial management of the 
CAP is concerned, is that the rate of growth in agricultural 
expenditure should be kept below that of the total available financial 
resources. The Commission has estimated that their present proposals 
should cut agricultural expenditure by 2,500 m ECUs in 1984/85, rising 
to 3,200 m ECUs in 1986/87, below v!hat it otherwise would be. However, 
the outcome of the Council meeting on prices and related matters has 
totally reversed this projection; expenditure in 1984 on the CAP is 
projected to rise by 2.13 b ECU and the consequences of these decisions 
in 1985 will raise this figure still further. 
The reform of the CAP should be seen in the general context of the 
general economic situation in the Community and in the narrower context 
of the problems of the agricultural sector itself. So far as the 
economic position of the Community is concerned the current recovery is 
still quite modest and even uncertain. This is mainly due to the fac~ 
that, despite the relative reduction in oil prices since 1982, there 
has been no change in two other external factors which have contributed 
to the creation of the present CrJ.S1S in the Community, and to its 
unusual duration: that is, the exceptionally high rates of interest in 
real terms in the United States ;md the weakness of world demand and 
trade. In these circwnstances and in view of the shaky hasis of the 
first signs of recovery in the Community, it is necessary to be 
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cautious as regards forecasts of the economic prospects, at least in 
the short term. In 1983 the gross domestic product of the Community 
increased only by 0.5 per cent in volume, only very slightly better 
than in 1982. In fact 1983 saw a reduction in the volume of gross 
domestic product in several Member States and, in certain cases, this 
was for the second year in succession. As for the prospects for 1984, 
despite the fact that some degree of economic recovery is expected in 
almost all Member States, the gross domestic product of the Community 
is projected to increase by only 1.5 per cent in volume, which is half 
the average rate of increase experienced in the period 1971-80. Nor 
are the prospects for employment more encouraging. Although there has 
been a slowing-down in the rate of increase of unemployment in 1983, 
the number of jobless could still increase over that in 1983, \vhen the 
unemployment rate in the Community was 10.4 per cent. 
One of the most worrying aspects of the present recession is the 
decline in world demand and thus in international trade in recent 
years. World trade in goods, which increased in volume at an annual 
rate of 4-5 per cent in 1977-80, remained stationary in 1981 and 
declined by 2 per cent in 1982. In the short-term, a gradual increase 
in internal demand in Europe and the United States should result in an 
acceleration of world trade in 1984, but two factors will continue to 
limit the expansion of world trade: the exceptionally high level of 
debt of many developing countries and the fall in income which is 
affecting many of the oil-producing countries. 
Thus the improvement in the general economic situation 'which so 
facilitated the evolution of the CAP in its early years no longer holds 
out the same prospect in terms of alternative employment, higher food 
consumption and additional financial resources. The consequences of 
this are th8t the f8ctors which contributed to the support of farmers' 
incomes in the European Community over the past two decades are likely 
to he milch less effective in the years immediately ahead. Apart from 
the political problems to which this will undoubtedly give rise, it 
will greatly strengthen the demands for further protection against 
supplies of farm products from outside the Community. This will affect 
some products more sharply than others bllt will have a series of 
repercussions throughout the agricultural sector. 
As the various measures for restricting output began to take full 
effect in one sector - e.g. milk, there will be a movement of farm 
resources into sectors where such severe restrictive policies are not 
applied e.g. sheepmeat. This could well lead to an even more rapid 
expansion of production in these sectors, to a point where they in turn 
he come subject to quotas or similar output reducing measures. This 
will, however, only intensify the farm income problem and in turn the 
pressure for relief from the economic difficulties of farmers and their 
families. 
12.9 Basis of Future Policy 
It is evident that the adaptation of the CAP in a long-term 
framework will require difficult decisions on the part of the Community 
institutions and a readiness by all parties to make concessions and 
sacrifices. There is little evidence so far of any readiness to make 
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real sacrifice. Such a policy would require transfers in costs and 
benefits between the different social and political groups concerned; 
taxpayers, farmers, consumers, processors, member States and third 
countries. To make adjustments of this kind is not a technical matter; 
it is a question of political choice for the CAP is essentially a 
political instrument. To rationalise and streamline a policy f6r the 
agriculture of ten Member States. after more than 20 years of 
development, requires imagination and great political will. A number 
of the major proposals for change hit various interest groups very hard 
and the political and economic position of Governments in the Community 
make it very difficult to get agreement. 
It is evident however, that the underlying philosophy of the long 
and detailed series of proposals has been to save money. It is the 
budgetary situation which has brought the reform of all CAP to a head, 
for all the repeated assertions by the Commission that it is the 
problems of market imbalance which has brought on the present crisis. 
Recently the president of the Commission reminded the European 
Parliament that the Commission had ,'larned the Council as far back as 
1980 that the Common Agricultural Policy would become unmanageable 
unless prices were radically realigned and some limitation placed on 
the guarantees given to producers of surpluses, which today cannot even 
be given away. He went on to say that because of the illusionary 
respite provided by the favourable trend of world prices in 1981/82 
precious time was lost during which the imbalance on the agricultural 
laarkets grevJ even worse. Unresolved problems piled up making the 
necessary decisions even more difficult. This call for a "radical 
realignment" of farm prices is not likely to be heeded; the steps in 
this direction \vill not be at all "radical" but simply some extension 
of the prudent price policy that the Commission has been advocating for 
more than five years now. 
What is not at all clear in the present debate on the reform of 
the CAP is any underlying economic, rather than purely financial 
philosophy on future policy. There is now an urgent need for a 
positive approach to the evolution of the CAP, if the policy is not to 
decline into a series of ad hoc measures. The Commission has rightly 
said that a cost cutting exercise, conducted without regard to the 
social and economic consequences, would render no service to the 
development of the European Comr:lUnity and that their aim is to 
rationalise the CAP. At the same time no coherent strategy for the 
future has been established. The view of the Commission is that the 
production of surpluses must be contained at all costs since their 
disposal jeopardises the guarantees which the Common Agricultural 
Policy can and must provide for other more marketable products. This is 
a quite inadequate basis for the future strategy for the development of 
the CAP. 
Rationalising the CAP must involve a basic set of new objectives 
that are more than just a set of pious aspirations. The operation of 
the first decade of the CAP involved a substantial measure of 
integration of the agricultural sector within the rest of the economy 
of the member States and an increasing food output, which was widely 
regarded as a -welcome phenomena in an uncertain world. From 1973 
onwards, a greater elflphasis ';Jas given to the income situation of 
farmers and the need to achieve a greater measure of parity bev;Jeen 
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farmers' incomes and those in other occupations. 
The Community now needs to develop a set of positive and realistic 
guidelines for the future of its CAP - to provide European agriculture 
with new horizons, going beyond long overdue reform. This is likely to 
take some time to evolve. The pressures of modern technology have 
entirely overshadowed the improvements that are being achieved by 
structural change. The development of a "dynamic export policy" has 
come up hard against the realities of the current world market 
situation for farm products. The growing problems in other sectors of 
the economy particularly unemployment, and the consequential growth in 
problems of urban societies, has lessened the degree of concern for the 
plight of the farmer, even for that of the fanners on small non-viable 
holdings. While the need for reform of the CAP has been brought to a 
head by the budgetary situation, a solution to that situation would not 
of itself solve the underlying problems. The 1980s are a totally 
different world for agricultural policy than that of the 60s and the 
70s. Unfortunately the most likely prospect is that the present 
restrictive price policy, the further development of more stringent 
production controls and the general tightening of the detailed 
administration of the CAP will be continued for some years to come. 
Whether, on the face of these essentially negative policies, a more 
constructive policy can be found is yet to be seen. There are no 
immediate prospects of such a solution in sight at the present time. 
CHAPTER 13 
NEW ZEALAND'S AGRICULTURE AND THE CAP 
l3.1 Role of Agriculture in the New Zealand Economy 
Among the advanced economies of the world, New Zealand is unique 
in its high degree of dependence for its export earnings on a small 
number of agricultural products - in particular products from the ewe 
and the cow. In a world of surplus agricultural products on commercial 
markets and in the face of large export subsidies on supplies from less 
efficient agricultures, New Zealand's economic situation in recent 
years has been one of increasing difficulty. The entry of the U.K. to 
the European Community in 1973 coincided with a fall in real incomes 
per head 1n New Zealand of 11.5 per cent over the period 1973-77 (this 
was the biggest drop in any DECD country). GDP growth since the mid 
seventies has averaged no more than 1 per cent annually. The 
reorientation of export markets for the traditional meat and dairy 
products has met with great difficulties, created in considerable 
measure by the trading policies of other advanced economies, notably 
the European Community. 
While it has been said that the agricultural sector plays only a 
minor and fluctuating role in New Zealand's GDP, looked at in a wider 
context the agricultural sector has shown a remarkable capacity to 
maintain its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product over the past 
decade. This is in contrast to the agricultural sectors of most other 
developed economies, which have contributed a smaller and smaller 
proportion to GDP over these years. This decline can be seen for 
example in the case of the European Community where the percentage 
contribution of agriculture to the Community's GDP has fallen by one 
third since 1973; in the case of member States dependent on 
agriculture, such as France and Ireland, the decline has been even 
greater. The New Zealand situation moreover has undoubtedly been 
influenced by the problems in 1974/75, a very poor year for agriculture 
due to the collapse tn commodity prices and by the rapid growth in 
total real GDP in the three preceding years. 
l3.2 Resources Used in Agriculture and Their Earnings 
The contribution of agriculture to GDP in any economy is largely 
determined by four factors - the volume and price of farm Olltput and 
the volume and price of the 'non-factor' inputs used in the production 
of that output. During the years 1973/4 to 1982/3, gross agricultural 
output in New Zealand has grown in nominal terms by over 153 per cent; 
the increase in the prices paid to farmers was over 166 per cent; this 
would imply a decline in the volume of output by just over 9 per cent. 
At the same time, however. the volume of inputs, ~vhich grew by 195 per 
cent in nominal terms, was subject to even sharper increases in price 
of over 248 per cent so that the volume of inputs declined by 15 per 
cent - a faster rate than that of output. These changes in the volume 
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of output and inputs imply a growth in the agricultural gross product 
in real terms, in spite of some fall in the gross product of the 
agricultural sector as a proportion of total GDP (this decline in the 
contribution could arise from the changes in the terms of trade in the 
agricultural sector which has taken place, even if the gross product of 
agriculture itself rose in real terms). It would appear that farmers 
have made strong efforts to sustain their incomes by reducing the 
volume of purchased inputs, and while there has been some decline in 
the volume of output, the improvement in the efficiency (in terms of 
purchased inputs per unit of output) has to some extent mitigated the 
effects of the adverse movement in the terms of trade of agriculture. 
which declined by over 30 per cent over these years. 
Agriculture provides employment for 9.7 per cent of the total New 
Zealand work force (1981 Census), compared with some 7.6 per cent in 
the European Community. The relationship between the proportion of 
population employed in agriculture and its contribution to GDP at 9.7 
per cent and 8.8 per cent respectively in New Zealand is much better 
than the situation in the EC, where the figures in 1981 were some 7.6 
per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively. This is due in considerable 
measure to the far more favourable ratio of land to labour in New 
Zealand and the consequential higher level of labour productivity than 
in the European Community. 
This much better land/labour ratio in New Zealand than in the EC 
can be seen in the average size of farm 293 ha and 18 11a 
respectively. Hhile the figure for New Zealand includes a higher 
proportion of hill and other disadvantaged land, the difference in 
average farm size, even allowing for this factor, is still very large 
indeed. The total area under agriculture and the number of holdings in 
New Zealand has been growing slowly over recent years, while the trend 
in the agricultural area, and more so in the number of farms, has been 
downwards in the Community. This better resource combination and the 
consequential higher labour productivity in New Zealand has led to 
higher incomes per farm than in the EC. 
13.3 Farm Incomes in New Zealand and the European Community 
Hhile it is a dangerous exercise to make direct comparisons of 
farm incomes between countries, the available data shows that average 
net farm incomes for dairying in the European Community were around 
11 .000 NZ$ in 1982 compared with 20,000 NZ$ in New Zealand, while 
average net farm incomes from cattle and sheep farming in the EC were 
9,300 NZ$, compared with 22,000 NZ$ from sheep farming in New Zealand. 
Mixed cropping farms in the EC had farm incomes of less than 6,000 NZ$ 
compared with 13,750 NZ$ from equivalent New Zealand farms. The EC 
figures probably contain a much greater degree of variation within 
these averages - for there are considerable differences between the 
averages for individllal member States. There is, therefore, likely to 
be a proportion of EC farmers with incomes around the New Zealand 
level. At the same time there is, by definition, a large number of 
European fanners with incomes much below the equivalent New Zealand 
incomes and it is the problems of these farmers which have loomed large 
in the agricultural policy decisions of the EC. 
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The decline in real incomes of New Zealand farmers since 1977/8 
has involved a period of some stability, apart from the very good 
out-turn in 1979/80. The most recent published data for farm incomes 
as a whole, in terms of changes in the Agricultural Operating Surplus, 
do not give an adequate indication of the changes in net farm income, 
as the Operating Surplus does not take account of the level of interest 
charges paid by farmers or of the fluctuating price supports paid to 
farmers by the producer boards. 
TABLE 2 
Farm Incomes in New Zealand 1977/78 to 1981/82 
======================================================================= 
1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
Agricultural operating 
surplus (m $) 866 965 1,534 1,444 1,662 
G.D.P. Price Index (1977/ 
78 = 1,000) 1,000 1,131 1,332 1,528 1,755 
Ag. OPe Surplus in real 
terms (1977 /78 = 1,000) 1,000 985 1,330 1,091 1,093 
======================================================================= 
Source: Department of Statistics Honthly Abstract of Statistics 
February 1984 and Infonnation Service 29 Harch 1984. 
The very severe fall in incomes of sheep farmers over the period 
1980-84 has been the primary cause of the decline in farm incomes 
generally as dairy incomes have been less affected by the very 
difficult external trading situation which New Zealand farmers have 
faced in recent years. More recent data are available for sheep and 
beef farms and for factory sUDplydairy farms, which are set out in 
Table 3. 
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TABLE 3 
Incomes On Sheep and Beef Factory Supply Dairy 
Farms 1979-83 
=================================~===================================== 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Net Income per Sheep 
Farm ($ ) 19,494 24,772 21,698 21,401 23,500 19,800 
Index in real terms 
(1975/6 1,000) 982 1,066 806 686 666 534 
Net Income per Dairy 
Farm ($ ) 13,341 13,742 14,188 18,190 20,900 18,900 
Index in real tenns 
(1975/6 = 1,000) 943 839 797 826 823 711 
===================================~3=================================== 
Source: M.A.F., New Zealand Agricultural Statistics 1983 and 1984 
In these circumstances, the reversal of growth in farm investment 
in real terms over recent years is readily understandable. Total 
capital expenditure fell in nominal terms by some 9.4 per cent (and by 
over 17 per cent in real terms) in 1982/83 over the previous year. This 
decline, which has come after a period of steady growth, has affected 
all the main categories of investment, and is likely to affect the 
capacity of New Zealand to maintain its production levels, particularly 
as the decline is expected to continue into 1983/84. 
13.4 Agricultural Trade Situation 
The entry of the UK into the EC has been generally regarded as the 
cause of the severe international trade problems that New Zealand 
agriculture has faced during the past decade and the principal cause of 
New Zealand's external terms of trade being 25 per cent lower in the 
years since 1975 than they were in the previous decade. In these 
circumstances, it is remarkable that the proportion of total 
agricultural output which is exported has not only remained high, but 
has apparently been increasing in recent years. The value of total 
receipts from the export of agricultural products as a proportion of 
agricultural output has been well over 90 per cent for the years 
1981-83, compared with 81 per cent in 1980. This comparison is not 
entirely a valid one because the values of exports are at f.o.b. prices 
and those of output are at farm gate prices, but the relationship 
between the two sets of values is nevertheless unusual. The 
contribution of agricultural exports to total exports has been slowly 
declining, from just over 71 per cent in 1980 to 69.3 per cent in 1983, 
while the ability to provide export earnings from 
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alternative sources has grown correspondingly slowly. It is 
interesting to compare this export performance of around 70 per cent 
from the agriculture sector with that of the EC, where agricultural 
exports provide less than 10 per cent of the total export earnings of 
the Community as a whole (Le. excluding the intra Community trade). 
This EC figure has also been declining slowly, in spite of the 
substantial export support payments from the Community budget. 
New Zealand exports of meat, wool and dairy products to the EC 
provide a quarter of total export earnings. Exports of dairy products 
have, however, been seriolJsly affected by the operation of the CAP. In 
the case of sheepmeat the voluntary restraint agreement, with its 
guarantee of access for 234,000 tonnes per annum, has been regarded by 
the EC authorities as having "effectively settled" the preoccupation of 
New Zealand with this issue. Ivhether this will in fact be the case 
seems extremely doubtful, in view of the Commission's new proposals to 
review the operation of these arrangements with third countries as part 
of the current reform of the CAP. As set out earlier, the effect of 
the common organisation of the sheepmeat market under the CAP has been 
to give substantial incentives to expansion of production in the 
Community, particularly in the U.K. and Ireland. This had had the 
effect of increasing pressure of supplies in the U.K. market, with a 
consequential sharp rise in support expenditure from the Community 
budget. Whether this grolflth of output tends to displace New Zealand 
sales on the UK market directly, or has the effect of competing on 
world markets for sheepmeat, is of lesser significance than the more 
immediate point that the effects of the common organisation of the 
market for sheepmeat in the EC has a real impact on the incomes of New 
Zealand sheep farmers. 
13.5 Trade Situation for Sheepmeat and Dairy Products 
Sheep production is one of the few areas in the agricultural 
sector of the Community where the present relatively low degree of 
self-sufficiency provides an opportunity for expansion in Community 
output. This expansion is now being generated not only by the direct 
effect of various very large support payments in recent years to sheep 
producers in the Community but also by the policies towards other farm 
enterprises, where pressure is directed towards reducing output and 
therefore to shifting resources to alternative activities as a means of 
maintaining farm incomes. 
The farm sector where this policy of output limitation and even 
reduction is most important is dairying. The growth of dairy output 
and the ineffectiveness of "producer coresponsibility" policies as a 
means of bringing a reasonable balance between supply and cOlmnercial 
demand has led to direct action in order to limit future dairy output. 
Consideration by the EC authorities of access to the Community 
market for dairy products, notably butter, frolG New Zealand has meant 
that the Commission has "had to take into account both the Community's 
surpluses in this sector and also Nevi Zealand's dependence on adequate 
outlets for its butter" i.n the belief that "to close the community's 
frontiers to I~w Zealand dairy imports could not solve the problem of 
the Ten's dairy surpluses", and "aware of New Zealand's dependence on 
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outlets for its butter on the Community Market, the European Commission 
has regularly sought a more lasting and balanced solution taking into 
account the preoccupations of Community producers and consumers alike". 
However, the "balanced solution" sought by the Commission is subject to 
the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers of Agriculture, where 
incomes for their own producers are at the forefront of their 
preoccupations and concern for New Zealand producers is inevitably 
relegated to a less irnnediate position. 
Prior to entry of the U.K. to the EC in 1973, imports of butter 
from New Zealand were some 170,000 tonnes, together with 70,000 tonnes 
of cheese and smaller amounts of milk powders and casein. The Treaty 
of Accession of UK to the Community provided for continued access for 
butter from New Zealand, on a declining scale to 1977, and thereafter 
subject to an arrangement by the Council of Ministers, and for access 
on a decreasing scale for cheese. Subsequently, in 1975, the 
Community's Heads of Government declared that the Community after 1977 
"should not deprive New Zealand of outlets which are essential for it". 
The problems on the U.K. butter market have arisen from two major 
sources - the extraordinary growth of butter production in the U.K. 
itself and the sharp fall in consumption in that country. UK output 
has grown from a level of between 50,000 and 100,000 tonnes in the 
years 1973-76 to 250,000 tonnes by 1983. At the same time the level of 
U.K. consumption has declined from between 450,000 and 500,000 tonnes 
in 1973-76 to less than 300,000 tonnes in 1983. Thus while the UK was 
producing only 10 per cent to 20 per cent of its requirements of butter 
in the early to mid '70s, by 1983 it was producing equivalent to 85 per 
cent. Both the growth in output and the fall in consumption of butter 
in the UK would have occurred if the UK had remained outside the EC, 
but membership of the Community almost certainly exacerbated this 
underlying trend. 
The UK butter imports in the 1973-76 period involved purchases of 
butter from other Community countries of between 200,000 and 350,000 
tonnes. This has now fallen to 85,000 tonnes. Thus the changes on the 
U.K. butter market have been most evident in the fall in supplies from 
other member States; this has been even more evident than the 
consequences for New Zealand. Of course, the other member States have 
had the benefit of intervention aids from the EC budget (to which they 
all contribute) to support their surpluses of dairy products and are 
thus under less direct pressure than is the New Zealand economy, 
whereas the problems on the U.K. market for dairy products translate 
into immediate problems for the New Zealand dairy farmer and the 
national exchequer. 
13.6 Effects of the CAP on New Zealand's Agriculture 
It is evident that the operation of the Common Agricultural Policy 
on the economy of New Zealand, and in particular in the agricultural 
sector are extremely serious. The CAP is not however, of itself, 
entirely responsible for the decline in the sales of New Zealand dairy 
products on the U.K. market. For any realistic estimate of the effects 
of the CAP itself, it would be necessary to estimate the likely trend 
in U.K. purchases of New Zealand butter and other dairy products in 
the absence of EC membership. This would involve the likely evolution 
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of UK agricultural policy, particularly in relation to the level of UK 
production of dairy products, the pricing policy on the UK market and 
the operation of any system of restricted access to the UK market. 
Since the analysis of the alternative possible developments on the UK 
market over the past decade would be of a largely academic nature, it 
is not proposed to explore this in any detail. Suffice to say that, 
while it is quite evident that the policies followed by the EC have 
contributed to the economic difficulties of New Zealand's dairy sector, 
these problems cannot be entirely laid at the door of that policy. A 
continuation of the policies being followed by the UK Government prior 
to 1973 would have led to a considerable reduction in access for New 
Zealand dairy exports to the UK markets and to some of the problems now 
being experienced by New Zealand dairy farmers. 
In the case of the sheepmeat market, similar underlying factors 
are also relevant, though these would not have had the same impact as 
those in the dairy sector. The trend in consumption of lamb might well 
have been lower in the absence of the effects of the CAP in raising the 
price of beef on the lJ:,z market. At the same time the growth in 
continental European markets for sheepmeat supplies, from both the UK 
and Ireland, has had some effect in reducing supplies from producers in 
these countries on the UK market itself. Furthermore, the benefits of 
the variable levy on returns to UK producers has enabled the government 
to regard the 10-'" prices of lamb on the UK market with considerable 
equanimity. If the effects of these low prices had impacted directly 
on the incomes of their sheep producers, the UK government would have 
been obliged to take some more direct support measures. It is likely 
that, in the face of greater supplies of sheepmeat on the UK market, 
the government would have instituted arrangements that would have 
limited access to the UK market; these might well have been at least as 
restrictive as the current voluntary restraint agreements of third 
countries with the European Community. 
The effect of the current EC sheepmeat policy in generating a 
substantial increast=! in supplies is minimised, so far as New Zealand is 
concerned, by the undertaking in GATT from the Community not to impose 
import restrictions greater than a 20 per cent tariff and to provide an 
acceptable level of compensation to external suppliers in the event of 
any more restrictive reginle being implemented. This limitation in the 
sheepmeat sector has led to the view, particularly from the French 
Government, that the question of access for New Zealand's butter should 
be linked to agreement on a more restrictive policy in regard to 
sheepmeat. 
13.7 Current EC Proposals for the CAP and Ne,,, Zealand Agriculture 
The CAP now faces a period when the major forms of support (first 
through increasing domestic prices behind a tariff wall and then 
through increasing budget expenditure on export surpluses in order to 
support farm incomes as the Community reached self sufficiency in most 
agricultural products) have become less and less effective. 
Faced with the immediate problem of the budget, the basic need of 
the Community is to save expenditure wherever this can be done. The 
impact of this on the incomes of European farmers is immediate and is 
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glvlng rise to a strong reaction by those producers most affected. One 
of these reactions is a demand for more stringent barriers to the entry 
of farm products from outside the Community. The countries which are 
affected by the CAP import regime can be categorised into four separate 
groups: 
(1) third world countries, particularly those which have some degree 
of commitment from the European Community directly under the Lome 
agreement, and more generally from the recognition in Europe of 
the need to provide the opportunities for trade with these 
countries as a means of helping their economic development. 
(2) the U.S., which is a major supplier to the Community and which has 
the economic and political strength to negotiate a solution to its 
agricultural trade problems. 
(3) countries, particularly those neighbouring the Community in 
Europe, with whom the member states are most anxious to preserve 
good relations, primarily for political reasons. 
(4) the remaining countries, including New Zealand, Canada, Australia, 
which have well developed economies and for which there is only 
limited political will in the EC to resolve the trading problems 
which have arisen. 
There is no doubt that a measure of general goodwill towards these 
latter countries, and particularly to a small one like New Zealand, 
exists within the Community. How much this goodwill is worth in the 
face of the economic and political problems now facing EC Ministers for 
Agriculture is problematical. Moreover the claims of the first three 
groups set out above are likely to be given greater priority than those 
in the fourth group; it may well be that much of the scope for trade 
negotiation would be largely used up by the Community in meeting the 
needs of these countries. This is especially the case of the US whose 
strength in negotiations gives it considerable opportunities to 
overcome the protectionist measures of the CAP. 
Furthermore, negotiations with New Zealand on access to the EC 
market for meat and dairy products would only cover part of the 
conflict arising from the operation of the CAP. The effects on New 
Zealand producers of the expansion of European farm exports to non-EC 
markets are equally serious. While these have been recognised in the 
efforts made by the Community and New Zealand to work together to 
stabilise the international dairy trade, these efforts are subject in 
the last resort on the EC side to those political considerations which 
influence decisions in the Council of Ministers. The political 
considerations take greater precedence at times when other pressures on 
the CAP mean that European farmers face severe reductions in their 
incomes in real terms. 
In the light of the present situation of European agriculture, it 
is of great importance to the interests of New Zealand that reasonable 
agreement on trade with the rest of the world should be achieved. In 
the case of dairy products and sheepmeat the amount of total world 
production entering international trade is relatively small, and a 
diversion of a small part of EC output of these products on to the 
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limited world market can and does have the most serious consequences. 
One of the most fundamental questions in the current situation is 
whether the fall in real prices of farm products (i.e. in the terms of 
trade of agriculture) will result in a limitation of the upward trend 
in total agr.icultural output in the Community. The substantial fall in 
farm prices in real terms over recent years and the even larger fall in 
1984, still leaves little prospects of any significant reversal in the 
years immediately following. Over the past two decades it is evident 
that the fall of around 4 per cent in the prices paid to farmers in 
real terms has not led to any reduction in outPut, as farm output has 
continued to grow in the face of these price developments. It is 
possible however that a much sharper rate of fall in real prices could 
generate a more conventional supply response, leading to an actual fall 
in the volume of output, particularly if the price policy was 
reinforced by more direct policies affecting the level of output of 
some of the major farm products (and particularly milk output). 
Such policies will be bound to have a very severe effect on farm 
incomes and, coming after the decline of 7 per cent in 1983, a further 
decline of this magnitude would create a major crisis in the Community. 
In the face of such a crisis, it is unlikely that the obligations to a 
small geographically isolated country, 18,000 miles from Europe on the 
other side of the world, would be to the forefront of the issues on 
which decisions would be taken. Given that the Commission has warned 
the Council of Ministers that the problems of the CAP are putting the 
whole of the Community in peril, the complexity and politically 
divisive nature of the solutions put forward by the Commission have 
created a very real crisis in Europe, a crisis that is much more than 
just a budgetary one. 
The three major elements in future Community agricultural policy 
are: 
(a) the adoption of more extensive and more stringent production 
constraints, 
(b) the continuation and possible strengthening of the prudent price 
policy and 
(c) the development of more extensive measures on farm structures. 
These policies will not solve the present problem of the CAP, 
though they are likely to stop the situation deteriorating further and 
may bring some measure of relief. The extension of production controls 
will contain the supply of the major farm products but as in some 
cases, particularly milk, the current supply is substantially greater 
than the level of disposal on internal and external markets, this 
constraint may do little towards re-establishing a reasonable balance 
on the world market for these products. Nothing in the proposal from 
the Commission, or even less so from the decisions of the Council of 
Ministers, would indicate direct supply management of such rigour that 
the present structural surpluses will be entirely eliminated. It would 
therefore be unrealistic for the New Zealand dairy industry to see any 
prospects for substantial improvement in its external markets arising 
from the EC policies in the dairy sector. 
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The continuation of the prudent price policy, both as a means of 
limiting the costs to the Community budget and as a route to better 
supply balance, could be a more effective means of achieving an 
improvement in the world market situation for the products involved. 
This is likely to be more the case in the cereals and beef sectors, 
where the Commission policy of achieving a more competitive European 
agriculture would seem to have a greater chance of success, than in 
some of the other major agricultural sectors. The rapid growth of 
expenditure on sheepmeat over recent years could lead to a more 
stringent price policy now that the final step in the alignment of 
prices in the sheepmeat regime has been undertaken. However, the 
attractiveness of present prices in the lower production cost member 
states of the Community, particularly the UK and Ireland, should not be 
underestimated. If production cost increases are effectively contained 
by successful policies against inflation, then the lack of any 
significant price increases may not be a major constraint to further 
expansion in production. This is not therefore a development that is 
likely to improve significantly the trade position of New Zealand's 
agriculture, as the UI( lnarket may see greater Community supplies, or 
alternatively, EC exports to non-member countries may expand 
appreciably. 
The third strand of CAP policy in the immediate future is the 
reform of farm structures. This includes various forms of direct 
income supplements (for example those currently paid to farmers in the 
Inountain and less favoured areas under Directive 75/268), but these 
supplements account for only a very small proportion of the total 
expenditure on the CAP. Even if the Cooonission's proposals on 
structures are implemented in full, and the consequential additional 
budgetary requirements are met from whatever sources may be available, 
it is doubtful if this is a route to a more market oriented 
agricultural policy for the COlffillunity. In so far as a policy in farm 
structures involves upgrading small non-viable farm businesses into 
economically viahle operations, this is likely to result in a larger 
volume of output from the farms concerned and consequently a greater 
demand on Community funds for farm price supports. It would be 
entirely unrealistic to envisage any such development leading to a 
diminution in the demands for higher farm prices, demands which have 
been and still are led by farm organisations in the Community 
representing larger farmers just as strongly as smaller ones. 
Furthermore the present unemployment problems in Europe effectively 
rule out policies to reduce the numbers of people on the land as a 
route to raising per capita incomes of those remaining. Certainly an 
effective farm structures policy can improve the economic and social 
circumstances of farmers in the poorer regions of Europe, but this is 
unlikely to reduce any of the pressures for greater protection against 
imports from third countries or mitigate the demands for higher prices 
to support larger Conoounity farm production. 
There is therefore no apparent reason for forecasting any 
amelioration of New Zealand's difficulties in the trade in agricultural 
products with the European Community arlslng from the current 
developments in the CAP. Whether the internal difficulties of that 
policy will eventually lead to a total change in its direction and what 
effect that might have in New Zealand is impossible to foresee. The 
economic and political forces holding the Community together are very 
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strong and the CAP is an essential part of the present basis of the 
Community. The current budgetary problems could well lead to an 
increasing demand for protection ("Community preference") as a means of 
improving the incomes of European farmers; the external trading 
policies of the EC may become even more responsive to the demands of 
the large trading powers, particularly the US with the commitment to 
the less developed countries taking much of whatever scope is left for 
negotiations on trade in farm products. In these circumstances New 
Zealand will have to fight to hold on to as much of its export trade as 
it can, against a much larger Economic Community facing political 
economic and social problems proportionally every bit as large as those 
in New Zealand itself. 
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